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Abstract 
This study explores the views of the peak level industrial and labour organisations 
towards government social policy after the publication of the Beveridge Report in 
1942. The reform of state welfare in the 1940s meant that employers and trade unions 
became more involved in the administration than in the provision of social services. 
The process entailed a greater role for the Trades Union Congress, the British 
Employers' Confederation and the Federation of British Industries in the formulation 
of state social policy. This is a hitherto neglected aspect of their relations with 
government. Labour and business historians have paid little attention to trade union 
and industrial views on social policy after the second world war while historians of 
the welfare state have neglected the participation of these particular interest groups in 
the formation of welfare policy. 
This thesis explores the attitudes of these groups towards the post-1945 welfare 
state from 1942 until 1964. It does so in the context of two widely-discussed 
approaches to government policy making that hold the potential to explain the 
influences behind policy after the war: namely corporatism and consensus. 
These concepts are herein applied to a range of areas of welfare - social security, 
pensions, the National Health Service and state education - in which the TUC, BEC 
and FBI demonstrated a level of interest. While being of some relevance in relation to 
particular areas of policy and and specific points in time, these approaches have a 
limited ftinction in explaining government consultation of primarily industrial 
interests on social policy matters. Corporate bias may help to explain why 
consultation took place but offers little understanding in those instances where it did 
not. A search for a wider welfare consensus reaching outside the political party arena 
is similarly flawed as the theory seeks to generalise and impose uniform patterns of 
policy-making where none existed. If the consenualists continue to adhere to the 
notion that the involvement of economic interests in policy making was a product of 
consensus politics, it must now seek to examine the impact of these interests on the 
policy-making process. In the same vein, corporate theorists might look to other 
policy areas outwith the industrial and economic sphere in order to explore the wider 
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Chqpter One: Introduction 
This is a study of the social policies of the peak level representative groups of the 
trade union movement and organised industry in Britain between 1942 and 1964 and 
their relationship with government in this sphere of policy-making. The Trades 
Union Congress (TUC), founded in 1868, was the'central organisation for trade 
unions, while industrial representation was divided fourfold. The Federation of 
British Industries (FBI), established in 1916, was, according to Stephen Blank, the 
foremost industrial body. ' Its capacity to represent industry, however, was shared 
with the National Union of Manufacturers (NUM), the National Confederation of 
Employers' Organisations (NCEO) which was set up by the employers' federations in 
1919, and later changed its name to the British Employers' Confederation (BEC) in 
1939, and the Association of British Chambers of Commerce (ABCC) which was, in 
fact, the first of these organisations, having been formed in 1860. In terms of activity 
in the social policy arena, the BEC was most important, having responsibility for 
monitoring provision in social security, pensions and certain aspects of education, and 
the FBI was also interested in education policy. Otherwise, there is no indication that 
the NUM paid any attention to social policy, while the Chambers of Commerce's 
involvement was iffegular. 
Co-operation between government, industry and the trade union movement, 
together with the impetus offered to social policy, are widely regarded as important 
features of the years 1939-1945. ' The connection between the two has received little 
1S Blank, Industry andgovernment, p. 6. 
2K Middlemas, Power, competition and the state, vol. 1, ch. 1; K Morgan, The people's peace, p. 13; D 
Dutton, British politics since 1945 (1997), p. 16; GC Peden, British economic and socialpolicy 
(199 1), p. 119; S Blank, Industiy and government, p. 32 have highlighted improvements in relations. R 
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detailed attention even though substantial welfare reform looked likely to impinge 
upon the objectives of occupational and trade union welfare schemes: labour 
discipline and the retention of workers/members. During the war trade union 
membership grew substantially as did government recognition of the labour 
movement. 3 Ernest Bevin, the General Secretary of the Transport and General 
Workers Union was appointed Minster of Labour when Churchill invited the Labour 
Party to fonn a Coalition government, and the Trades Union Congress was consulted 
on a par with the Federation of British Industries and the British Employers' 
Confederation after 1941. In 1945, collaboration with, and consultation of, these 
interest groups was viewed positively, and certain govermnent policies, such as the 
employment policy outlined in the 1944 White Paper, presumed that co-operation 
would continue in order to ensure their effectiveness. 4 
A substantial number of monographs have examined the evolution of both state- 
interest group relations and the postwar welfare state, but there are no detailed studies 
of the relationship between these two phenomena. ' As Noel Whiteside notes, '[s]ocial 
Titmuss, Problems ofsocial policy, D Fraser, The evolution ofthe British weý(are state (1984), p. 207; 
P Addison, The road to 1945 (1998), p. 121 identify the stimulating effects of war on social policy. 
3S Beer, Modern British politics, p. 214; L Minkin, The contentious alliance, p. 54; H Pelling, The 
history ofBritish trade unionism (1985), p. 211; Membership reached 8.8m in 1945, and increased 
further to 9.53m in 195 1. Figures from H Clegg, A history ofBritish trade unions since 1889, vol. 111, 
r. 293. 
L Minkin, 'Radicalism and reconstruction', p. 179; W Paynter, British trade unions, p. 84; H Pefling, 
The history ofBritish trade unionism (1985), p. 211; M Sullivan, The politics ofsocialpolicy, p. 8; K0 
Morgan, The people's peace, pp. 114; S Beer, British politics in the collectivist age (1965), pp. 189- 
200. 
' There are several comprehensive studies of the postwar welfare state including R Lowe, The welfare 
state in Britain since 1945; H Glennerster, British socialpolicy since 1945; M Sullivan, The 
development ofthe British we4(are state; M Hill, The welfare state in Britain, J Brown, The British 
wel(are state; P Gregg, The welfare state; N Timmins, Thefive giants. State relations with industry and 
trade unions are explored in the following: P Barberis &T May, Government, industry andpolitical 
economy, D Barnes &E Reid, Governments and trade unions; S Beer, Modern British politics; S 
Blank Industry andgovernment, N Harris, Competition and the corporate society K Middlemas, 
Politics in industrial society and Power, competition and the state: vol. I; B Pimlott &C Cook, eds., 
Trade unions in British politics; R Taylor, The trade union question in British politics. 
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policy and'industrial relations are rarely studied together'. 6 This link has been 
established in fact in the concept of the 'postwar settlement', though only implicitly. 7 
In this reading of postwar British history, it is generally believed that both Labour and 
Conservative governments accepted responsibility for maintaining high levels of 
employment and a range of welfare services in return for wage restraint. 8 Thus, 
Bryan Turner argues that welfare refonn was 'a consequence of bargains developed 
between labour and capital under the auspices of extended state intervention in 
wartime conditions'. 9 For Lewis Minkin, in his study of the Labour Party and the 
unions, '[tlhe unions' ... imprint lay on many key features of the post-war settlement. 
It was there in the initiative which led to the Beveridge enquiry and there also in 
Bevin's push for the preservation of full employment. "O ý 
What is lacking in these accounts is a detailed exposition of employers' and trade 
unions' contribution to social policy formulation. There is a tendency to allocate 
passive roles to both the trade union movement and capital in the making of the 
welfare state after 1945; it is presumed that the mere strength and size of the TUC, or 
its bargaining power in wages policy, influenced the direction of social policy. It is 
argued here that without greater knowledge of the TUC's objectives in relation to 
welfare, and the role of its industrial counterparts, it is not possible to judge the 
significance of the 'postwar settlement' from the perspective of these participants. 
6N Whiteside, 'The politics of the "social" and the "industrial" wage', p. 122. 
7P Dorey, The Conservative Party and the trade unions, p. 40; J Cronin, The politics ofstate 
expansion, p. 15; R Taylor, 'Industrial relations', p. 94. 
8G Dorfman, Wage politics in Britain, p. 5 1; H Glennerster, British socialpolicy, p. 11. 
9B Turner, Citizenship and capitalism, p. 69, cited by R Taylor, 'Industrial relations', p. 94. 
10 L Minkin, The contentious alliance, p. 77. 
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The TUC's activities, and those of employers in the area of social welfare, have 
attracted quite a lot of attention with respect to the period before 1939.11 As general 
unions became more dominant in the TUC, growing support superseded the trade 
union movement's initial ambivalence towards state social security schemes. 12 At 
first, a compulsory scheme of contributory social security was unpopular because it 
required the unionised and better-paid workers to subsidise those in less secure 
employment. 13 In addition, unions were concerned that state provision would 
undermine their relationship with their members, and did not welcome state 
intervention in the functioning of the labour market. 14 Yet in 1925 the trade unions 
did not resist the extension of the insurance principle to pensions in the 1925 Old Age 
and Widows and Orphans Contributory Pensions Act: '[tlhey had effectively accepted 
that the provision of a minimum income in old age was the business of the state. ' 15 
Moreover, contributory insurance schemes also offered 'benefit as of right' with 
which governments could not tamper. 16 Cronin suggests that the change in attitude 
also stemmed from the effects of high unemployment and the emergence of long-term 
unemployment on the unions' capacity to provide for their members in these 
circumstmces. 
17 
11 R Fitzgerald, British labour management and industrial wetrare; R Hay, 'Employers and social 
policy'; JR Hay, 'The British business community'; H Jones, 'Employers' welfare schemes'; J 
Melling, 'Welfare capitalism' and 'Industrial capitalism'; T Rodgers, 'Employers' organisations, 
unemployment and social politics'. 
12 J Cronin, Politics ofstate expansion, pp. 5-6; P Thane, 'The working class and "state" welfare in 
Britain', pp. 883-84. 
13 J Cronin, Politics ofstate expansion, p. 39; H Heclo, Modern socialpolitics, pp. 84-87; N Whiteside, 
'Welfare legislation and the unions during the first world war', p. 867. 
14 j Cronin, Politics ofstate expansion, pp. 5-6; N Whiteside, 'Welfare legislation and the unions 
during the first world war', p. 858. 
15 L Hannah, Inventing retirement, p. 3 1. 
16 AM Rees, TH Marshall's social policy, p. 120. 
17 j Cronin, Politics ofstate expansion, p. 113. 
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As state intervention in the form of 'Social policy expanded, unions' attitudes 
became more conciliatory and, consequently, more opposed to those of employers. 
Research on employers' attitudes has generally found them to be informed by 
perceived implications of state welfare for company welfare schemes, its cost, and 
views on the appropriate role of the state. 18 Employers used occupational welfare for 
the purpose of maintaining good industrial relations and discipline in the workplace. 19 
Accordingly, Melling believes that they became increasingly resistant to state reforms 
in the twentieth century, although others stress some variation in attitudes. 20 Turner 
has found that before world war one, 'some businessmen supported state welfare 
schemes to stave off social unrest; others promoted their own private welfare schemes 
as part of an industrial relations strategy directed against trade unions; others rejected 
any form of welfare activity, public or private'. 21 
After the first world war, and the establishment of centralised business 
organisations, the Federation of British Industries and the National Confederation of 
Employers' Organisations, differences of opinion were apparent at this peak level. " 
The FBI favoured the provision of a range of benefits that should be organised by 
employers and workers. This approach was adopted -by successful companies who 
could afford to make such provision and did so partly to undermine trade unions and 
to maintain stability in their labour force. By contrast, the Engineering Employers' 
18 R Fitzgerald, British tabour management and industrial wetQre, p. 225; H Jones, 'Employers' 
welfare schemes', pp. 63-4; J Melling, 'Welfare capitalism', p. 4. 
19 R Fitzgerald, British tabour management and industrial wetfare, p. 212; H Jones, 'Employers' 
welfare schemes', pp. 63-4. 
20 R Fitzgerald, British tabour management and industrial wetrare, p. 225; JR Hay, '17he British 
business community', p. 124; J Melling, 'Welfare capitalism', p. 19; J Turner, 'The politics of 
business', p. 6. 
21 J Turner, 'The politics of business', p. 6. 
22 The establishment of these bodies is discussed in S Blank, Government and indust7y, AR Ilersic &P 
FB Liddle, Parliament ofcommerce, and J Turner, British politics and the great war. 
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Federation, a leading member of the NCEO, argued that the state should provide 
welfare at a basic level. The NCEO itself was opposed to an expansion of industrial 
schemes owing to their cost. 23 State provision was not necessarily their preferred 
option: Rodgers refers to a deputation to the government which 'made a series of 
sweeping attacks on the administration of the social services and demanded that a 
strict limit be imposed upon social expenditure'. 24 Fitzgerald also highlights 
industry's dissatisfaction with state welfare systems during the interwar period: they 
offered patchy coverage and offered little assistance to industrial relations. 25 
Complaints were also made about the increase of government intervention and the 
impact of unemployment and health insurance on taxation. 26 
In contrast to the reasonably substantial body of research on the prewar period, 
there has been no systematic study of either trade union or business attitudes towards 
the welfare state either during the war or after 1945. Their activities during the war 
have received most attention but existing interpretations of these are unsatisfactory in 
some respects. The TUC's self-professed role in the establishment of the Beveridge 
Committee in 1941 has been widely acknowledged. 27 Others have played down the 
TUC's interest in social reform before the war. 28 For instance, Wooldridge believes 
that unions' 'preoccupation with industrial conflicts distracted them from long-term 
consideration of reform of the state, and union barons spent more time squabbling 
23 J Turner, 'The politics of business', pp. 13-14. 
24 T Rodgers, 'Employers' organisations, unemployment and social politics' pp. 331-32. 
25 R Fitzgerald, British labour management and industrial weýrare, pp. 235-36. 
26 j Cronin, Politics ofstate expansion, p. 6; R Fitzgerald, British labour management and industrial 
weýrare, p. 212. 
27 P Barberis &T May, Government, industry andpolitical economy, p. 100; A Marwick, Britain in the 
century oftotal war, (1968), p. 289; T May, Trade unions andpressure grouppolitics, p. 14; L Minkin, 
The contentious alliance, p. 43. 
2" D Bames &E Reid, Governments and trade unions, p. 11; B Pirnlott &C Cook, Trade unions in 
British politics, p. 163. 
6 
among themselves than they did thinking about social benefits'. " His impression may 
reflect a focus on individual unions since the appropriate departments and committees 
in the TUC developed social policies, which is where lengthy consideration of social 
benefits may be found . 
30 Nevertheless, others have examined the work of the TUC 
itself and do still overlook its activities in this sphere. 31 Although labour historians 
have identified the expansion of the TUC's interests outwith the traditional confines 
of trade union legal issues and industrial relations over the course of the twentieth 
century to new areas such as social policy, they are usually mentioned briefly if at 
all . 
32 The' only detailed studies that exist for the postwar period deal solely with the 
subject of social security. Peter Baldwin's The politics of social solidarity looks at 
the TUC's attitudes towards development in social security in the 1940s and 1950s, 
and Hugh Heclo traces the development of pensions policy in the 1950s, an account is 
based on published sources only. 33 The findings of these studies will be discussed in 
the relevant chapters. 
Industrial responses to the welfare state have been similarly neglected; Melling and 
Hay's criticisms that this subject has been neglected for the first part of the twentieth 
century are yet more applicable to the years after 1945 and the modem welfare state. 34 
Only responses to the Beveridge Report have been briefly considered, and Sir 
Norman Kipping, a former director-general, describes FBI education policy in his 
29 A Wooldridge, 'In place of fear', p. 9 1. 
30 W Paynter, British trade unions, p. 140. 
31 For instance, J Lovell &BC Roberts, A short history ofthe T UC.; R Martin, TUC. the growth ofa 
ressure group. 
2VL Allen, Trade unions and the government, p. 12; H Clegg, A history ofBritish trade unions since 
1889, vol. III, preface; A Hutt, British trade unionism; K Laybourn, British trade unionism; R Martin, 
TVC. the growth ofa pressure group, p. 328; W Paynter, British trade unionism, p. 89. 
33 P Baldwin, The politics ofsocial solidarity and H Heclo, Modern socialpolitics. 
34 R Hay, 'Employers and social policy', p. 435; J Melling, 'Welfare capitalism', p. 453. 
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memoirs. 35 Whereas trade union history has tended to underestimate the contribution 
of organised labour towards social reconstruction, those examining the role of 
business organisations have tended to emphasise the most supportive and pro-reform 
views that can be detected. For instance, Pat Thane points to the activities of the FBI 
and the paternalistic proposals of a group of 120 industrialists who produced a 
pamphlet on social policy, A National Policyfor Industry, in 1942, shortly before the 
publication of the Beveridge Report. 36 Paul Addison is aware of the BEC's hostility 
towards social reforrn but considers the contribution of the same 120 industrialists to 
be of more significance. 37 In a similar vein, Keith Middlemas suggested that the 
BEC's dislike of the Beveridge Report had been modified under the influence of these 
industfialists. 38 
It is argued in this thesis that the tendency to highlight the activities of the 120 
industrialists and the FBI is misleading since the BEC's more negative outlook was of 
equal, if not greater, significance. As Middlemas later acknowledges in Power, 
Competition and the State, there is no evidence to suggest that the BEC relaxed its 
views on the prospect of social security reform at any time during the war; clearly 
divisions within industry on social reforms were sustained . 
39 For instance the 
National Policy for Industry group proposed a school leaving age of sixteen which 
both the BEC and the FBI continued to oppose in the 1950s and 1960s. 40 The BEC's 
hostile reaction to the Beveridge Report is important because the employers' 
confederation, not the FBI, was responsible for monitoring government policy in 
'5 N Kipping, Summing up. 
36 P Thane, Foundations ofthe wetfizre state, p. 233. 
37 P Addison, The road to 1945 (1994), p. 214. 
38 K Middlemas, Politics in industrial society, p. 287. 
39 K Middlemas, Power, competition and the state vol. I, p. 60. 
40 Ibid. 
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relation to social security and pensions. After the war, the interest of these 120 
industrialists in social policy had disappeared and the BEC was left to represent 
industry on most social issues. The FBI's involvement extended only to specific 
aspects of state education; therefore, it is to the British Employers' Confederation that 
we must look for much evidence of state-industry relations in the sphere of state 
welfare. 
The more positive impressions of industry's response - to wartime social 
reconstruction are -sustained in postwar studies. These tend to believe that capital 
accepted the expansion of state welfare after 1945. Rogow and Shore suggest this 
was the case although ftirther expansion would not have been tolerated . 
41 Andrew 
Cox claims that industry accepted social reconstruction on the basis that the state 
would not undertake economic reforms . 
42 - There is a lack of evidence to support such 
assertions; industry did not launch any campaign against social reform but, given the 
level of public support for social reform, this would have been politically disastrous. 
Hence, fin-ther research on the activities of the BEC and FBI in relation to welfare is 
required toýdepict more accurately the relationship between industrial interest groups 
and the postwar welfare state. 
As indicated earlier, this subject is neglected in studies that seek to explain 
developments in state-interest group relations in the postwar period. One major 
theoretical approach to understanding these developments is corporatism. Accepted 
definitions of corporatism are elusive and often vague but all seek to describe the 
41 A Cox, 'The failure of corporatist state forms', p. 206; AA Rogow &P Shore, The Labour 
overnment and British industry, p. 176. 
A Cox, 'The failure of corporatist state forms', p. 206. 
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process by which outside interests were integrated into the state for the purposes of 
formulating and implementing government policy. "' Both Wyn Grant and Andrew 
Cox have rejected the application of theories of corporatism to postwar Britain 
because the peak level interest groups of industry and labour rejected the prospect of 
integration into the state and were unable to guarantee the consent of their members. " 
A more enduring thesis has been that of 'corporate bias' presented by Keith 
Middlemas. He argues that the peak level representatives of capital and labour - the 
TUC, BEC and FBI - became increasingly involved in state policy-making to the 
extent that corporate bias became a distinguishing feature of the British state, 
particularly from the 1920s to the 1960s. In this process, these organisations were 
elevated to the status of 'governing institutions'. Middlemas has selected the term 
corporate bias to convey the involuntary nature of its development, and the fact that 
the system was unstable owing to these groups' lack of control over their members. "' 
With regard to the postwar period, Middlemas subscribes to the notion of a political 
contract whereby the state would guarantee high levels of employment in return for 
wage restraint, high productivity, high levels of investment and adequate levels of 
exports. "' Herein, the national interest superseded sectional interests as these groups 
participated in government policy-making to these ends. 
Corporate bias, like competing corporatist theories in their various guises, exhibits 
a tendency to either examine the role of producer groups in industrial and economic 
43 See W Grant, ed., The political economy ofcorporatism; A Cawson, ed., Organised interests and the 
state; A Cox and N O'Sullivan, eds., The corporate state; PC Schmitter &G Lembruch, Trends 
towards corporatist intermediation for various interpretations of corporatist theory. 
"W Grant, ed., The political economy of corporatism, p. 11; A Cox, 'The failure of corporatist state 
forms', pp. 203-04. 
45 K Middlemas, Politics in industrial society; Power, competition and the state: vols. I and 11. 
46 K Middlemas, 'Corporatism', pp. 8-9. 
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policy, or to assess developments in social Policy without considering the contribution 
of producer interests. 47 No accounts of corporatism in Britain have studied the 
relationship between the state and industrial interest groups in the context of the 
welfare state. Middlemas' argument is based upon economic and industrial policy, 
leaving us to presume that social policy was formulated in the same fashion, or that it 
was of little interest to either capital or labour. As this thesis intends to disprove the 
latter, it will consider the appropriateness of Middlemas' model in depicting state- 
interest group relations in the sphere of social policy and examine the evidence for the 
existence of corporate bias in relation to its implications for social policy. 
The exclusion of these groups from corporatist interpretations of the development 
of state welfare may follow from the practice of labelling them as producer interests 
while the welfare state is located in the sphere of consumption or distribution. "" 
Hence, O'Sullivan criticises Middlemas' theory of corporate bias on the basis that 
'[t]he overriding significance it attaches to the power of producer groups could at best 
only account for selective welfare benefits and not for the universal ones which the 
welfare state in fact provides. '49 O'Sullivan's argument reflects the tendency to 
disregard the activities of producer groups in relation to welfare, particularly the TUC. 
This thesis will demonstrate not only the range of TUC activities in relation to the 
welfare state but its consistent commitment to universalism and opposition to 
47 A Cawson, Corporatism and weý`are; H Eckstein, Pressure group politics; P Whiteley &S Winyard, Pressurefor the poor take this approach in relation to the welfare state. A Cox &N O'Sullivan, eds., 
The corporate state; W Grant, Business andpolitics in Britain; K Middlemas, Politics in industrial 
society and Power, competition and the state vol. I look at interest group relations but not social 
policy. S Beer, Modern British politics typifies both practices. 49 S Beer, Modern British politics and A Cawson, Corporatism and wetrare both discuss the welfare 
state in a corporatist context but not the role of employers or the TUC. 49 N O'Sullivan, 'The political theory of corporatism', p. 10. 
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selectivity in state welfare. Furthermore, the TUC's role in representing users of the 
welfare state, particularly NHS patients, will be considered. 
A second approach to explaining the relationship between the state and industrial 
interests and the creation of the modem welfare state in wartime and post- 1945 can be 
found in the idea of the postwar consensus. The origins of consensus are generally 
found in the war years and the Coalition government's policies for reconstruction and 
it endured until some point between 1964 and 1979.50 Proponents of the consensus 
thesis have suggested that similarities and continuities between the policies of the 
Coalition government and postwar Labour and Conservative governments imply the 
51 
existence of a shared approach to policy-making across a range of policy areas. 
These policies include the establishment of a mixed economy, employment policy, 
foreign policy, trade union recognition and the introduction of a wide range of welfare 
measures. 52 Addison, in 'The road from 1945', selects a similar range of policies: the 
mixed economy, ftill employment, the welfare state and expansion of state education, 
increased consultation of interest groups by government, and the advancement of the 
industrial worker. 53 
The policy content of consensus has prompted an extensive debate, which will be 
outlined below. More fundamentally, the very definition of the concept has eluded 
agreement. Kavanagh and Morris are amongst its main supporters and present the 
50 A Butler, 'The end of the post-war consensus', p. 438. 
51 This theory has been propounded by; D Dutton, British politics since 1945 (199 1); D Kavanagh &P 
Morris, Consensus politics; D Kavanagh, 'The postwar consensus', A Seldon, 'Consensus: a debate too 
long'; D Marquand, 'The decline of the postwar consensus'; E Midwinter, The development ofthe 
wetfare state. 
52 D Kavanagh &P Morris, Consensus politics, p. 3. 
"P Addison, 'The road from 1945', p. 6. 
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case for consensus in terms of 'a set of parameters that bounded the set of policy 
options regarded by senior politicians and civil servants as administratively 
practicable, economically affordable and politically acceptable' where party 
differences were subdued. " This approach allows for disagreement between parties 
and ideological differences. Neither is it necessary for governments to share the same 
objectives in the formulation of their policies. This has been the basis of Ben 
Pimlott's attack on the idea of the postwar consensus; he has described it as a 'myth' 
on the grounds that similar policies did not reflect a free choice of action, informed by 
the same motives and aspirations. " Stephen Brooke and Kevin Jefferys have focused 
on intra- and inter-party conflict to convey the lack of consensus in the political 
sphere. 56 
Paul Addison and David Dutton have sought to counter these criticisms by arguing 
that total agreement was not a precondition for a consensus. 57 Nonetheless, the 
confusion surrounding its usage has led Addison, one of its earliest progenitors, to 
forsake the term in preference for the idea of a 'postwar settlement' as he readily 
concedes that disagreements did exist between the membership of the Labour and the 
Conservative parties. 58 Cross-party differences, however, are disregarded by Anthony 
Seldon whose response to the debate has been to narrow the definition of consensus. 
In 'Consensus: a debate too long' he speaks of 'a broad parameter of agreement on 
many key areas of policy between the leaderships of both main parties when they are 
54 D Kavanagh &P Morris, Consensus politics, p. 13. 
55 B Pimlott, 'The myth of consensus', p. 130. 
`S Brooke, Labour's war, p. 110; K Jefferys, 'British politics and social policy during the second 
world war', p. 128. 
57 P Addison, 'The road from 1945', p. 5; D Dutton, British politics since 1945 (1997), p. 7. 
58 P Addison, 'The road from 1945', pp. 5-6. 
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in office'. 59 This approach may be more tangible but considerably reduces the scope 
of the consensus thesis in explaining economic and social developments in postwar 
Britain, and consequently his interpretation has not convinced the sceptics. ' 
Still, both sides of the debate continue to centre on the activities of the British 
political parties, whether in government or otherwise. The notion of a welfare 
consensus follows this pattern. Its origins are sought in the war years, which are seen 
to have lent greater legitimacy to state intervention in the economy and society, thus 
setting a precedent for governing in peacetime. 61 At first the government undertook 
emergency measures such as the evacuation programme, the Emergency Medical 
Service, and free school meals. 62 Fraser has argued that the experience of war 
generated a greater degree of social solidarity: '[b]ombs, unlike unemployment knew 
no social distinctions, and so rich and poor were affected alike in the need for shelter 
and protection. 63 This mood precipitated the period of planning for postwar social 
reconstruction that followed. Jose Harris and Kevin Jefferys have questioned the role 
of the war in stimulating government interest in social reconstruction. Harris suggests 
the conclusions drawn from Titmuss' work on the emergency social services cannot 
be applied to government attitudes towards postwar reform. Both she and Jefferys 
believe that the war effort itself remained paramount. Hence the release of the 
Beveridge Report was perceived as a regretful incident from the perspective of 
Churchill and the Conservative Party. 64 Nonetheless, the government did proceed to 
59 A Seldon, 'Consensus: a debate too long? ', p. 508. 
60 For instance, N Rollings, 'Butskellism, the postwar consensus and the managed economy', p. 114; H 
Jones, 'A bloodless counter-revolution'. 
61 D Kavanagh &P Morris, Consensus politics, p. 6; D Dutton, British politics since 1945 (199 1), p. 2. 
62 R Titmuss, Essays on 'the weo'are state', p. 83. 
63 D Fraser, The evolution ofthe British wetrare state, p. 208. A Calder, The people's war, p. 545 also 
subscribes to this interpretation of the social impact of war. 
64 J Harris, 'Some aspects of social policy', p. 249; K Jefferys, ed., War and reform, p. 90. 
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produce a series of White Papers on social reconstruction and actually legislated for 
educational reform. 
The case for the postwar consensus continues along the same theme of seeking 
similarities between the Coalition's policies and those of the 1945-51 Labour 
governments, and later Labour and Conservative administrations. The pro-consensus 
school has detected a strong element of continuity between the wartime White Papers 
and the Labour government's programme. Evidence is found in the implementation 
of the National Insurance Act of 1946, which contained a substantial element of the 
Beveridge plan and Labour's wholesale adoption of the 1944 Education Act 
wholesale. 65 Consensus is also suggested by the resemblance between both parties' 
manifestos in 1945.66 There have been claims that a Conservative government in 
1945 would have taken a similar approach to social policy: Addison believes that the 
Tories would have introduced the national insurance scheme and universal health 
services. 
67 
Studies of the 1951-64 Conservative goverrunents are held to offer further support 
for the consensus theory. In spite of early concerns, and Labour Party propaganda, 
&. at the Tories would dismantle the welfare state, radical changes were avoided. 68 
According to Anthony Seldon, '[t]he welfare state was accepted, and in some areas 
was extended. Initial plans for instituting cuts and other economies were dropped. 
There was no doctrinal attack on welfare, nor was there any social policy offered by 
65 D Dutton, British politics since 1945 (1997), p. 23. 
06 Ibid., p. 20. 
67 P Addison, 'The road from 1945', p. 15. 
69 S Beer, The British political system, p. 176; N Deakin, The politics ofweýfare, p. 52; J Harris, 
'Society and the state in twentieth-century Britain', p. 105; A Seldon, 'The rise and fall of the postwar 
consensus', P. 47. 
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the Conservatives that could be said to have been distinctly Conservative. 1,69 The 
Conservative government did increase health service charges but Labour had 
introduced them in the first instance. 70 In addition, social expenditure rose under the 
71 Conservatives: further evidence of a consensus, according to Beer. In 1958, the 
resignation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Peter Thomeycroft, and his Treasury 
team, following the Cabinet's refusal to sanction cuts in the social services, is seen to 
represent 'the formal political acceptance of the welfare state by the Conservative 
govemment'. 72 
The mass of evidence, of which only key points have been identified here, has been 
highly contested. Naturally, respondents have focused upon the political sphere as 
dictated by the current parameters of the debate. As indicated earlier, the consensus 
has often been challenged on the basis of party differences. Thus Stephen Brooke 
argues that continuity between the Coalition's proposals and the Labour Party's 
programme has been overstated. He agrees that both parties accepted the need for 
welfare reform but claims that the Attlee governments did not consider the VVhite 
Papers 'blueprints for easy appropriation, but as platforms on which to build more 
radical reforms'. 73 Hennessy believes it is likely that Labour's policies 'went ftu-ther 
and faster than anything a Churchill Cabinet would have undertaken after 1945 1. . 
74 
Eirgen Heo echoes this point, contending that social reform would have been 
accorded less priority under the Tories. 75 
69 A Seldon, 'The rise and fall of the postwar consensus', p. 47. 
70 C Pierson, 'Social policy', p. 148. 
71 S Beer, The British political system, p. 176. 
72 R Lowe, 'Milestone or millstone', p. 465. 
73 S Brooke, Labour's war, p. I 10. 
74 P Hennessy, 'The Attlee governments', p. 33. 
75 J Hep, 'The social policy of the Attlee government', p. 3 00. 
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Disagreement also surrounds the record of the post-1951 Conservative 
governments on a number of levels. First, it is claimed that the Conservative 
governments did not attach as much priority to social policy. This is suggested by 
regular changes in social policy ministers and their exclusion, with the exception of 
the Minister of Housing, from the Cabinet during this period. 76, Secondly, the 
Conservatives were believed to have accepted Labour's policies as the maximum 
degree of reform: '[t]he expectation was that economic growth and not social policy 
would now provide for social needs. 977 Social expenditure may have risen but only in 
the midst of much discord within the Conservative Party. 78 Neither was it permitted 
79 to rise faster than the level of economic growth . 
Owing to full employment, 
economic growth in the 1950s, and falling defence expenditure, the Conservatives 
were able to maintain the welfare state without compromising other commitments 
such as lower taxation-80 Moreover, while the Conservatives did not reduce current 
expenditure, the 1956 Guillebaud Report found that long-term investment in the NHS 
had been neglected. 81 The third approach reflects the continued focus on party 
differences: 82 during the 1950s the Labour Party made a commitment to the 
introduction of comprehensive schools, renounced NFIS charges, and began to 
consider the prospect of earnings-related pensions in advance of the Conservatives. 
76 M Hill, The weUýre state in Britain, p. 50. 
77 P Alcock, Poverty and state support, p. 59. 
78 N Ellison, 'Consensus here, consensus there', p. 20; M Kandiah, 'Conservative leaders', p. 67. 
79 A Gamble, Conservative nation, p. 64. 
so M Hill, The wetrare state in Britain, p. 50; R Lowe, 'Milestone or millstone', pp. 463-9 1. 
81 Guillebaud Report, pp. 34-5. This is also noted by H Jones, 'New tricks for an old dog? ', p. 39. 
82 N Deakin, The politics ofweUiare, p. 5 1. 
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In view of this preoccupation with the political sphere, the more recent notion of a 
&negative consensus' offers some relief This suggests that policy-making was a 
product more of constraints on governments than of a mutually acceptable shared 
approach to solving postwar problems. 83 Constraints included adverse economic 
circumstances for the Attlee governments, electoral considerations for the 
Conservatives, the impact of demographic changes on state welfare, the civil service, 
and the strength of the trade union movement. 84 
It is the latter factor that is of significance for this study. We have already 
mentioned the TUC's wartime role, which is seen to have obliged govermnents to 
subscribe to welfare reform or prevented them from doing otherwise in the context of 
the postwar settlement. 85 Noel Whiteside, in a study of the 'social wage', argues that 
governments were unable to cut benefits for fear that they would precipitate higher 
wage demands and industrial action. 86 Once more, it is merely the presence of a 
strong trade union movement, or external policy considerations, that are considered to 
have affected social policy. Neither Harriet Jones nor Whiteside look in any detail at 
the TUC's social policy to ascertain its expectations of the government in this sphere. 
Furthermore, these interpretations all focus exclusively on the trade union movement, 
ignoring the role of employers or other interests that may have participated in 
government policy-making. 
93 P Catterall's preface of H Jones &M Kandiah, The myth ofconsensus, p. x. 
94 N Ellison, 'Consensus here, consensus there', p. 18; H Jones, 'New tricks for an old dog', p. 34; R 
Lowe, 'The second world war, consensus and the foundation of the welfare state', p. 160 & 174. 
85 J Cronin, Politics ofstate expansion, p. 194; A Gamble, Conservative nation, p. 63; H Jones, 'New 
tricks for an old dog? ', p. 34. 
86 N Whiteside, 'The politics of the "sociar' and the "industrial" wage', p. 13 1. 
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Still, the link between the trade union movement and social policy has at least been 
established. This represents an advance on earlier and more traditional interpretations 
of consensus, which both recognise the role of the trade union movement in policy- 
making and seek to establish a policy consensus in relation to the welfare state but do 
not link the two. This highlights a major weakness of the consensus thesis in its 
tendency to separate analysis of the constituent areas. For Kavanagh and Morris, a 
consensus existed with regard to the style of government which featured 'consultation 
between government and the major economic actors ... notably ... trade unions', later 
described as 'agents of the political consensus', and the policies pursued by all 
postwar governments from 1948 to the mid-1970s. 87 The implications of this style of 
government for policy-making are subsequently ignored in the analysis of welfare 
policy, since its adherents insist that only policies pursued by government require 
consideration. " Accordingly, no attention is paid to the impact of trade union 
consultation on social policy. Having identified the wider forces of policy-making, 
the consensus thesis then fails to address its effects in the context of its own argument. 
Recent critics of the consensus thesis suggest that the focus on government 
activities and the policies that they implemented 'has concealed more than it has 
rcvealed' . 
89 Corporatists and pro-consensualists alike have identified the importance 
of consultation of interest groups after the war, particularly in relation to economic 
and industrial policy. 90 Social policy offers an opportunity to examine their 
relationship with government, and to assess the application of corporate bias outside 
87 D Kavanagh &P Morris, Consensus politics, pp. 34 and 52-3. 
88 Ibid., p. 4. 
89 M Kandiah, 'Conservative leaders', p. 74. 
90 S Beer, Modern British politics; A Cox &N O'Sullivan, The corporate state; W Grant, Business and 
politics in Britain (1993); K Middlernas, Politics in industrial society and Power, competition and the 
state vol, L 
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the more traditional policy areas where these groups' interest is easily understood. In 
doing so, the impact of these groups on welfare policy can be explored. This will help 
to redress the existing emphasis on the role of the goverment in the history of the 
welfare state where interest groups are neglected unless it is impossible to ignore 
them, as in the case of the BMA during the struggle to establish the National Health 
Service or the family allowances movement. 91 The social policies of trade unions and 
industry have attracted little interest, yet the records of these organisations offer a 
valuable insight into contemporary responses to the welfare state and its 
conceptualisation. In turn an insight into their role and their attitudes towards postwar 
social policy will assist in determining the existence of a broader consensus, outside 
Whitehall, in Britain between 1942 and 1964. This will take into account perceptions 
of the maintenance, or even growth, of the welfare state, and. its fundamental 
principles and objectives. 
The changing role of peak level labour and industrial organisations in relation to 
welfare - from direct provision and monitoring the limited scope of state services to 
negotiating the boundaries of the welfare state - can be investigated by consulting the 
records of these organisations. The archives of the Labour Party and government 
papers are also of assistance. These records reveal the content of the internal 
discussions held by these groups, their correspondence, their submissions to 
government and independent enquiries, and their meetings with Ministers and 
officials. They allow us to ascertain their opinion of state welfare, the motives behind 
their policies and objectives, the contribution that they made to policy formulation 
"H Eckstein, Pressure group politics; R Klein, The new politics ofthe national health service; J 
Macnicol, The movementforfamily allowances; C Webster, The national health service vols. I and II. 
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and the level of influence held by them overý its direction. TUC interest can be 
detected in all aspects of state welfare during the process of wartime reconstruction 
and in the postwar years. The two leading industrial organisations, the BEC and FBI, 
dealt with labour issues and economic matters respectively. Therefore, the 
employers' confederation was responsible for social security, pensions, and some 
aspects of education while the FBI discussed only secondary education in grammar 
schools, higher technological education, and policies concerning the universities. 
The division of responsibilities between the BEC and FBI suggests, quite rightly, 
that a neat and rational picture is unlikely to emerge from this research, given that 
these organisations did not discuss social policy in such a manner. Different areas of 
the welfare state were discussed in isolation from each other within these groups. The 
level of interest and concern could vary with respect to different areas of policy, and 
over time. The TUC declared a fervent interest in all welfare policies but the BEC 
and FBIs approach was much more haphazard and inconsistent. Neither of them took 
any direct interest in the NHS for instance. The policies of all three were also shaped 
by a variety of influences, which changed over time. These influences included the 
policies of the governing party, the economic situation, the implications of social 
policies for their other interests, the level of opportunities for them to participate in 
government policy, and their perceptions of what social policy should seek to achieve. 
Neither were their relations with government in this sphere necessarily similar to each 
other as their interpretations of appropriate behaviour differed. Also, willingness to 
participate in government policy-making was subject to variation, on the part of 
industry at least. 
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The focus of this study, addressing only the peak level of activity and relations 
with central goVerrunent, is not always ideal. In health and education, much policy 
was implemented at the local level where trade unions and industrialists were also 
involved. Nonetheless, the dlite nature of this research is not entirely inappropriate. 
Social policies were generally formulated by the central organisations of these groups, 
and were informed by their members' views as advised in correspondence, responses 
to questionnaires and surveys, and at annual conferences. Within the peak level 
bodies, committees and departments existed to determine their position of various 
social policy matters. The TUC had social insurance and education departments and 
committees. The BEC too had a social insurance and an education and industrial 
training committee but no supporting departments owing to the relatively small size of 
its central bureaucracy and lack of funds. 92 The FBI's Education Committee 
discussed relevant educational matters. Furthermore the government would usually 
consult the peak level groups on policy changes rather than individual members: this 
aspect of the relationship requires an dlite focus. 
The formulation of many welfare policies within these organisations predated the 
second world war, but the establishment of the Beveridge Committee and plans for 
the reform of state education and the health services required more, explicit policy 
stances and a response to government action. The TUC reacted most eagerly to the 
opportunity that the war presented to persuade the goverment to accept its 
prescriptions for reform. Accordingly, it composed comprehensive policy statements, 
92 Modem Records Centre (henceforth MRC), MSS. 200/B/3/2/C4 pt. 109, Ref N. C. 8303, 
Confederation finance memorandum by director, 29 Feb. 1944. 
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which contained proposals for reconstruction in line with the principles of the trade 
union movement. After the war, the TUC monitored all aspects of government social 
policy with a view to securing expansion and improvement. Industrial views are less 
easy to discern because of the different organisations involved. Generally, neither the 
FBI nor the BEC approached government directly to discuss policy issues. They 
tended to rely on goverment requests for consultation, and opportunities to express 
their views as members of government committees, or when presenting evidence to 
such enquiries. Through a variety of methods, therefore, these interest groups made 
some contribution to social policy-making both during and after the war. The 
significance of that contribution and the influence they had on government policy will 
be discussed the following chapters, which explore developments in social security, 
pensions, health and education policy. Housing policy is not considered, as a brief 
examination of these organisations' activities in this area detected little interest. 
The following chapter examines the evolution of social security from the 
establishment of the Beveridge Committee in 1941 through to plans for earnings- 
related unemployment and sickness benefit formulated by the Conservative 
government in 1963 and 1964. The TUC adopted the Beveridge Report as an ideal 
model of state social security from which it was loath to depart. It was not quite so 
dearly held by the BEC, which was forced to temper its views. As successive 
governments gradually abandoned the Beveridge plan, the attitudes of these 
organisations towards social security, and the motivations that underpinned them, are 
explored in the context of the postwar period. The third chapter continues by looking 
specifically at the case of pensions policy. Both social and labour policy 
considerations were raised in this sphere owing to the relationship between the 
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presence of older workers and wage levels and employment opportunities. This 
presented the TUC with a dilernma in its views on pensions, which it was slow to 
address. Consultation by Conservative governments and the establishment of the 
Phillips Committee on Pensions also provided the BEC with opportunities to air its 
views. Chapter four moves away from the income maintenance sphere to explore the 
TUC's activities in relation to health policy. The focus on the TUC reflects the virtual 
absence of industrialists in this sphere, owing to a lack of direct interest in the NHS. 
In this sector, the TUC emerges most clearly as representative of consumers rather 
than having been concerned merely with sectional issues. Education is the subject of 
the final substantive chapter. This is the only policy sector in which the TUC, BEC 
and FBI all made a contribution towards the formulation of policy, during the war and 
thereafter. The chapter considers policy developments at the levels of secondary 
schooling, ftu-ther and technical education, and higher education. The reasons behind 
a much more active interest on the part of industrialists will be considered. Finally, 
the concluding chapter assesses the whole range of these groups' involvement across 
different aspects of welfare policy in order to assess the nature of relationship 
between government and interest groups in the context of the welfare state. It can 
then determine whether or not corporate bias was a feature of state-interest group 
relations in this sphere of policy, and if so the degree of its importance. Given the 
extent of their involvement, and the opportunities provided for these groups to express 
their opinions on the development of the welfare state, it is then possible to identify 
the existence, or otherwise, of a broader consensus over welfare policy that 
encapsulated important economic interests during this period. 
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Chapter Two: Social Securi 
The publication of the Beveridge Report in December 1942 set in train social security 
reforms that culminated in the implementation of the 1946 National Insurance Act and 
the 1947 National Assistance Act on 5 July 1948. Under the terms of the 1946 
legislation, a single contributory national insurance scheme was established in which 
participation was compulsory for the majority of workers. For those who were 
excluded, or who found insurance benefits to be insufficient, the National Assistance 
Board provided means-tested help. After 1948 there were no major developments in 
social security policy until the introduction of eamings-related pensions under the 
1959 National Insurance Act. Before 1939 employers and trade unions were 
important sources of welfare provision. The wartime reforms were accompanied by 
ttWch greater state intervention in the sphere of social security that resulted in a lesser 
role for these groups. Little is known, however, about their responses to these 
changes. 
This chapter will look at the central organisations of these interests, the TUC and 
the BEC, in order to examine their activities in this area of policy after 1942. It will 
be argued that these activities have significant implications for the theories of both 
consensus and corporate bias. Consultation with industry and the trade union 
movement was undertaken by the state during the war and maintained therealler to a 
greater extent than in the aftermath of the first world war. It has been suggested that 
different govenunents' willingness to consult these groups is a feature of the 'postwar 
consensus', as is the maintenance of the welfare state. This chapter considers the 
extent and importance of this consultation in relation to social security, the fwst area 
of social policy that tends to be overlooked as being of interest to organised labour 
and capital. Having established the level of these groups' interest in this aspect of 
social policy, and their activities in relation to social security, it will then be possible 
to examine the existence of a 'welfare consensus' outside the province of the political 
parties. 
Reformin state welfare: the reconstruction of social security. 1942-1948 
British social security before Beveridge 
The flaws in interwar social security policy have been well-documented, in particular 
its patchy and ad hoc nature? In the words of Derek Fraser, '[c]ommon social 
conditions did not produce common social security benefits as classification and 
technical qualifications had usurped need as the determining factor. Q In 1941, social 
security was administered by seven separate government departments and financed 
from different sources. 3 For instance, pensions were funded by general taxation local 
rates provided public assistance. Benefit levels also varied: rates of workmen's 
compensation for industrial injury were earnings-related, while unemployment benefit 
was a flat-rate subsistence payment. 
-TUC criticism of the social services was longstanding. Pensions, unemployment 
insurance and national health insurance all gave cause for concern. In particular the 
TUC was unhappy with nature of provision under unemployment and health 
I For example, see B Abel-Sm ith, 'The Beveridge report', p. 13. 
2D Fraser, Me evolution ofthe British wvV2zre state, p. 202. 
3J Harris, William Beveridge, p. 378. 
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insurance, and the relationship between these two schemes. The upper income limit 
of E250 per annum for unemployment insurance was said to deter non-manual 
workers from accepting wage increases that would take them above this ceiling. 
Health benefits were lower than those for unemployment, resulting in a fall in benefit 
when workers became ill. 4 In February 1941, a General Council deputation met with 
the Minister of Health, Ernest Brown, to express its concerns about national health 
insurance. These included the lack of cover for dependants and discrepancies in the 
provision offered by the different Approved Societies. The TUC officials asked 
Brown to devise a new state scheme for social security, which could be implemented 
5 
after the war. 
Divisions in industrial representation before 1965 manifested themselves in 
similarly divided views on social policy in the interwar years. The FBI favoured a 
paternalistic approach whereby employers would provide social security benefits and 
social services for their workers. It was generally supported in this by successful 
companies who could afford to make provision, and did so to undermine trade unions 
and maintain stability in their labour forces. ' The NCEO (BEC after 1939) adopted a 
somewhat different stance that reflected its belief that welfare was the responsibility 
of the state but only at a very basic level of provision. Consequently, the NCEO was 
not interested in Pursuing improvements in state social services and consistently 
opposed increases in social expenditure. 7 
4 Annual Trades Union Congress Report 1937, pp. 34142. 
5 MRC, MSS. 292/15531/4, Health insurance reform -history of case, 194 1. 6J Turner, "Me politics of business', P. 6. 
7T Rodgers, 'Employers' organisations, unemployment and social politics', pp. 331-2. 
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Thus the TUC and the FBI and BEC held quite different attitudes with regard to 
state social security. The TUC was unhappy with current provision because it was 
confined to manual workers and the low-paid, and was'ridden with anomalies. It 
sought reform and improvements, firmly believing this to be the responsibility of the 
state. This view had developed gradually during the 1920s and 1930s following the 
inability of trade union schemes to cope with high unemployment. Meanwhile, 
industry was ambivalent about the role of the state in social security provision but had 
little to offer in terms of solutions for interwar problems. While the FBI wanted 
employers to be responsible for social policy in order to derive benefits in terms of 
industrial relations, smaller firms, affiliated through their employer organisation to the 
BEC, argued that such provision should be organised by the state but only at a 
minimal level. 
The Interdepartmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services 
Wartime plans for the reform of social security have their roots in the report of the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services (the Beveridge 
Committee). On 22 May 1941, Ernest Brown, the Minister of Health, announced in 
the House of Commons that the government was to undertake a survey of the social 
services. Subsequently, Churchill established a Central Committee on Reconstruction 
chaired by Arthur Greenwood, deputy leader of the Labour Party. Greenwood then 
appointed the Beveridge Committee in June 1941, which is widely recognised as the 
most important legacy of his committee. Its membership comprised eleven civil 
servants, selected from departments concerned with social insurance. The terms of 
reference were: 'to undertake with special reference to the inter-relation of the 
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schemes, a survey of the existing national schemes of social insurance and allied 
services, including workmen's compensation, - and to make recommendations. '8 The 
government expected the Beveridge committee to do no more than carry out an 
administrative review; however, Beveridge would make the most of his appointment 
as chairman to produce a report that had a more far-reaching impact. 
Friendly relations existed between the TUC and the Beveridge Committee. The 
TUC claimed that its deputation to Brown in 1941 had been instrumental in the 
committee's establishment. 9 Beveridge also believed that the TUC's complaints 
about unemployment and health insurance had been influential. 10 Several scholars, 
who have cited the TUC's role in the setting up of the Interdepartmental Committee, 
have acknowledged the link. " According to Ross Martin, the author of a study of the 
TUC, '[i]t might well be argued that the TUC's little-noticed achievement in relation 
to the formation of the Beveridge Committee, is actually one of its most momentous 
successes - perhaps even its greatest. ' 12 The amicable relationship between the TUC 
and Beveridge himself has also been noted while the TUC's evidence bore substantial 
similarities to the general content of the Beveridge Report. 13 
Agreement extended to the basic principles of state provision of social security: a 
flat-rate scheme with respect to both contributions and benefits, universalism and 
" Beveridge Report, para. 1. 
9 MRC, MSS292/150.5/1, TUC social insurance department circular to trades councils and affiliated 
unions, 30 July 1942. 
'0 W Beveridge, Power and influence, p. 296. 
11 B Abel-Smith, 'The Beveridge Report', p. 13; P Barberis &T May, Government, industry and 
political economy, p. 100; S Brooke, Labour's war, p 146; A Calder, Me people's war, p. 525; A 
Marwick, Britain in the century oftotal war (1968), p. 289 and 7he homefront, p. 128; T May, Trade 
unions andpressure group politics, p. 14; L Minkin, 7he contentious alliance, p. 43 and 'Radicalism 
and reconstruction, p. 187; E Wilson, Women and the wetfare state, p. 143. 
12 R Martin, TUC. the growth of a pressure group, p. I On. 
13 H Heclo, Modem social Politics in Britain and Sweden, p. 147. 
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subsistence. This supports the widely expressed view that the Beveridge Committee 
represented the origins of a consensus on social policy during the second world war. 14 
The TUC took an appreciable interest in social policy but it is clear that the 
significance of its close links with Beveridge should not be overstated. The 
Beveridge Report was very much a one-man exercise, and Beveridge was sidelined 
after the publication of his report. The goverment, especially its Conservative 
members, did not perceive the Beveridge Committee to be of any great importance 
when it was appointed. 
Industry's attitudes towards social policy during the war offer less support for the 
consensus thesis. As in the interwar period, industrial views were less coherent than 
those of the TUC and reflected conflicts both between and within the different 
organisations. The most positive views were expressed by a group of 120 
industrialists who comprised a liberal wing of the FBI. 15 In 1942 these industrialists 
endorsed a document entitled A national policyfor industry, which outlined support 
for a welfare system that included corporate housing, subsidies jo prevent 
unemployment and occupational supplements to state pensions. 16 Less positive views 
continued to be expressed by the BEC although there were internal differences of 
opinion. The Shipping Federation and the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' 
Association, dismayed at the BEC's procrastination, submitted evidence to the 
Beveridge Committee independently. They endorsed the reform of the social services 
in the shape of a single scheme for unemployment and health insurance, workmen's 
14 P Addison, 'The road from 1945', pp. 134; H Glcnncrstcr, British socialpolicy since 1945, pp. 10- 1; 
R Lowe, The second world war, consensus and the foundation of the welfare state', p. 158; C Pierson, 
'Social policy', p. 139. 
"Their views did not reflect official FBI policy. 
16 C Madge, Industry after the war, K Middlemas, Politics in industrial society, p. 287. 
30 
compensation, widows' and orphans' benefits, and pensions. These would be funded 
by equal tripartite contributions from the Exchequer, employers and workers. 17 This 
appears to be have been the exception rather than the rule: the Employers' 
Association of the Port of Liverpool and the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' 
Associations both refused to submit observations on Beveridge's list of questions. 
The former claimed that it was 'actively and entirely engaged on work of far more 
urgent and immediate importance'. 18 The Cotton Spinners and the Railway 
Companies were concerned that social security reform would create higher costs for 
industry. 19 The Wool (and Allied) Textile Employers' Council wanted to postpone 
discussion on the matter until the end of the war was closer. 20 
These more negative views were predominant in the BEC's evidence to the 
Beveridge Committee. The Confederation purported to endorse the principle of a 
compulsory national insurance scheme, but the thrust of its statement emphasised the 
impracticability of implementing postwar social reforms in anticipation of an adverse 
economic situation. Thus, it suggested that the Beveridge Committee be replaced by a 
Commission, which would assess existing social policy and make recommendations 
for reform after the war that would be in keeping with the postwar economic and 
financial climate. 21 
17 MRC, MSSIOO/B/3/2/C216 pt. 3, Post-War Social Services: Evidence to Inter-Departmental 
Committee, Submitted by the Shipping Federation and the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association, 
23 March 1942. 
's Ibid., W Awstun Jones, Secretary of Employers' Association of The Port of Liverpool to HM Piper, 
Social Service Survey - Governmcnt Committee, 19 Feb. 1942. '9 Ibid., WM Wiggins, President of Master Cotton Spinners' Associations Ltd to Sir John Forbes 
Watson, Social Service Survey - Government Committee, 23 Feb. 1942; Memorandum: Observations 
of Railway Companies on Principal Questions Raised with Ile British Employers' Confederation by 
Interdepartmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services, 24 Feb. 1942. 
20 Ibid., Preliminary Memorandum by The Wool (and Allied) Textile Employers' Council, undated (c. 
Feb. 1942). 
21 Ibid., N. C. 7405, Draft Report to Beveridge Committee: Post-War Reconstruction - Social Services, 
undated (April 1942). 
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In accordance with its prewar views, the BEC was unwilling to sanction greater 
state intervention in welfare. Although it accepted compulsory national insurance, 
such a scheme should play only a minimum role in social security provision. Non- 
state organisations should continue to offer supplementary provision, making 
subsistence-level state benefits unnecessary., The Confederation resisted state benefits 
at subsistence level on the grounds that they would undermine 'thrift, independence 
and individual responsibility' . 
22 Flat-rate contributions and benefits were approved 
by the employers for reasons of administrative convenience. They were also 
compatible with the objective of minimising the state's role, an issue on which the 
BEC and Beveridge were in accord. By contrast the TUC's adherence to flat-rate 
principles was based more on its ideology of equality, which it believed could be 
ftS. 23 achieved through uniform bene I Furthermore, the TUC was unwilling to accept 
the replication of wage inequalities in social security that would result from earnings- 
related benefits. The burden that flat-rate contributions imposed on the lowest-paid 
workers and the consequences for the financing of social security were not considered 
at this time. Baldwin suggests that the TUC did not anticipate problems here because 
it expected minimum wages to be higher after the war. 24 
The BEC was the only central industrial organisation to provide the Beveridge 
Committee with evidence. This reflected its responsibility for matters relating to 
social policy. Its evidence was largely negative in tone although its desire for a 
minimum state role was perfectly in keeping with Beveridge's own views. Their 
22 lbidL 
23 B Abel-Smith, 'The Beveridge report', p. 16; P Baldwin, 7hepolitics ofsocial solidarity, pp. 122 
and 127. 
24 P Baldwin, Politics ofsocial solidarity, pp. 122 and 127. 
32 
respective interpretations of minimal state intervention were quite different however: 
the BEC did not support the central principles of universalism or subsistence to which 
both Beveridge and the TUC were firmly wedded. Its unwillingness to countenance 
plans for postwar social reform was clearly out of step with popular opinion and the 
views of the trade union movement. This suggests that the perceived consensus on 
the need to plan for the postwar world was not quite so prevalent as is often believed. 
The Beveridge Report 
The Beveridge Report was published on I December 1942. It outlined a plan that 
would coordinate and consolidate the existing social security schemes. Its chief 
objective was to abolish poverty via compulsory participation in a comprehensive 
social insurance scheme, which would provide an income, adequate for subsistence, in 
times of need. The scheme would be financed by flat rate, tripartite contributions 
from employers, workers and the state. Beveridge devised six principles on which the 
social insurance scheme would be based: flat rate of subsistence benefit; flat rate of 
contribution; unification of administrative responsibility; adequacy of benefit; 
comprehensiveness and classification. 25 For the scheme t6 be successfid there were 
three preconditions or 'assumptions'. These were universal provision of family 
allowances, the establishment of a national health service and the maintenance of high 
levels of employment. Finally, a safety net, in the form of national assistance, would 
provide for those outside the national insurance scheme. This would be a residual 
means-tested benefit for which demand was expected to fall as the scope of insurance 
expanded. 
25 Beveridge Report, paras. 303-309. 
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The Beveridge Report has been variously described as the founding document of 
the welfare state and a plan for rationalising existing provision, containing little that 
was radical or revolutionary. 26 However, there is no doubting its contemporary 
popularity among the British public at large; it is claimed that approximately 750,000 
copies were sold and a British Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO) poll showed that 95 
per cent of people were aware of the Beveridge Report two weeks after its release. 27 
Political responses to the Beveridge Report were somewhat more complex. The 
Labour Party responded enthusiastically while Conservative members of the 
government were rather less impressed. Like the BEC, Churchill's main concern was 
that the report should not be implemented before the war ended . 
28 Amore positive 
Conservative reaction came from the Tory Reform Committee although this 
progressive wing was very much a minority at this time. The more critical views in 
the government were sustained during the parliamentary debate on the Beveridge 
Report that took place in February 1943. The debate created the impression that the 
government was lukewarm in its attitude towards the Beveridge Report. Ultimately, 
however, public support for the Beveridge Report was such that Churchill was forced 
to be outwardly positive. In a radio broadcast in March 1943, he announced details of 
a four-year plan for post-war reconstruction. Afterwards, the drafting of a White 
Paper on the reform of social security got underway. 
26 ADK Owen, The Beveridge Report, p. I and RJ Cootes, The making ofthe wetibre state, p. 82 
subscribe to the fonner view and M Bruce, The coming ofthe welfare state, p. 274 and AI Ogus, 
'Great Britain', p. 191 to the latter. 
27 jC Kincaid, Poverty and equalily in Britain, p. 44; British Institute of Public Opinion, The 
Beveridge report and the public, p. 5. 
29 P Alcock, Poverty and state support, p. 52. 
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Given the role of interest groups such as the TUC and the BEC in other areas of 
policy and their involvement in social policy via the Beveridge Committee, it is 
plausible to seek a wider notion of a welfare consensus outside the arenas of party 
politics and public opinion. There has been a tendency among some historians to 
underestimate the trade union movement's interest in the Beveridge Committee and 
social poliCy. 
29 This is a reflection of a focus on individual unions rather than the 
TUC, which was where trade union social policy was formulated. Others have noted 
the trade union movement's positive response to Beveridge. A number of 
explanations for this have been put forward: Heclo suggests that high interwar 
unemployment, a dislike of the means test and amicable links between Beveridge and 
trade unionists were factors in the unions' lavourable reaction. 30 Van Leeuwen also 
cites the influence of interwar mass unemployment .31 Brooke argues that wartime 
purchasing restrictions reduced the importance of wages resulting in a corresponding 
increase in interest in social POHCY. 32 
The TUC's Joint Social Insurance and Workmen's Compensation and Factories 
Committee discussed the Beveridge Report in some detail. The committee drew a 
favourable comparison between the TUC's evidence to Beveridge and the content of 
the report, recommending that the General Council accept the report although the 
details required ftirther examination. 33 The emphasis was on obtaining improvements 
in, and the extension of, its provisions. With the exception of the incorporation of 
29 D Barnes &E Reid, Governments and trade unions, p. 11; M Bruce, The coming ofthe weyizre state, 
p. 276; B Pimlott &C Cook, eds., Trade unions in British politics, p. 163. 
30 H Heclo, Modern socialPOlitics, p. 147. 
31 MHD van Leeuwen, 'Trade unions and the provision of welfare in the Netherlands', p. 787. 
32 S Brooke, Labour's war, p. 152. 
33 MRC, MSS. 292/161.1/3, Joint Social Insurance and Workmen's Compensation and Factories 
Committee (Jt. SIC. WC & FC) 1,9 Dec. 1942; MSS. 292/150.5/4, General Council resolution, 16 Dec. 
1942. 
35 
workmen's compensation into social insurance, any dissatisfaction'on the part of the 
TUC stemmed from a desire to advance upon Beveridge's proposals rather than from 
an aversion to them. From the earliest stages, the TUC was active in lobbying for the 
implementation of the Beveridge Report. 
The Beveridge plan formed the basis for TUC social security policy over the 
course of the next twenty years. The key tenets of TUC policy included the principles 
of universalism, uniformity, flat-rate contributions and benefits and subsistence levels, 
those that underpinned the Beveridge model. The drawbacks of a flat-rate system 
were to become apparent in the early 1950s but there was little resistance in 1942 
when flat-rate principles satisfied different interests for different reasons. The 
principle of subsistence benefits did provoke controversy. The Beveridge Report 
advocated that benefits should be sufficient both in amount and duration. The TUC 
was a keen proponent and pursued the concept of subsistence benefits and pensions 
throughout this period. It praised the report for establishing 'subsistence on a proper 
administrative basis under which every citizen will be provided with subsistence as a 
right by virtue of his contributions and without means test or investigations' . 
34 The 
TUC rejected the government's argument that subsistence benefits were impractical 
because they would be required to fluctuate in line with inflation. It believed that the 
government should control inflation in peacetime as they were doing during the war. 35 
With regard to industrial views, we have already observed that the most positive 
and enlightened views emanating from industry have been highlighted while the 
34 MRC, MSS. 292/150.5/4, A. SIC. WC & FC 4,14 Jan. 1943. 
35 Ibid. 
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BEC's more conservative outlook has been overlooked or downplayed. 36 The 
Beveridge Report received a less amicable response from the BEC than from the 
TUC. The fiercest criticism came from its director, Sir John Forbes Watson, - although 
the Confederation's official reaction was toned down in response to the, popular 
mood. 37 Watson complained that 'an atmosphere has been created in which anyone 
who dares to criticise the proposals from any angle is looked upon, not only as being 
antagonistic to the Government and thereby jeopardising the national unity, but as an 
inhumane person who wishes to perpetuate want in this country'. 38 Watson and the 
BEC were now opposed to compulsory participation in a social insurance scheme. 
The retreat was based on their belief that Beveridge had not satisfactorily established 
the widespread existence of want. Watson also objected strongly to the cost of 
implementing Beveridge, which would require an undesirable level of redistribution 
of incomes and higher taxes. He concluded that the report was 'an instrument which 
holds within itself the possibility of political exploitation to an extreme point where, 
through increases in Direct Taxation, the whole community can be reduced to a 
uniform level of income and where the reward for initiative and enterprise would 
disappear. 09 
The BEC's published statement on the Beveridge Report was more subdued. Still, 
the only positive comment was in praise of the survey of existing provision. The 
Confederation resisted the principle of universalism because the scheme would then 
provide for those who were 'not in want'. Its chief concem was the cost of the 
36 P Addison, 7he road to 1945 (1994), p. 214; P Thane, Foundations ofthe weVire state, p. 233. See 
also K Middlemas, Politics in industrial society, p. 287. 
37 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C216 pt 5, Sir John Forbes Watson to Sir Andrew Duncan, 20 Jan. 1943. 
39 WC, MSSIOO/13/3/2/C4 pt. 105, N. C. 7720, Social Insurance and Allied Services. "Beveridge' 
Report Notes for Meeting - 15th January, 15 Jan. 1943. 39 Ibid. 
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Beveridge plan; it argued that the introduction of Beveridge's proposals could not be 
considered until Britain had established the order of her post-war priorities and her 
capacity for meeting them. The BEC also shed doubt on the feasibility of maintaining 
Beveridge's recommended level of employment amid 'international and other factors 
beyond our control which may largely determine the employment position of an 
40 exporting and importing country such as ours'. Indeed, employers believed that the 
cost of the Beveridge Report and its impact on industry would be a cause of 
unemployment. Thus, rather than implementing the Beveridge Report, the 
goverment should instigate an inquiry to investigate the existence of want and ways 
and means of eliminating it. 
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Another organisation, representative of business interests, the Association of 
British Chambers of Commerce, expressed its views on Beveridge. While the ABCC 
favoured the simplification of social security provision and endorsed the -general 
themes contained in the Beveridge Report, it too warned against making plans before 
the end of the war. Unlike most other contemporary commentators, the Chambers of 
Commerce held reservations over flat-rate principleS. 42 
Strong public support encouraged a more positive political response to the 
Beveridge Report, which eventually included the Conservative Party albeit with some 
reluctance. Similar enthusiasm was displayed by the TUC. The apparent consensus 
over Beveridge is, therefore, only undermined by the continued pessimism expressed 
40 mRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C216 pt. 5, Social Insurance and Allied Services - Memorandum on the 
Beveridge Report, 10 Feb. 1943. 
U lbid- 
42 Public Record Office (henceforth PRO), PIN 8/23, The Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and 
Allied Services, Report of a special committee on the views expressed by Chambers of Commerce, I 
June 1943. 
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by the BEC. Although the BEC did temper its response in keeping with public 
opinion, it was basically opposed to the implementation of the Beveridge plan and to 
the fundamental themes of universalism and subsistence that found so much favour 
among the public and in the labour movement. While more positive views from other 
representatives of industry complicate the picture somewhat, these found little 
expression after 1942. The conservative BEC emerged as the main spokesgroup in 
relation to social security policy although it often only volunteered opinions when 
governments made direct approaches to it. 
In fact, the BEC did not prove to be particularly effective in influencing 
government social policy. Its reactionary nature and unwillingness to participate in 
the policy-making process militates against Middlemas' thesis of 'corporate bias'. 
The BEC did not seek to shape plans for social reconstruction during the war. 
Conversely, while the TUC actively sought to participate in social policy-making via 
deputations to members of the government, it had little obvious success at first. 
Access to government, in this case to Sir William Jowitt who was responsible for 
social reconstruction as Minister without Portfolio, was unproblematic but produced 
little in the way of results. Efforts to elicit the government's intentions towards 
Beveridge tended to be ineffectual as Jowitt refused to provide the TUC with details 
of governinent PoliCY. 43 Meanwhile, officials were reticent about consultation with 
the TUC and the government's Reconstruction Priorities Committee expressed a 
desire for caution when informing the TUC of government PoliCY. 44 
43 PRO, PIN 9/9 1, Sir William Jowitt to Sir Walter Citrine, General Secretary of TUC, 2 April 1943; 
Note on TUC deputation to Sir William Jowitt on 8 April 1943; MRC, MSS-292/150.5/4, TUC General 
Council deputation to Sir William Jowitt, 8 April 1943. 
" Ibid., TT Hutson, Office of the Minister without Portfolio to EG Beam at the Ministry of Health, 6 
Aug. 1943. 
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Legislating social security: 1944-1946 
The Coalition government released, a VVWte Paper, Social Insurance, in September 
1944. It embodied many of Beveridge's proposals but rejected the principle of 
subsistence and unlimited duration for benefits and there was no prospect of 
implementation during the war . 
4' The TUC's response to social security reforms 
proposed after the Beveridge Report has attracted little attention from scholars. 
Brooke suggests that the Labour Party and the TUC were ambivalent towards the 
White Paper. 46 Indeed, the TUC was generaRy satisfied with the White Paper but 
irate at the omission of the subsistence principle, time limits on benefits and the level 
of family allowances. 47 Employers paid little attention to the White Paper; there is no 
record of any discussion on the matter by the BEC. 
Responsibility for the implementation of the Beveridge Report and the 1944 White 
Paper passed to the Labour Party upon its election in July 1945 and the new 
government is associated with a range of social policy measures which formed the 
basis of the postwar welfare state. These included the, 1946 National -insurance Act 
and the 1947 National Assistance Act. Another wartime trend, the practice of 
consulting the trade union movement and industry in policy-making, was also 
ostensibly maintained. This is the period in which the 'postwar settlement' is 
believed to have been forged. 48 It is argued that the cooperation of the unions in the 
45 R Lowe, 'The second world war, consensus and the foundations of the welfare state', p. 169. 
46 S Brooke, Labour's war, p. 147. 
47 MRC, MSS. 292/150.6/1, Government's White Paper on Social Insurance - Parts I and 11, Proposed 
Statement, 10 Oct. 1944. 
48 1 Gough, Ae political econoM ofthe w60re state, p. 7; K Jcfferys, 7he Labour Party since 1945, 
p. 8; M Sullivan, Thepolitics ofsocialpolicy, p. 6; A Warde, Consensus and beyond, p. 4 1. 
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war effort and their increased strength resulted in concessions to labour in the form of 
a government commitment to maintaining a high level of employment and a range of 
state-sponsored social serviceS. 49 In turn, the unions would adopt new responsibilities 
for cooperating in industrial and economic policy, particularly in terms of wage 
50 restraint to assist the government in carrying out its policies. 
Scholars have questioned the strength of the links between the Labour Party and 
the TUC! ' There were early grievances in the TUC with regard to consultation, and 
these were evident in social policy-making following TUC complaints that it had not 
been involved in the drafting of the 1945 National Insurance Bill. 52 TUC 
representatives met with Jim Griffiths, the Minister of National Insurance only once 
before the publication of the Bill although it may be presumed that the Labour Party 
would have been familiar with TUC policy already. The deputation pressed Griffiths 
to implement the subsistence principle, following its rejection by the Coalition 
government, and to remove the time limits on beenefitS. 53 
Whether the Labour government subscribed to the subsistence principle continues 
to be a subject of debate. Both Hill and HeB believe the Labour government did 
intend to provide subsistence benefits even if it was not necessarily successful in 
doing S0.54 Others have questioned this view and have cited the out-of-date price 
49 G Dorfinan, Wage politics in Britain, p. 5 1; L Minkin, The contentious alliance, p. 77. 
50 S Beer, Modem British politics, pp. 318-9; G Dorfman, Wagepolitics in Britain, p. 5 1; H 
Glcnnerster, British socialpolicy since 1945, p. 11; 1 Gough, Thepolitical economy ofthe weVizre 
state, p. 147; B Jessop, 'The transformation of the state in post-war Britain', pp. 28-9; R Taylor, 
'Industrial relations', p. 94. 
51 R Martin, TUC, pp. 290 and 296. 
32 Ibid.; PRO, PIN 19/21, Sir Walter Citrme to Rt. Hon. James Griffiths, 30 Oct. 1945. 
53 MRC, MSS192/161.1/4, A. SIC. WC & FC deputation to the Minister of National Insurance, 15 Nov. 
1945. 
54 J HeB, 'The social policy of the Attlee government', p. 304; M Hill, The wettizre state in Britain, p. 
30. 
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55 index used to set benefit levels and estimates of rent employed. Lowe also points 
out that the time limits on benefits also contravened the principle of adequacy. 56 A 
memorandum written by Griffiths reveals his determination to avoid committing the 
government to the subsistence principle, which he thought was an unfeasible basis for 
benefit levels. 57 He promised the TUC that benefits would be increased beyond the 
levels proposed in the White Paper but not necessarily in accordance with the 
subsistence principle on grounds of practicality. 58 However, initial benefit levels did 
correspond with Beveridge's concept of subsistence even though there was no 
commitment to strictly maintain the correlation between benefit levels and increases 
in the cost of living. TUC representatives met with Griffiths to discuss the National 
Insurance Bill in February 1946. The Minister told the deputation that the benefit 
levels in the Bill were based on Beveridge's recommendations plus an allowance for 
the subsequent increase in the cost of living. The government was not prepared to tie 
benefit rates to prices though it would try to keep the cost of living at its current level. 
In addition, quinquennial reviews would provide the opportunity to adjust benefits in 
line with inflation. 59 These meetings between Griffiths and the General Council led 
the TUC to believe that the Labour government did in fact give effect to the 
subsistence principle, which continued to be a feature of TUC policy. 
The BEC's response to the National Insurance Bill is unknown owing to the 
absence of records documenting the discussions of a sub-committee which was set up 
-5-5 B Abel-Smith, "Me Beveridge Report', p. 20; P Baldwin, Thepolifics ofsocial solidaray, p. 133; H 
Heclo, Modem socialpolitics, p. 148; B Jordan, 'Want', p. 19; J Veit-Wilson, 'Condemned to 
deprivationT, p. 109. 
56 R Lowe, 'A prophet dishonoured in his own countryT, p. 120. 
57 PRO, PIN 1816, Social Services Committee, national insurance pensions and benefit rates, draft 
memorandum by the Ministry of National Insurance, 6 Nov. 1945, p. 1. 
58 PRO, PIN 19/21, Deputation from the General Council of TUC, 15 Nov. 1945, p. 3. 
59 MRC, MSS292/161.1/4, A. SIC. WC & FC 5/1, deputation to Minister of National Insurance on 
National Insurance Bill on 12 Feb. 1946,14 Feb. 1946. 
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to discuss potential amendments to the Bill. 60 One member organisation, the Cotton 
Spinners' and Manufacturers' Association, wrote to the BEC to complain about the 
payment of full national insurance contributions on behalf of part-time workers, a 
grievance that would be pursued throughout this period. The Cotton Spinners were 
concerned that generous state benefits would encourage absenteeiSM. 61 In response to 
the National Insurance Act, 1946, the BEC focused on the implications for 
occupational sick pay schemes and its impact on the economy. 62 The BEC blamed 
economic difficulties on the labour shortage and the cost of imports: essential imports 
required high export levels to pay for them, which raised the issue of wages as a 
factor in production costs. The Confederation cited recent wage rises, family 
allowances and increased state social spending as the source of inflationary pressure. 
The BEC was also worried about the level of taxation, claiming that Britain was 'the 
most heavily taxed ... [country] in the world'. 
63 In 1947 these concerns led the British 
Employers' Confederation to conclude that 'that the Government should make it clear 
that its National Insurance and Industrial Injuries Acts will not be brought into 
operation next year'. 64 
Throughout this formative period of the modem welfare state, the TUC continued 
to monitor the development of social policy but its positive relations with the 
Beveridge Committee were not maintained when the responsibility for social security 
reform shifted to the government. Access to the relevant members of government was 
60 MRC, MSS200/B/3/2/C4 pt. 114, N. C. 9156, FJC Honey (Assistant Secretary) to members of the 
National Insurance Bill Sub-Committee, 23 Feb. 1946. 
61 Ibid., N. C. 9163, Government's National Insurance Bill, Summary of Observations by Members of 
Confederation, undated, (FcbJMarch 1946). 
62 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C4 pt. 115, N. C. 9397, HM Piper, Secretary to employers' organisations 
concerned, Superannuation and Sick Pay schemes, 6 Sept. 1946. 
63 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C4 pt. 117, N. C. 9625, Notes for Confederation Committee - Economic 
Survey for 1947,4 March 1947. 
64 Ibid. 
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granted but was looked upon with little enthusiasm in government circles. The 
situation improved little upon the election of the Labour Party, which provided little 
additional opportunity for the TUC to play a role in policy making. Nonetheless the 
TUC had unlimited access to the government and was kept informed of policy 
developments. The TUC's general endorsement of the pattern of social reform 
supports the consensus thesis at a general level but disagreement over details 
remained. The BEC did not actively seek a role in policy making, nor to influence 
government policy. This should not imply that the BEC accepted events as they 
unfolded. The popular mood forced the Confederation to stifle its criticism but until 
the implementation of the 1946 National Insurance Act the BEC continued to oppose 
social security reforms along the lines of the Beveridge plan. 
The development of social security. 1948-64 
As discussed in the introduction, certain scholars locate the origins of a welfare 
consensus in the activities of the Coalition government during the second world war. 65 
Others look to the continuity between the policies of the Coalition and the 1945-51 
Labour governments or between the Attlee administration and the Conservative 
opposition. 66 The policies of the, postwar Labour government and subsequent 
Conservative administrations, particularly that led by Churchill between 1951 and 
1955, have also been examined for this purpose ý7 Some critics of the consensus 
thesis have argued that there are explanations for apparent continuities in policies 
65 Page 14. 
66 P Addison, The road from 1945', p. 15; D Dutton, British politics since 1945; R Lowe, 'Second 
world war, consensus and the foundations of the welfare state', p. 158. 
67 S Beer, The British political system, p. 176; J Harris, 'Society and the state in twentieth-century 
Britain', p. 105; A Marwick, Britain in the cerawy oftotal war, p. 374; A Seldon, 'The Churchill 
administration' p. 67; A Seldon, 'The rise and fall (and rise again? ) of the post-war consensus', p. 47. 
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other than the existence of a cross-party consensus . 
68 For instance, policy may have 
been governed by constraints, which prevented radical change. The trade union 
movement has been cited as one such constraint. 69 One of the problems with this 
approach is that it fails to consider the role of employers who may have countered 
trade union influence. 
Labour governments 
On 5 July 1948 the Labour goverment implemented its 1946 National Insurance and 
National Health Service Acts and the 1947 National Assistance Act. The social 
security legislation was largely based on the Beveridge Report, causing historians to 
establish an element of continuity between the social security policies of the wartime 
Coalition and the postwar Labour governments. On the whole the TUC approved of, 
and supported, this legislation. By contrast the BEC had, in 1947, voiced its opinion 
that the acts should not be implemented amid adverse economic circumstances. Once 
the legislation was in place, the Confederation turned its attention to the activities of 
the National Insurance Advisory Committee (NIAC) which had been established to 
make and review social security regulations. It largely eschewed direct involvement 
in other aspects of social security policy other than when it was approached by the 
goverment for advice. 
The Labour government's social security policy quickly provoked dissatisfaction 
among both employers and the trade union movement alike. In 1949, Forbes Watson 
68 N Ellison, 'Consensus here, consensus there', pp. 18-19; H Jones, 'New tricks for an old dog? ', p. 
43; C Pierson, 'Social policy', p. 149. 
69 H Jones, 'New tricks for an old dog? ', p. 43. 
45 
of the BEC complained to the National Joint Advisory Committee (NJAC) about the 
negative effects of social spending on capital investment and tax levelS., 
70 The unions 
took an opposing stance: social expenditure was not high enough. The Labour 
government's benefit levels corresponded to those recommended by Beveridge, thus 
creating the impression that the principle of subsistence had been implemented. But 
the inconsistency of flat-rate subsistence benefits soon became apparent, exacerbated 
by the anomalous relationship between national insurance and national assistance. 
National insurance benefits included a flat-rate element for rent that was inevitably 
inadequate in some regions while national assistance provided a full allowance for 
rent, which resulted in national assistance payments being higher than those under the 
national insurance scheme. Consequently national insurance beneficiaries with-no 
other source of income were able to supplement their benefit or pension with national 
assistance. Instead of diminishing as the scope of insurance expanded, national 
assistance grew considerably over the years that followed. This trend was intensified 
by the tendency for insurance benefits to fall behind movements in the cost of living 
from the outset. The, subsistence principle, always tenuous, soon became eroded 
when benefit levels were not improved until 195 1. 
Initially these developments incited complaints from the unions at annual trade 
union congresses, which were stifled or deflected by members of the General Council 
who defended the government's record . 
7' The 1951 National Insurance Bill put an 
end to its deference: the Bill made proposals for confming pension increases to older 
pensioners only, invoking a breach with the principle of uniformity. Strong 
70 NMC, MSS. 292/108.2/2, Ministry of Labour and National Service National Joint Advisory Council 
(NJAC) 27th minutes, 27 April 1949. 
71 Annual Trades Union Congress Report 1948, pp. 356-58, Annual Trades Union Congress Report 
19499p. 129. 
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dissatisfaction with anomalies between national'health insurance and unemployment 
insurance in the interwar period had led the General Council, if not the wider trade 
union movement, to consider uniformity of benefits to be a central tenet of social 
security policy. Further dissatisfaction was incited by the fitilure to reinstate the 
subsistence principle together with improvements in national assistance, which 
created a 'poverty trap': increases in national insurance caused a reduction in national 
assistance leading to no or very little increase in total income. The inadequacy of the 
benefit increases was especially unsatisfactory since the government had also taken 
advantage of the surplus in the national insurance fund to reduce the Exchequer's 
share of the national insurance contribution, and had abolished the block grant to the 
fund. The TUC's dismay at these developments was compounded by the Labour 
government's failure to consult it during the drafting of the Bill. 72 
At the end of the Attlee goverment's period in office, the BEC was still critical of 
the levels of social expenditure and there was also evidence of dissatisfaction amongst 
the trade union movement at large as expressed at congress. The unions' complaints 
came to be voiced among the highest echelons of the movement in 1951. The BEC 
had never shown any support for Labour's social security policy while the TUC's was 
disintegrating towards the end of the Labour administration. The TUC's complaints 
concerned not only the nature of the development of social security policy but the 
government's failure to consult it. The BEC had no direct contact with the Labour 
government with regard to this area of policy outside of the NIAC. There is, 
therefore, little evidence to support Keith Middlemas' thesis of 'corporate bias' during 
this period. These groups, by virtue of their importance in other areas of policy, were 
72 MRC, MSS292/161/9, Social Insurance and Industrial Welfare Committee (SIIWC) 14,11 June 
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granted unlimited access to government in this sphere, an opportunity that the BEC 
regularly chose not to exploit, but in any case were not involved in the making of 
policyper se. 
Conservative governments 
Both the theories of corporate bias and consensus are argued to have extended into the 
subsequent period of Conservative rule, from 1951 to 1964. The Churchill 
goverment (1951-55) in particular has been fertile ground for both supporters and 
detractors of the consensus thesis. It is during these years that trade union opinion, 
for some, became a constraint on government policy-making, a factor in preventing 
Conservative government from undertaking radical changes in social policy. 
Middlemas also maintains that the practice of corporate bias was sustained. The good 
relations between the Churchill government and the TUC have been widely noted 
although the relationship is often perceived to have deteriorated thereafter. 73 It has 
been suggested that government-industry relations took a downturn immediately 
following the Tory victory in 1951 although for the purposes of social security policy 
the BEC was treated on equal terms with the TUC. 74 
The practice of consultation was in fact maintained by Conservative governments, 
and to a greater degree than under their Labour predecessors. For those seeking 
1952. 
73 VL Allen, Trade unions and the government, p. 34; D Bames &E Reid, Governments and trade 
unions, p. 19; P Dorcy, 7he Conservative Party and the trade unions, p. 3 9; G Dorfin an, Wage politics 
in Britain, p. 8 1; R Martin, TUC. ý growth ofapressure group, pp. 300-2; L Minkin, The contentious 
alliance, p. 81; H Pelling, A history ofBritish trade unionism, pp. 223 and 247; R Taylor, 'Industrial 
relations', p. 98. 
74 S Blank, Industry antigovernment, p. 59; W Grant &D Marsh, The Confederation ofBritish 
Industpy, p. 23; N Kipping, Summing up, p. 68. 
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evidence of 'corporate bias', the period began promisingly, with substantial 
consultation of both the BEC and TUC during the drafting of the 1952 National 
Insurance and Family Allowances Bill. The BEC continued to have close links with 
the NIAC while the TUC increased its involvement with this body. 75 rMe 
appointment of the Phillips Committee on pensions and the introduction of graduated 
pensions, both fully discussed in chapter three, provided additional opportunities for 
BEC and TUC involvement in social policy-making. Finally, proposals for the 
introduction of earnings-ýrelated unemployment and sickness benefit in 1963 required 
full and regular consultation with both bodies. 
The new Conservative Minister of National Insurance, Osbert Peake, approached 
the BEC and TUC for consultation while it was preparing its first piece of social 
security legislation. Meetings were held with TUC and BEC representatives, and both 
groups were given advance note of the contents of the Bill before its publication. The 
Act itself did restore the principle of uniformity and benefits were raised, though not 
as far as subsistence levels. However, both the consultation process and the 
coincidence between the TUC's views and the policy changes owed more to the 
desire to compensate for reductions in food subsidies and attempts to secure TUC and 
BEC agreement for a higher retirement age . 
76 The restoration of uniformity probably 
resulted more from the Treasury's opposition to providing higher pensions for older 
pensioners on grounds of cost rather than a desire to adhere to Beveridgian 
principleS. 77 Thereafter, neither the TUC nor the Confederation was consulted during 
75 During the 1940s, the TUC submitted evidence to the NIAC regularly but its nominee, Sir Alfred 
Roberts who chaired the General Council Social Insurance Committee, seldom attended its meetings. 
76 PRO, 7227/105, Osbert Peake to RA Butler, 4 Dec. 1952. Tripartite talks on the retirement age are 
discussed in chapter 3, p. 14. 
77 PRO, T227/119, EW Playfair to JG Owen, 28 Jan. 1952. 
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the preparation of social security until the consideration of earnings relation in the 
1960s. 
The BEC and TUC were involved in extensive consultation with regard to social 
security regulations through the activities of the National Insurance Advisory 
Committee. The NIAC was established by the National Insurance Act, 1946 to 
review draft regulations, and to advise the Minister on the technical problems of 
national insurance. Both the BEC and the TUC made non-dnations for one member 
each of the advisory committee although their nominees were not appointed in a 
representative capacity. The BEC and TUC were also active in presenting evidence to 
NIAC inquiries, which dealt with matters such as the duration of unemployment 
benefit and the participation of certain groups, i. e. married women and part-time 
workers, in the national insurance scheme. 78 Discussions on the proposed 
introduction of earnings relation and membership of independent committees aside, 
the NIAC provided one of the most important opportunities for these interests to be 
actively involved in the formulation of policy, albeit at an administrative level. 
Consultation took place then on those occasions when significant policy reviews 
were taking place or on administrative issues processed by bodies such as the NIAC. 
It generally reflected a desire on the part of the government to acquaint itself with the 
views of industry and employers on certain issues rather than efforts to integrate these 
groups into the policy-making process. Therefore, the TUC continued to send 
deputations to government ministers on a regular basis in order to try to affect policy. 
78 The minutes of the NIAC until 1960 can be found in PRO, PIN 60. Minutes for subsequent years are 
not yet available under the thirty year rule. 
50 
The BEC seldom made such direct approaches to the goverriment though it was 
always available for consultation. 
Released from the ties of loyalty to a Labour administration, the TUC became 
much more critical of government social security policy during the Conservative 
years. In part this reflected a philosophy of resistance to change. The Beveridge plan 
continued to form the basis of TUC thinking on social security and, therefore, the 
principles of actuarially-based contributions, flat-rate contributions and benefits, 
uniformity and subsistence were fiercely, if not always successfully, defended . 
79 By 
1964, TUC support of government social security policy, already eroded in 195 1, had 
been severely tested. Signs of consensus are yet fewer when examining the BEC's 
position: beneath a veneer of general disinterest and unwillingness to undertake direct 
action before 1963, the BEC took every opportunity to express its dissatisfaction with 
the national insurance scheme and its underlying principles, and levels of social 
spending. As the tripartite talks on earnings-related unemployment benefit in 1963 
and 1964 would reveal, the BEC never came to terms with the social objectives of 
state social security policy. 
The gradual abandonment of the Beveridge Report led to growing dissatisfaction in 
the TUC with social security policy, a process that was provoked by Labour's 
abandonment of uniformity in 1951 and accelerated under Conservative 
administrations. Contribution and benefit levels were the main source of concern. 
The TUC was wedded to the principle of actuarially based contributions and so 
79 Actuarially-based contributions were calculated on the basis of the average amount of contributions 
required to finance benefits and pension received from the national insurance sclieme by an employee 
who participated from the ages of 16 to 65. 
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resisted increases beyond those required to maintain the actuarial principle. 
Moreover, during the 1950s, the TUC became increasingly concerned about the 
burden of contributions on low-paid workers. The TUC persistently failed to 
acknowledge this as an inherent flaw of a social security system based on flat-rate 
contributions, continuing to perceive the problem in terms of inadequate government 
funding. 80 It was aided in this analysis by Labour's cut in the Exchequer's 
contribution in 1951, which had produced an obvious explanation for the presumed 
shortfall in the national insurance fund. A shift away from actuarial principles in 
setting contribution levels also encouraged their belief that the fault lay with the 
government. In 1960 the General Council complained that contributions were rising 
faster than benefit levels thus shifting liability for future national insurance fund 
deficits from the Exchequer to the employee. 81 In order to reverse this trend, the TUC 
called for a return to actuarially based contributions and an increase in the 
Exchequer's share of the contribution. It also objected to the NHS element in the 
national insurance contribution. 82 
The TUC was unsuccessftil in persuading Conservative governments to increase 
their fmancial commitment to the insurance scheme. 83 In spite of this, it was reluctant 
to consider other methods of funding. The Labour Party's proposals for a social 
security tax incited little enthusiasm in the TUC leading to the policy being dropped . 
84 
A flat-rate contributory system of social security continued to be favoured by the 
so MRC, MSS292/161/10, SIIWC 14/1, Congress resolution on national insurance benefit rates - note 
of deputation to Minister of National Insurance on 13 May 1953. 
81 MRC, MSS. 292B/ 161/13, SIIWC 2,9 Nov. 1960. 
112 Ibid., SIIWC 2/6, Changes in national insurance, industrial injuries, national assistance and war 
1 en=ns schemes, 9 Nov. 1960. 
3C, MSS. 292/20/39, General Council (General Council), 24 Nov. 1954; MSS. 292/161/12, SIIWC 
4,8 Dec. 1954; MSS. 292B/161/13, SIIWC 2/6, Changes in national insurance, industrial injuries, 
national assistance and war pensions schemes, 9 Nov. 1960. 
" Labour Party Archive, (henceforth LPA), R. 508/April 1955, Policy and Publicity Sub-Committee. 
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TUC because it was seen to offer benefits 'as of right' and be a more egalitarian 
system than the graduated benefits that would be provided under a social security tax. 
Baldwin and Ashford have explained the TUC's recaltricance in terms of highcr-paid 
workers' opposition to a greater degree of redistribution because they were often 
members of supplementary insurance schemes. Baldwin also notes that earnings- 
related benefits were perceived to produce inequality. 85 Such self-interested motives 
are not reflected in the discussions of the TUC's Social Insurance Committee. These 
reveal that reservations were based on a desire to avoid both an expansion in means 
testing and the threat to the principle of universalism that would be posed if well-paid 
workers sought to be exempted from the national insurance scheme. 86 Should 
national insurance be confined to low-paid employees, as in the interwar period, then 
a greater degree of redistribution would not have been achieved in any case. 
The TUC was equally ineffective in persuading governments to restore the 
subsistence principle. Although it was consulted during the preparation of the 1952 
National Insurance Bill, the Act did not raise benefits to subsistence level. Successive 
Conservative Ministers of National Insurance rejected TUC demands for substantial 
increases in national insurance benefits. Still, the TUC prevaricated over the Labour 
Party's proposals for a national superannuation scheme for fear that graduated 
pensions would undermined its campaign for a flat-rate subsistence national insurance 
benefit. 87 By the time the Conservatives had increased benefits to 1946 levels in real 
tenns the TUC had raised the stakes. The Beveridge concept of subsistence was now 
dismissed as being out-dated and thus it wanted an independent inquiry that would 
85 DE Ashford, Policy andpolitics in Britain, p. 208; P Baldwin, Politics ofsocial solidarity, p. 233. 
86 MRC, MSS292/161/10, SlIWC 10,11 March 1953. 
87 MRC, MSS. 292/161/6, SllWC 5,13 Nov. 1958. 
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establish a modem-day definition of subsistence. The General Council also suggested 
that the government devise a special cost-of-living index, giving more weight to basic 
items, to be used for setting benefit levels, a request that was denied. 88 Neither was 
the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance willing to agree to an inquiry into 
subsistence. Niall Macpherson, the current Minister, rejected this on the grounds that 
the principles of flat-rate and subsistence were inherently incompatible. In fact the 
government was already undertaking a review of guiding principles for benefit levels 
but did not want the TUC to know since 'this would invite pressure for announcement 
of the findings'. 89 Benefit increases under the 1961 and 1963 National Insurance Acts 
then failed to meet the TUC's demands. 90 
No such demands for improvements to national insurance came from the 
employers. While the TUC expressed dismay over the expansion of national 
assistance, the BEC was arguing that national assistance should take precedence over 
national insurance. 91 In its evidence to the Phillips Committee on pensions, the 
Confederation blamed the social services for encouraging people to rely excessively 
on the state. 92 It continued to resist the principle of subsistence benefits and 
pensions. 93 When, in 1963, the BEC first signalled its acceptance of eamings-related 
unemployment benefit, economic considerations were presented as being paramount. 
Its activities in relation to the NIAC, with which the BEC had strong links, reveal that 
the Confederation's attitudes towards social security in the 1950s continued to be 
88 MRC, MSS292B/ 161/13, Letter from Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, 21 July 1960. 
89 PRO, CAB 134/2418, Cabinet Committee on Pensions and National Insurance 3,28 Jan. 1963. 
90 MRC, MSS192B/161/16, SIIWC 8,8 May 1963. 
91 PRO, PIN 46/79, Budget proposals and national insurance benefits - note of meeting with British 
Employers' Confederation in Minister's room on 27 March 1952, pp. 1-2. 
92 NMC, MSS. 200AB/3/2/C4 pt. 144, N. C. 13746.. Goverrunent committee on economic and financial 
r roblems of the provision for old age - note by Confederation, undated (c. Nov. 1953-Jan. 1954). 3 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C 1120 pt. 2, N. C. 14050, Government committee on economic and financial 
problems of the provision for old age - memorandurri of evidence by Confederation, April 1954, 
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governed by conservative concerns about cost and expenditure. Fear of abuse of the 
national insurance fund and inconvenience to employers also appeared to be 
formative factors. Considerations of both the public purse and to industry itself 
explains the BEC's opposition to the payment of extended unemployment benefit, full 
participation of part-time workers in the national insurance scheme and the 
requirement to pay contributions during holiday periods. 94 The BEC supported the 
maintenance of the Married Women's Anomalies Regulations that placed restrictions 
upon the participation of married women in national insurance on the grounds that 
such workers could abuse the scheme. 95 Finally, inconvenience to employers was the 
reason behind the BEC's support for improved provision for short-time workers 
because these workers were placing pressure on their employers to arrange their hours 
of employment so as to allow them to maximise entitlement to unemployment 
be f-t. 96 ne I 
In 1957 the TUC conceded that the flat-rate national insurance scheme was 
operating unsatisfactorily, a fact made glaringly obvious by the continued expansion 
zp. 1-3. 
Details of the BEC's grievances on these matters can be found in the following documents: MRC, 
MSS. 200/B/3/2/C4 pt. 121, N. C. 10068, National Insurance (Contributions During Holidays) Draft 
Regulations - copy of letter from the Confederation to the National insurance Advisory Committee, 20 
Jan. 1948; MSS. 200/B/4/t/14, N. C. 14700, Annual Report 1954-55, p. 3 1; MSS. 200/B/3/2/C365 pt 8, 
N. C. 13263, National insurance proposed regulations - copy of statements submitted by the 
Confederation to the National Insurance Advisory Committee, 7 April 1953; MSS. 200/B/3/2/C 115 1, 
N. C. 14928, Part-time employment in relation to national insurance - memorandum submitted to the 
National Insurance Advisory Committee, May 1955; N. C. 15787, National Insurance Acts - Part-time 
workers, c. 6 Feb. 1957; PRO, PIN 60/22, N. I. AX. 13, Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of 
National Insurance (vide N. I. A. C. 13, Paper 3, Representation 1, Note) Contributions during holidays - 
historical sketch, 3 Feb. 1948, p. 1; PIN 60/1, National Insurance Advisory Committee 5th meeting, 10- 
II Feb. 1948, pp. 13-15. 
95 PRO, PIN 19/144, Married women's anomalies regulations, undated; PIN 60/100, N. I. A. C. 88, Paper 
3, Representation 1, Married Women Amendment Regulations, 1953, Representation from the British 
Employers' Confederation, 30 March 1953; MRC, MSS. 200/B/4/l/12, N. C. 13270, Annual Report 
1952-53, pp. 26-27. 
96 MRC, MSSIOO/B/3/2/C4 pt. 166, N. C. 16870, Note of meeting at Ministry of Pensions and National 
Insurance, 23 July 1958; PRO, PIN 60/159, N. I. A. C. 147, Paper 3, Representation 2, Unemployment 
and Sickness Benefit Amendment (No. 2) Regulations, 1959, memorandurn submitted by the British 
Employers' Confederation, I June 1959. 
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of means-tested national assistance. It admitted that 'the uniform benefits of the 
97 
present scheme have become synonymous with inadequate benefits'. It somewhat 
reluctantly accepted the principle of earnings-relation for pensions in 1959 and, in 
1962, entered into discussions on graduated unemployment and sickness benefit with 
the Labour Party and then with the Conservative goverment in the following year. 
In spite of the shift towards eamings-related contributions and benefits, a flat-rate 
subsistence level benefit and pension remained the predominant goal of TUC social 
security policy at the end of this period, one which was clearly at odds with 
government policy. The BEC entered into discussions on eamings-related benefits for 
quite different reasons: its interest reflected economic concerns, while social 
considerations were dismissed as being irrelevant to the Confederation. 
Modernisation ofnational insurance: earnings relation 1963-1964 
Both the BEC and the TUC were involved in consultation with the Conservative 
goverment in 1963 and 1964 regarding plans to introduce earnings-related benefits. 
The talks involved the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Pensions and National 
Insurance (MPNI), and were conducted at an official level. The opinions expressed 
by the BEC and TUC show that twenty years after the publication of the Beveridge 
Report, these interests were still as divided as ever over the objectives of social 
security policy. Although both groups came to endorse eamings-related 
unemployment benefit, their reasons for doing so and views about the scope of 
earnings-relation continued to be very different. The govenunent's response to the 
BEC's proposals, and the TUC's attitude, undermine any suggestion that agreement 
97 MRC, MSS. 2921161/14, SIIWC 14/7, Suggested paragraphs for Congress report, 12 June 1957. 
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on camings-rclation for unemployment benefit as the future direction of social 
security policy amounted to a consensus. These tripartite talks provide the strongest 
evidence of corporate bias in the making of social security policy during this period. 
The BEC and TUC were consulted because of their position as interest groups. 
However, the existence of corporate bias was no guarantee that these groups would 
have an active influence on the development of policy. In fact, officials proved to be 
disappointed with their solutions to the problems of earnings-relation. 
The TUC first took part in discussions on eamings-related benefits with the Labour 
Party in 1962. The General Council endorsed the principle of earnings-relation on the 
condition that basic national insurance benefits were restored to subsistence level, 
which needed to be redefiried. 98 This remained the TUC's chief objective during talks 
with the Conservative government; it anticipated that the additional funds raised by 
graduating contributions could be used to improve the flat-rate scheme. 99 This 
reflected the TUC's continued emphasis on social security for low-paid workers and 
those who were excluded from occupational provision. The social aspects of the 
national insurance scheme were deemed to be paramount and the alleviation of 
poverty continued to be the TUC's priority. By contrast BEC interest in earnings- 
related unemployment benefit reflected economic concerns: 'any question of the 
adequacy of the unemployment benefit on social grounds was not a matter for the 
Confederation. What concerned the Confederation was the advantage or otherwise to 
98 Ibid., SIIWC Sub-Committee on Sickness and Unemployment Benefit 4,9 May 1962. 
" PRO, LAB 10/193 1, Note of deputation from the TUC to the Minister of Pensions and National 
Insurance on 14 Jan. 1963,18 Jan. 1963, p. I and 3; Note of a meeting with representatives of the 
TUC, 17 Dec. 1963, p. 1; LAB 10/1932, Richard Wood to AS Marre, 17 Dec. 1963; LAB 10/193 1, CF 
Heron to DC Barnes, 30 Jan. 1964; Note of the third meeting of officials with representatives of the 
TUC, 21 Feb. 1964; PIN 18/302, Earnings-related short-term benefits -a summary of the discussions 
held at official level with the BEC and the TUC, undated. 
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industrial relations of any change in benefit rates'. '00 The BEC devised proposals for 
improved unemployment benefit in order to avoid government legislation on 
severance pay and to relieve demands on employers to make provision for 
redundancy. '01 It also hoped to use earnings-related unemployment benefit in order to 
improve labour mobility and to encourage agreement on an incomes poliCy. 102 
Under the BEC's scheme, earnings-relation would not be extended to sickness 
benefit for a number of reasons: sick workers had jobs to which they would return, 
over 50 per cent of workers received occupational sick pay, eamings-related. sickness 
benefit was irrelevant to the objective of increasing mobility, and it would be 
inflationary. 103 The Confederation also favoured strict conditions on the receipt of 
eamings-related unemployment benefit; these included a good national insurance 
contribution record and willingness to relocate and retmin. 104 The objective of the 
contribution condition was to 'cut down the numbers qualifying for benefit to a 
moderate figure ... and enable contributions to be kept small if spread over all 
insured 
persons'. 105 The BEC later agreed that the requirement to relocate and retrain was 
perhaps too onerous but believed it should be given serious consideration once the 
supply of housing and training facilities improved. 106 In order to avoid benefit 
becoming a disincentive to return to work, the BEC advocated a ceiling on the total 
100 MRC, MSS. 200/C/3/EMP/3/114, BEC 63/135, Payments for redundancy, 7 March 1963, p. 2. 
101 Ibid., BEC 62/385, Report of working party on unemployment benefit, 27 Sept 1962; BEC 63/135, 
Payments for redundancy, 7 March 1963, p. 2. 
102 PRO, LAB 10/1932, Note of a meeting with representatives of the BEC, 16 Dec. 1963; Mr Davies 
to K Barnes, 18 Dec. 1963. 
103 Ibid., Report on meeting of Minister of Pensions with BEC, 26 Nov. 1963, p. 2; Note of the second 
meeting of officials with the BEC, 7 Feb. 1964, p. 1; Note by K Barnes, Ministry of Labour, 13 Feb. 
1964; PIN 18/302, Memorandum by the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, undated (c. Feb. 
1964). 
104 PRO, LAB 10/1932, Report on meeting of Minister of Pensions with BEC, 26 Nov. 1963, pp. 1-2. 
105 MRC, MSS. 200/C/3/EMP/3/115, Notes of meeting with Minister of Pensions and National 
Insurance, 16 Dec. 1963. 
106 PRO, LAB 10/ 1932, Note of the second meeting of officials with the BEC, 7 Feb. 1964, p. 3. 
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benefit of two-thirds of normal earnings, which would be payable for only ten to 
fifteen weeks. 107 The TUC was concerned solely with the social aspects of national 
insurance and wanted the new scheme to be as generous as possible. Accordingly it 
rejected the E9 to E18 wage band that operated for graduated pensions as being too 
narrow since it would not 'achieve a satisfactory measure of re-distribution in favour 
of the lower-wage earners'. 108 The TUC was also strongly opposed to the exclusion 
of sickness benefit from an earnings-related scheme. This stemmed from the trade 
unions' dislike of the anomalies between national health insurance and unemployment 
insurance in the interwar period. In addition, a high proportion of workers were not 
members of occupational sick pay schemes. 'O' 
The BEC's scheme found little favour with either the Ministry of Labour or the 
Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, though the former was more 
sympathetic to its interest in the economic aspects of the national insurance 
scheme. ' 10 The MPNI was opposed to the BEC's attempts to restrict improvements to 
redundant workers and objected to national insurance being used to satisfy only 
economic objectives. "' Both Ministries accepted that, earnings-relation should be 
107 PRO, LAB 10/1931, Eamings-related unemployment benefit -some of the points for discussion, 
undated, LAB 10/1932, Note of the second meeting of officials with the BEC, 7 Feb. 1964, p. 3; PIN 
18/302, Memorandum by the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, undated (c. Feb. 1964). 
'011 PRO, LAB 10/193 1, Note of a meeting with representatives of the TUC, 17 Dec. 1963, p. 2; LAB 
10/1932, Meeting with BEC and TUC on 16-17 Dec. 1963 - note of main points concerning practical 
problems of wage-relation. 
'09 PRO, LAB 10/193 1, Note of a meeting with representatives of the TUC, 17 Dec. 1963, p. 2; LAB 
10/ 1932, Meeting with BEC and TUC on 16-17 Dec. 1963 - note of main points concerning practical 
problems of wage-relation; Richard Wood to AS Marre, 17 Dec. 1963. 
110 PRO, PIN 35/203, AS Marre to RS Swift, 23 Dec. 1963. 
111 PRO, LAB 10/1932, Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance document, 'Eamings-related 
unemployment benefit', 14 Nov. 1963; Report on meeting of Minister of Pensions with BEC, 26 Nov. 
1963, p. 2; PIN 35/203, Note of a meeting on earnings-related unemployment benefit, 7 Jan. 1964; 
MRC, MSS. 200/C/3/EMP13/I IS, Notes of meeting with Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, 
16 Dec. 1963. 
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also extended to sickness benefit. ' 12 The Ministry of Labour found that only ten per 
cent of unemployed workers would benefit under the BEC's plan, which would do 
little to lessen workers' fear of redundancy or to improve industrial relations. 113 ne 
MINI was critical of the two-thirds. ceiling on benefit levels that would prevent 
families with two children on an income of E16 per week from receiving a graduated 
supplement even though the wage earner would be liable for eamings-related 
contributions. ' 14 VVhile the Ministry of Labour agreed with the BEC with regard to 
the three-month limit on the payment of eamings-related unemployment benefit, the 
Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance argued that it should be paid for seven 
months on the same basis as flat-rate unemployment benefit. "' 
While the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance found it desirable to 
ascertain the views of industry and trade unions on earnings-related short-term 
benefits, they did not necessarily influence it. One Ministry of Labour official 
described the shortcomings of the BEC's proposals as 'formidable'. ' 16 The MINI 
was clearly not impressed with many aspects of the BEC's proposals and observed 
that while '[o]bviously the views of the B. E. C. are extremely important ... they 
do not 
fully reflect the views of industry. ' 117 Officials were also disappointed by the TUC's 
contribution to the talks on the practical problems of earnings-related benefits: '[i]t 
seems likely that the main value of these talks with the T. U. C. will be to make the 
112 MRC, MSS. 200/C/3/EMP/3/115, Notes of meeting with Minister of Pensions and National 
Insurance, 16 Dec. 1963; PRO, PIN 35/203, AS Marre to RS Swift, 23 Dec. 1963; LAB 10/193 1, CF 
Heron to DC Barnes, 30 Jan. 1964. 
113 PRO, LAB 10/2024, Note of meeting to discuss the BEC's comments on the government's 
memorandum on redundancy, 29 Nov. 1963. 
114 PRO, LAB 10/1932, K Barnes to AS Marre, 24 Feb. 1964. 
115 PRO, PIN 35/203, AS Marre to RS Swift, 23 Dec. 1963; Note of a meeting held on earnings-related 
unemployment benefit, 18 Feb. 1964. 
116 PRO, LAB 10/1932, UD to Minister of Labour, 4 Nov. 1963. 
117 PRO, LAB 10/2046, DC Barnes to unknown, 18 Dec. 1963. 
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unions realise the difficulties involved. "" Another suggested that 'the main interest 
of the talks for us is to gauge their attitude and strength of feelipg on particular points 
as a background of opinion to our own discussions'. ' 19 
Neither were the BEC and the TUC impressed by the other's plans. The TUC was 
critical that the employers were approaching the subject from an economic viewpoint 
only. 120 It was particularly opposed to the proposed exclusion of sickness benefit 
from earnings-relation, the BEC's benefit levels, and the time limit of three months. 121 
Similarly the TUC's position found little favour with the BEC. The Confederation 
objected to the TUC's demands for improvements in both flat-rate national insurance 
benefits and the introduction of earnings-relation for sickness as well as 
unemployment benefit: '[ilt cannot be repeated too often that increased payments of 
this type to workers whether through Social Insurance schemes or by employers are 
inflationary unless they can be paid for by higher productivity. " 122 Although the BEC 
had agreed to the introduction of earnings-relation, for unemployment benefit only, it 
continued to concern itself about the cost of such advances. Its director, Sir George 
Pollock, wrote to the Ministry of Labour to voice 'concern at the serious inflationary 
situation which might result from the - implementation of all, or part of, the 
Government's programme for the improvement of the status and security of 
workers'. 123 The BEC was worried that the introduction of earnings-related 
118 PRO, LAB 10/ 193 1, Note by K Barnes, 21 Jan. 1964. 
119 Ibid., Davies to K Barnes, 31, Jan. 1964. 
120 PRO, LAB 10/ 1932, Richard Wood to AS Marre, 17 Dec. 1963. 
121 PRO, LAB 10/193 1, Note of the second meeting of officials with the TUC, 30 Jan. 1964; Note of 
the third meeting of officials with the TUC, 21 Feb. 1964; PIN 18/302, Earnings-related short-term 
benefits -a summary of the discussions held at official level with the BEC and the TUC, undated. 122 PRO, LAB 10/1932, Extract from BEC Bulletin No. 222,22 Jan. 1964. 
123 MRC' MSS. 200/C/3/EMP/3/115, George Pollock to Sir James Dunnet, Ministry of Labour, 29 Jan. 
1964. 
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unemployment and sickness benefit would result in increased costs for industry and a 
reduction in employers' bargaining power in negotiations with the trade unions. ' 24 
Although agreement was reached on the introduction of earnings-relation for 
unemployment benefit between the TUC and the BEC, important differences 
remained outstanding and were not resolved while the Conservatives were in 
goverment. For the duration of these talks, the Confederation refused to endorse the 
application of graduation to sickness benefit. Together with the restrictive nature of 
its proposals for earnings-related unemployment benefit this demonstrated its 
continued aversion to the social benefits of state social security provision. The TUC 
continued to support earnings-relation only on the basis of substantial improvements 
to the basic national insurance scheme, a policy option that was not satisfactory in the 
eyes of the goverment. 
Conclusion 
In 1948, the Labour government introduced social security reforms based largely on 
the recommendations of the Beveridge Report. By 1964, the basic structure remained 
in place following thirteen years of Conservative administration,, but many of the 
Beveridgian principles had been abandoned. The principle of uniformity was 
breached by the Labour government in 1951, restored by the Conservatives in 1952, 
and- finally displaced by the introduction of graduated pensions in 1961. Earnings- 
related pensions also incurred a departure from the principles of flat-rate contributions 
124 PRO, T227/1498, Deputation from the BEC on 3 Feb. 1964,4 Feb. 1964. 
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and benefits and universalism. Finally, the subsistence principle was never fully 
implemented. 
Although the underlying principles of the Beveridge Report slowly became 
obsolete, Conservative governments did not instigate radical reform of social security 
policy. The shift from universal insurance benefits to means-tested national 
assistance occurred only gradually and not as a consequence of cuts to the national 
insurance scheme. The most important policy change involved the introduction of 
earnings-relation, which was first mooted by the Labour Party. Cross-party support 
for the Beveridge Report, the implementation of the Beveridge plan by the postwar 
Labour government, the decision by post-1951 Conservative governments not to 
undertake radical reform of social security, and the lack of different policies between 
Conservative governments and the Labour opposition in the 1950s have all lent 
support to the idea of a 'postwar consensus' of which the welfare state is but one 
ingredient. A second aspect is the practice of consultation with the major interest 
groups in policy-making, a process that Middlemas describes as corporate bias. 
This chapter has sought to establish the existence of corporate bias in the sphere of 
social security policy during the period 1942 to 1964. It has found that it can only be 
applied tentatively: it was evident in relation to particular instances of policy-making 
but was not a characteristic of social security policy-making as a rule. Neither the 
BEC nor the TUC experienced difficulty in gaining access to the government 
ministers or officials although the BEC seldom took advantage of this opportunity. 
Both were consulted on important changes of policy and on administrative change via 
the NIAC. Access, however, was not tantamount to influence and the latter is hard to 
63 
detect. It seems that successive governments of both parties consulted these groups in 
their own interests. Often the objective was to ascertain views for a backgroundto 
discussion or to obtain agreement to a change of P-olicy as in the case of earnings- 
relation. The goal was never to instigate a tripartite policy network. 
These groups were not incorporated into the policy-making process with respect to 
social security policy but were consulted at various times by government and actively 
formulated policy within their own organisations. The TUC was the more active in 
terms of the development of its own policy and the frequency of meetings with 
government at its own bequest. In the absence of any other pressure group activity 
addressing the issue of poverty before 1965, this may have been the TUC's most 
important contribution. In this case, its lack of success in obtaining improvements to 
the national insurance scheme was unfortunate. The BEC tended to focus its efforts 
on the activities of the NIAC and developed policy in response to requests for advice 
or consultation by the government. As groups, which developed definite positions on 
social security policy bringing them into contact with the government, it is plausible 
to look here for signs of a consensus outside government. 
The evidence is mixed: the TUC supported government policy with few 
reservations until 1951, while the BEC tended to resist social policy initiatives 
regardless of the governing party. After 1951, the TUC became increasingly 
dissatisfied with government policy as it moved away from the Beveridge model of 
social security. Contribution and benefit levels were particular sources of grievance 
and the introduction of eamings-relation was accepted only grudgingly. The BEC 
took advantage of meetings with the government and its membership of social 
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security-related committees to express continued distaste for the underlying principles 
of the social security system. Tripartite talks on eamings-related benefits in 1963 and 
1964 revealed that the BEC and TUC had maintained significantly different opinions 
about the purposes of state social policy throughout this period. At a fundamental 
level the TUC was part of a welfare consensus whereby government should be the 
main provider of social security, while the BEC clearly never subscribed to this view. 
On closer inspection the principles which underpinned TUC social security policy at 
this time came to be increasingly at odds with that of the goverment. Signs of 
consensus, therefore, diminished throughout this period. 
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Chapter Three: Retirement Pensions 
Chapter one on social security showed how the TUC became one, of the most 
important sources of pressure on governments for improvements in social security 
during the years 1942 to 1964. Higher benefits were a feature of TUC social policy 
throughout this period. These were pursued by lobbying government and via the 
TUC's membership of the National Insurance Advisory Committee. This indicated 
that the TUC was the most important of those groups promoting the rights of the 
unemployed and the sick, who were dependent on state benefits, prior to the 
emergence of poverty-based pressure groups in the mid-1960s. While the TUC's 
direct impact is difficult to assess, its strong opposition to cuts in social expenditure 
has been cited as an indirect factor in Conservative governments' maintenance of the 
welfare state. However, this reading of TUC influence on government social policy 
ignores the input of the employers' association, the BEC, which often presented views 
quite opposite to those of the TUC. An examination of BEC social policy in the 
postwar period and its impact on policy-making highlights the complexity of relations 
between government and interest groups. 
This chapter focuses on one particular aspect of social security policy, retirement 
pensions in order to allow a more in-depth assessment of the TUC's anti-poverty 
stance and the BEC's attitudes towards state social services. Pensions proved to be 
problematic for successive governments because of widespread concerns about the 
cost of the 'ageing population' and their implications for employment policy. 
Likewise, the TUC's pension policy did not solely reflect concerns about social 
justice but impinged upon other trade union interests, namely wages and the labour 
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market. TUC pension policy, throughout this period, was therefore, somewhat 
inconsistent with its wider social security policy. The TUC's interest in better 
pensions for the benefit of the elderly was seldom pursued at the cost of possible 
detriment to the structure of the labour market. Competing interests also led the BEC 
to have very little interest in the social objectives of pensions policy. 
Old age pensions to retirement pensions: the process of reform, 1942-48 
British old age pensions before the second world war 
The 1908 Pensions Act introduced the first state old age pensions for the over-70s. 
These were financed from taxation and means-tested. Contributory pensions for the 
over-65s were not introduced until the legislation of the 1925 Widows', Orphans' and 
Old Age Pensions Act, which covered all manual workers and those earning less than 
E250 a year. Following the 1937 Pensions Act, voluntary participation was extended 
to those earning less than E400 a year. Then, in 1942, the responsibility for deciding 
the future of pensions policy was passed to the Beveridge Committee. 
These changes in pensions policy were largely supported by the TUC. Initially it 
preferred state-financed pensions to a contributory system, and welcomed the 1908 
Act accordingly. By 1925 the TUC had come to endorse the contributory principle 
and accepted state responsibility for the administration of pensions schemes. 
Thereafter, it turned its attention to pension levels. These provoked frequent 
complaints from the TUC during the interwar period. Dissatisfaction with pensions at 
the annual congresses in 1937 and 1938 prompted the General Council to send a 
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deputation to Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in February 1939 to 
protest about the dependence of many old people on public assistance as a result of 
inadequate pensions. ' Shortly afterwards the govermnent instigated an enquiry into 
pensions but little progress was made before the war. Sympathy for elderly poverty 
was not, however, the sole determinant of TUC pensions policy. Labour market 
considerations were equally, if not more, important. High unemployment had 
heightened interest in the removal of older workers from employment in order to 
reduce competition for younger workers. 2 Unions were also concerned about, the 
practice of cutting older workers' wages by the value of their pension, which had a 
negative impact on the wage structure and on trade union bargaining power. 3 
Consequently both the Labour Party and the TUC adopted the policy. of making state 
pensions conditional upon withdrawal from the labour market in 1937.4 
Business interest in pensions policy before 1939 often reflected concerns with their 
CoSt. 5 During the 1920s, the NCEO persistently lobbied the government for a 
reduction in the health insurance contribution in view of a surplus in the health 
6 insurance fund . It also urged that 
implementation of the 1925 Widows', Orphans' 
and Old Age Pensions Bill be delayed until unemployment was reduced, and accused 
t1he government of being 'prepared to see the Health Section of the Social Services 
over-developed and over-financed. 0 The NCEO was opposed to the legislation 
1 Annual Trades Union Congress Report 1939, pp. 165-66. 
2j Macnicol and A BIaikie, 'The politics of retirement', p. 25, BE Shenfield, Social policiesfor old 
age, p. 94. 
3J Macnicol, 'Beveridge and old age', p. 80; J Macnicol and A Blaikie, 'The politics of retirement', p. 
30 
4J Macnicol, 'Beveridge and old age', p. 8 1; WA Robson, Social Security, p. 159. 
5L Hannah, Inventing retirement, p. 17. 
6 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C645 pt. 2, Deputation from CEO to the Rt. Hon. Neville Chamberlain, 17 
July 1925, pp. 3-5. 
7 Ibid., Ref. N. C. 127 1, Widows, Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions Bill, 29 June 1925. 
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because the cost was too onerous for -industry and excessive in comparison with 
foreign competitors! Opinions were mixed however; Hannah has found some 
businessmen welcomed the 1925 Act since state pensions that did not carry a means 
test would not infringe upon occupational schemes. 9 
In the interwar years, both the policies of business and the labour movement in 
respect of pensions reflected a certain amount of self-interest. Employers focused on 
levels of taxation and insurance contributions, and the implications for occupational 
provision. The TUC was more concerned about elderly poverty but had to consider 
also the interests of younger workers and the wider impact of pensions on wage 
levels. Higher pensions could lead to larger wage cuts for older workers, therefore, 
the retirement condition was seen as a potential solution to this problem and as such 
was to become a central feature of TUC policy towards the aged. 
Beveridge andpensions 
The outbreak of war and subsequent high rates of employment shifted the emphasis 
from family' to elderly poverty. 'Only with the economic upturn and urban 
evacuations at the beginning of World War II was policy attention directed away from 
the mass unemployment of the interwar years and toward the gross poverty of many 
aged Britons. "O Early measures to address this matter included a reduction in the 
pension age for women from 65 to 60 and the introduction of a 5s supplementary 
pension subject to a household means-test. When the Beveridge Committee began its 
a Ibid., Ref, N. C. 1285, Widows, Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions Bill, notes for 
deputation to Minister of Health, 17 July 1925. 
9L Hannah, Inventing retirement, pp. 29 and 159. 
10 H Heclo, Modern socialpolitics, p. 254. 
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review of social security in 1941, pensions quickly emerged as an important issue 
because of the growing numbers of elderly people and their prospective cost. 
The amicable relationship between Beveridge and the TUC, and the degree of 
similarity between their ideas about social security has been discussed in chapter one. 
With regard to pensions, the TUC proposed that they should be sufficient as to 
provide a subsistence standard of living, and that they should be paid only upon 
retirement from paid work. In line with TUC prewar policy on this matter, the 
attachment of a retirement condition was intended to prevent employers from 
reducing older workers' pay once they were in receipt of a pension. The provision of 
adequate pensions combined with a retirement condition was also designed to 
promote earlier retirement in order to provide work for younger people. " Clearly 
labour market considerations continued to inform the TUC's position on state 
pensions in wartime. The BEC did not formulate any detailed policy on pensions 
although their wider opposition to the subsistence principle was at odds with both the 
views of the TUC and Beveridge himself. 12 
Some of the TUC's views and those of Beveridge coincided in the Beveridge plan. 
The report proposed that pensions be brought into line with other social security 
benefits in order to establish the principle of uniformity. Beveridge also 
recommended that old age pensions be subject to a retirement condition in accordance 
with the TUC's proposal. The new pension involved a substantial improvement on 
the prewar pension of I Os, which had provoked repeated complaints at annual 
11 J Macnicol, 'Beveridge and old age', p. 80. 
12 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C216 pt. 3, N. C. 7405, undated (April 1942). 
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congresses. Beveridge recommended that the pension be increased to 24s and 42s for 
a single person and a couple respectively, but in view of the cost of pensions the 
improved pensions were to be introduced over a transitional period of twenty years. 
Consequently, the proposed pension reforms probably incurred more 
dissatisfaction in the TUC than any other recommendations aside from the 
incorporation of workmen's compensation into social security. A memorandum 
produced by the TUC Joint Committee on Social Insurance and Workmen's 
Compensation following discussion of the Beveridge Report over a month-long 
period identified retirement pensions as one of the most contentious aspects of the 
plan for social security. 13 Beveridge's initial pension levels and the prospect of such a 
gradual introduction were the sources of its dissatisfaction. While the TUC General 
Council eventually agreed to a transitional period of ten years in conjunction with the 
Labour Party, it continued to seek an alternative to the transitional period. 14 -In a 
meeting with Sir William Jowitt, the minister in charge of social reconstruction, its 
representatives suggested that reduced pensions be paid to those with inadequate 
contribution records instead of a delay in the introduction of full pensions. 15 
While the TUC and Beveridge agreed on the subsistence principle, the TUC 
wanted it to be implemented immediately in relation to retirement pensions while 
Beveridge had recommended its gradual introduction in order to reduce costs. 
Similarly, both favoured a retirement condition with Beveridge doing so following 
13 MRC, MSS. 292/150.5/2, Jt. SIC. WC & FC memorandum on certain phases of the Beveridge Report, 
4 Jan. 1943. 
14 MRC' MSS. 292/161.1/3, Jt. SIC. WC & FC meeting with the Social Insurance Sub-Committees of 
the Labour Party and the Co-operative Union, 9 Feb. 1943. 
15 MRC, MSS. 292/150.5/4, Jt. SIC. WC & FC, TUC deputation to Sir William Jowitt, 12 Aug. 1943. 
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discussions with the TUC on this matter. Yet, as John Macnicol has pointed out, 'in 
one of the oddest paradoxes of social policy history, the stated intention behind 
Beveridge's innovation was precisely the opposite of what previous advocates had 
suggested. He hoped that the retirement condition would discourage withdrawal from 
the labour market, and thus contain the cost of pensions. ' 16 In order to reinforce this 
objective, Beveridge recommended increments to the pensions of those who deferred 
retirement and also his proposals permitted a small amount of earnings in order to 
allow pensioners to undertake some part-time work after retirement. 17 At first the 
TUC Joint Social Insurance Committee refused to sanction higher pensions for 
deferred retirement in view of the TUC's policy of encouraging earlier retirement but 
did change its mind a few days later. 18 
Herein lay the contradictory nature of TUC pensions policy throughout the postwar 
years, stemming from its adherence to the retirement condition which effectively 
limited the potential income of those over the statutory retirement age. Consequently, 
improvements in elderly standards of living were largely dependent upon the level of 
state assistance. This put the onus on the TUC to ensure that pensions were adequate 
in order to make compulsory retirement tolerable, a task with which it had little 
saccess and where its commitment proved at times to be ambivalent. Macnicol and 
Blaikie have noted how the TUC prioritised the needs of younger workers through its 
6curious "complicity" ... in demanding a measure that was to confirm the economic 
uselessness of old people'. 19 The TUC was, however, caught in a dilemma: it 
16 j Macnicol, 'Beveridge and old age' p. 85. 
17 Beveridge Report, para. 338. 
18 MRC, MSS. 292/150.5/2, it. SIC-WC & FC memorandum on certain phases of the Beveridge Report, 
4 Jan. 1943; MSS. 292/161.1/3, it. SIC & WC & FC 4/1,14 Jan. 1943. 
19 J Macnicol and A Blaikie, 'The politics of retirement', pp. 37-8. 
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believed that employers would cut the pay of older workers in receipt of a pensions, 
which would reduce opportunities for younger workers and undermine wage 
negotiations unless a retirement condition was in place. 20 This reflected the legacy of 
mass interwar unemployment and the weakness of the trade unions at that time. Such 
insecurity continued to dominate TUC thinking after the war in spite of sustained high 
employment levels. Although its wider social security policy tended to be guided by 
social principles - an aversion to means testing and a belief in the elimination of 
poverty via state benefits - pensions policy produced a conflict of interests that was to 
prevent the TUC from becoming an effective defender of pensioners. 
Following the Beveridge Report, the next development in pensions policy was 
outlined in the publication of the coalition government's White Paper on social 
insurance in 1944. It rejected Beveridge's proposed transitional period for pensions 
on the grounds that it was politically unattractive. The coalition agreed that pensions 
would be introduced at 20s and 35s for those who were insured under the 1925 
legislation. Meanwhile those who had not participated in the existing insurance 
scheme would have to make contributions for ten years before gaining entitlement to 
a state retirement pension. The coalition did accept Beveridge's recommendation for 
compulsory retirement subject to permitting earnings of 20s per week. The TUC was 
unhappy with this earnings limit, arguing that pensioners would find it difficult to 
i 
obtain work that paid less than 20s. Consequently it would be necessary to implement 
safeguards to prevent exploitation by employers seeking to employ pensioners at 
lower rates of pay. 21 Furthermore the TUC complained that the pension levels 
20 Ibid. 
21 MRC, MSS. 292/150.6/1, Jt. SIC. WC & FC meeting with the Labour Party and the Co-operative 
Congress, 5 Oct. 1944; Jt. SIC. WC & FC meeting with representatives of certain affiliated unions, 4 
Oct. 1944. 
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recommended in the White Paper were inadequate and argued that these should be 
increased. 22 During this time, employers had little to say on the subject of pensions. 
The BEC's hostile reaction to the Beveridge Report and its lack of response to the 
1944 White Paper have been noted in the previous chapter. The Confederation would 
not participate in any -debate on pensions before the return of a Conservative 
administration in 1951. 
Postwar retirement pensions and the cost of the welfare state 
Labour governments 
Pension reform was a component of the new Labour government's programme for 
social reconstruction. Historians have observed similarities between the policies of 
the wartime coalition government and the postwar Labour administration resulting in 
the identification of a post-1945 consensus. The example of pensions lends credence 
to this reading of postwar British politics. There were no real differences between the 
coalition's plans for pensions and the reforms implemented by the Attlee 
governments. Pensions were integrated into the national insurance scheme in line with 
other benefits such as unemployment and sickness, although pension reform was 
introduced two years earlier. This reforni involved two significant changes: a 
substantial improvement in pension levels, to 24s and 42s (single and couple rate), 
and the implementation of the retirement condition. While the Labour government's 
pensions were higher than those offered by the Coalition, the principle was the same 
and both the Conservatives and Labour were agreed on compulsory retirement. 
22 MRC, MSS. 292/150.6/1, Some comments on the government White Paper by JL Smyth, undated. 
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The welfare state did bring about significant improvements in financial provision 
for the aged. Retirement pensions were substantially increased, from 10s to 24s 
(single rate) while the replacement of public assistance by national assistance was 
designed to eliminate the stigma often attached to means'tested benefits. Yet the 
introduction of universal pensions was most beneficial for the better-off among the 
elderly since those with an annual income of less than E420 had been protected under 
the previous legislation. Nonetheless, after the war itwas believed that the problems 
23 
of elderly poverty had been resolved. At the same time, increasingly more negative 
attitudes were being expressed about the financial 'implications' of the ageing 
population. 24 If there was a consensus that the government should address the issue 
of elderly poverty after the war, there was also a consensus that this would'be 
expensive and problematic. Predictably, the BEC subscribed to this'sentiment in its 
evidence to the 1953 Phillips Committee on pensions, but it was also evident in the 
TUC's reticence in pursuing better pensions that would require higher national 
insurance contributions from its membership. 
Fo owing Labour's electoral victory, the TUC initially tried to obtain a 
commitment to the subsistence principle since the coalition government's pension 
levels, 24s and 42s, did not conform to'Beveridge's definition of subsistence. But 
James Griffiths, the new Minister of National Insurance, was unreceptive to its claims 
and refused to'prioritise pensions over other national insurance ben'efits. 25 The TUC 
Social Insurance Committee now quite readily accepted his argument since the 
23 C Phillipson, Capitalism and the construction ofold age, p. 28; R Crossman, The politics of 
? ensions, p. 6. 
41 C Phillipson, Capitalism and the construction ofold age, p. 29. 25 MRC, MSS. 292/161.1/4, Jt. SIC. WC & FC deputation to the Minister of National Insurance, 15 Nov. 1945. 
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Labour government promised substantial improvements in pensions. 26 Subsequently 
the TUC General Council proved reluctant to challenge the Labour government's 
pension policy in relation to the value of retirement pensions. Following the release 
of the 1946 National Insurance Bill, a TUC deputation to James Griffiths conveyed 
the unions' 'general approval' of the Bill. 27 While the TUC still believed that pension 
levels. were too low, representatives were sympathetic to the cost of retirement 
pensions to the govenunent. 28 Pension levels continued to be the subject of 
correspondence but the TUC put little pressure on the government for improvement. 
In 1949 the General Council rejected a Congress resolution calling for better pensions 
because it required significant increases in contributions and would break with the 
principle of uniforinity of benefit. 29 Its unwillingness to countenance higher 
contributions and undermine the principle of uniformity in order to secure better 
pensions suggests that the TUC's concern with elderly poverty was not to be pursued 
at the expense of its current membership's interests. 30 Accordingly, it was dissatisfied 
when the government's 1951 National Insurance Act only improved provision for the 
over-70s thus abandoning the uniform basis of national insurance benefits. 
The TUC's commitment to achieving higher standards of living for the elderly can 
b. -. questioned on the basis of its unwillingness to countenance, higher contributions 
from workers. In addition, certain aspects of TUGlabour policy placed older people 
at a disadvantage vis-A-vis younger employees. Full employment permitted greater 
26 MRC, MSS. 292/150/1, Document re: Notes on national insurance legislation, undated. 
27 MRC, MSS. 292/161.1/4, Jt.. SI. WC & FC, 14 Feb. 1946. 
29 MRC, MSS. 292/150/1, Notes on National Insurance legislation, undated. 
29 MRC, MSS. 292/166.2/1, Consideration of a 1949 Congress resolution entitled 'Retirement 
Pensions', undated. 
30 MRC, MSS. 292/166.2/2, Assistant Secretary of Social Insurance Department to Councillor Chas A 
Howell, Derby and District Trades Council, 4 Oct. 195 1; TUC Annual Report 195 1, pp. 229-30. 
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tolerance of older workers and led the TUC to endorse government policies that 
31 
encouraged later retirement but it continued to resist statutory intervention. The 
TUC undertook consideration of improving incentives for deferred retirement that 
meant better pensions but it would not accept measures that could reduce 
opportunities for younger workers. For instance, in 1949 the Social Insurance 
Committee endorsed a government proposal for a lump sum payment to be paid to 
workers deferring retirement, but by 1951 some members were voicing concern that 
this could damage younger employees' promotion prospects. 32 The Labour Party then 
dropped the policy before the TUC could discuss it fin-ther although its reservations 
were by then obvious. 33 Similar concerns were raised by the 1951 National Insurance 
Act and the 1951 budget: the Act doubled the earnings limit under the retirement 
condition, from 20s to 40s, in spite of TUC opposition while the budget increased the 
increments for deferred retirement. 34 Ultimately the TUC's ambivalence towards 
financial incentives to delay retirement and its opposition to the relaxation of the 
retirement condition were detrimental for older workers at a time when it was not 
actively seeking improvements in state pensions. 
The TUC was hardly persistent in its campaign for better pensions before 1951. 
This may be explained by the wider feeling that Labour's social security legislation 
had successfully addressed the problem of elderly poverty. 35 At the same time there 
appeared to be a political consensus over what could be described as 'the problem of 
31 LPA, Research Series R. D. 166/October 1948, 'The Employment of Older People; Policy and 
Publicity Committee 9,21 Feb. 1949. . 32 MRC, MSS. 292/161/8, SIIwC, 15 Feb. 195 1; SIIWC, 15 March 195 1. 33 Ibid., SIIWC, II April 195 1. 
34 PRO, CAB 130/66 Gen. 357/2, National Insurance Scheme interim review by Chancellor of Exchequer and Minister of National Insurance, 14 March 195 1; MRC, MSS. 292/166.2/2, General 
Secretary to Mr A Deakin, 4 June 195 1. 35 R Crossman, The politics ofpensions, p. 6; C Phillipson, Capitalism and the construction ofold age, 
p. 28. 
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pensions' to which the TUC and the BEC both subscribed. There is no record of the 
BEC's views on developments in retirement pensions during the period of Labour 
government. Nonetheless, its general attitude towards developments in social security 
suggests that it was reluctant to accept reforms but was aware that its views were 
impolitic. Resource considerations were never absent from discussions on state 
pensions from the date of publication of the Beveridge Report. This resulted in a lack 
of political will to increase pensions between 1946 and 1951. It also explains why 
pensions were granted such a high, profile Labour's 1953 discussions on social 
security reform and how they were also the first aspect of the national insurance 
scheme to be reviewed by the independent Phillips Committee in advance of the 
Quinquennial Review - of the national insurance scheme. Finally, in 1959, the 
Conservative government introduced earnings-relation to pensions before any other 
national insurance benefit. In the TUC, awareness of demographic change and the 
cost of pensions seem at first sight to have informed its caution in pressing for higher 
pensions but the TUC's sympathy in this respect soon dissipated upon the election of 
a Conservative government in 1951. Still it was reluctant to consider a radical 
overhaul of the state pension scheme. Combined with the BEC's sheer antipathy 
towards public expenditure, these two interest groups had little to offer once the 
&-bate on pension reform got underway in the 1950s. 
Conservative governments 
The Conservatives' first piece of social security legislation was passed in 1952. 
Following consultation with both the BEC and TUC, the Family Allowances and 
National Insurance Act increased benefits and pensions, and restored the uniform 
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basis of national insurance in the process which satisfied, the TUC. 'The levels of 
benefits were not so satisfactory, and the election of a Conservative government 
coincided with a renewed emphasis on the importance of subsistence benefits by the 
TUC. 36 It soon became evident that the TUC would not tolerate any perceived 
neglect of the national insurance scheme by a Conservative administration. 
Beveridge's principle of uniformity remained important: a 1952 Congress resolution 
that demanded higher pensions was accepted by the General Council on the grounds 
that it would require increases in all benefits. 37 The 1952 Act was more in line with 
TUC policy than that of the BEC. Employers' representatives now voiced antipathy 
towards the national insurance scheme and the cost of national insurance 
contributions. They suggested that contributions should be increased no further and 
that means-tested national assistance be expanded instead of national insurance. 38 
Although the new Conservative government made early improvements to social 
security, the cost of pensions continued to be contentious. One means of reducing 
pressure on the national insurance fund was the proposal to increase the pension age. 
However, this made little progress after consultation with the TUC and BEC . 
39 The 
TUC Social Insurance Committee believed that union opposition had been 
instrumental in the government's decision not to pursue this line of poliCy. 
40 
Nonetheless the govenunent approached the TUC again a year later. Osbert Peake, the 
Minister of National Insurance, put forward two suggestions: an increase in the 
36 MRC, MSS. 292/16 1/10, SIIWC, II March 1953. 
37 Ibid.. 
38 PRO, PIN 46/79, Note of meeting with British Employers' Confederation, 27 March 1952, pp. 1-2. 
39 Ibid., p. 1; MRC, MSS. 292/20/36, GC, 26 March 1952 and 23 April 1952. 
40 MRC, MSS. 292/166.2/2, Assistant Secretary, Social Insurance Department to Mrs M Craven, 24 
April 1952. 
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pension age to 62/67 or a smaller pension for workers who retired before these ages. 41 
The TUC rejected both the goverment's propositions. 
The TUC was unresponsive to government attempts to reduce the cost of pensions 
and was generally reluctant to address the 'problem of pensions' actively. In spite of 
its belief ý that national insurance contributions could not be raised further and its 
knowledge that pensions, had consistently lagged behind- increases in the, cost of 
living, the TUC was initially unenthusiastic when the Labour Party began to consider 
reform of the national insurance scheme in 1953. This disinterest combined with its 
continued commitment to a compulsory retirement age of 60/65 and the retirement 
condition, which adversely affected the income of elderly persons, suggests that 
labour market considerations continued to be more important than the situation of the 
aged poor. The TUC's resistance to increases in the earnings allowance under the 
retirement condition did weaken during the 1950s but this happened only gradually 
and with clear reluctance in spite of the strength of the labour movement and high 
levels of employment. As far as pensioners in the fifties were concerned, the labour 
market appeared to take precedence over social justice. 
Dissatisfaction with benefit levels nonetheless did lead the TUC to put pressure on 
the government for an early Quinquennial Review of the national insurance scheme. 42 
Its demands were deflected by the appointment of the Phillips Committee to Review 
the Economic and Financial Problems in Providing for Old Age in 1953, which 
highlighted the significance of pensions in the growing cost of the welfare state. Both 
41 MRC, MSS. 292/161/10, SIIWC 14/1,13 May 1953. 
42 Ibid. 
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the TUC and the BEC were represented on the membership of the committee and 
submitted written and oral evidence. 43 
In its evidence to the Phillips Committee, the TUC complained about the growth in 
numbers of elderly national assistance claimants; it estimated that at the end of 1952 
20 per cent of those claiming assistance were pensioners. 44 The TUC believed that 
the increase in the supplementation of national insurance pensions by means-tested 
benefits was undermining 'the whole concept of providing a minimum through 
insurance'. 45 The TUC blamed this development on successive governments' failure 
46 
to maintain pensions at a subsistence level. In spite of inadequate benefit and 
pension levels, the TUC still strongly endorsed flat-rate national insurance 
contributions. It also refused to accept increases in contributions in order to fund the 
growing deficit in the national insurance fund which had arisen as a result of the early 
entry of participants who had not made sufficient contributions. This was perceived 
to be a govemment liability. 47 
The TUC failed to present any original proposals for pension reform to the Phillips 
Committee, or to the Labour Party. Its adherence to the Beveridge scheme in spite of 
increasing evidence of its weaknesses is testimony to the extent of the TUC's 
conservatism on this issue. The Phillips Report rejected the subsistence principle 
43 The TUC's representatives were both members of its Social Insurance Committee, Mr C Bartlett 
(COHSE) and Mr A McAndrews (TGVX). Sir Cuthbert Clegg, past president and Mr FJC Honey, 
Secretary, were nominated by the BEC. 
44 MRC, MSS. 292/161/1 1, SIIWC 6/1,10 Dec. 1953; SIIWC, 10 Dec. 1953 (Appendix A, Estimation 
of supplementation of insurance benefits by national assistance at the end of 1952). 
45 Ibid., SIIWC 6/1,10 Dec. 1953. 
46 MRC, MSS. 292/166.21/1, Old Age (54) Eighth Meeting, Note of TUC oral evidence to the Phillips 
Committee, 13 May 1954. 
47 Ibid., MSS. 292/16 I /11, SIIWC, 10 Dec. 1954. 
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because of the inconsistency between the principles of adequacy and uniformity. 48 
The TUC refused to address this contradiction and instead insisted that not only 
should subsistence continue to be the guiding principle for benefit levels but that it be 
re-assessed in order to take into account improvements in standards of living since 
Beveridge. 49 
The Phillips Report's suggestion that occupational pension schemes should be 
expanded in order to deal with the funding problem received a mixed response from 
the TUC. While its Social Insurance and Economic Committees favoured the 
extension of occupational provision to workers who were currently excluded, they 
also held reservations over the merits of occupational pension schemes. Their 
ambivalence was based on the nature of the development of occupational provision, 
which had tended to overlook manual worker's and displayed considerable disparities 
in its coverage. These inequities in access and coverage were perceived to increase 
inequalities among pensioners in relation to the TUC's interpretation of equality, 
which was based on the principle of uniformity. 50 Ultimately, the TUC's Social 
Insurance Committee and Economic Committee supported the extension of 
occupational pensions but felt that the advantages of this provision over national 
51 insurance had been exaggerated by the Phillips Committee. 
Overall the TUC's main concerns with state social security were to maintain the 
contributory national insurance scheme and obtain improvements in relation to the 
48 Phillips Report, p. 8 1. 
49 MRC, MSS. 292/161/12, SIIWC 6/3,12 Jan. 1955. 
30 MRC, MSS. 292/166.21/2b, Ref Fi/SS/24.1.57, 'Pensions: Labour Party National Superannuation 
Scheme - Notes on Labour Party Study Group Draft Memorandum on Security and Old Age. 51 Ibid. 
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level of contributions, benefits and pensions. It strongly believed that these should be 
at the expense of the state if actuarially-based contributions were not sufficient to 
allow adequate benefits., It was unwilling to countenance higher contributions' in 
order to pay for pensions, the cost of which the TUC blamed on early entry to national 
insurance retirement pensions. The TUC also expected that the social security system 
should provide more or less fully - for the financial needs of the elderly and was 
unwilling to make -concessions in relation to labour policy that would have reduced 
pressure on the state to provide for the old. The expansion of occupational pensions 
was passively accepted but was not expected to supplant state provision because of 
the implications for inequality. 
Meanwhile the BEC, which had had little to say on developments in pensions prior 
to the appointment of the Phillips Committee, was interested in neither elderly 
poverty nor inequality. , Its main concern was that the state was doing too much rather 
than too little and it was critical of the national insurance scheme in its meetings with 
the Phillips Committee. The Confederation claimed that the national insurance 
scheme had created a culture of dependency: 'successive governments have led the 
people of this country to look far too much to the national Exchequer to safeguard 
themselves against contingencies for which it was formerly considered to be the 
52 responsibility of individuals to make their own provision, at any rate in part'. It also 
believed that the growing financW difficulties of the national insurance system were a 
result of excessive generosity. 53 Subsistence benefits were rejected on the basis that 
52 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C 1120 pt 1, N. C. 13746, Undated (c. Nov. 1953 - Jan. 1954). 53 MRC, MSS. 292/16.6.21/1, Old Age (54) Eighth Meeting, Committee on the Economic and Financial Problems of the Provision for Old Age, Note of TUC oral evidence to the Phillips Committee, 13 May 1954. 
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they encouraged too much reliance on the state. 54 Still, the Confederation did not 
favour the abolition of the insurance scheme because it would be unfair to deny 
benefits to people who had contributed during the past five years . 
55 Neither the TUC 
nor the BEC offered any positive contribution to the Phillips Committee's main 
problem: how to address the emerging deficit in the national insurance fund. Neither 
would accept an increase in national insurance contributions for this purpose but 
while the TUC expected the shortfall to be addressed by national taxation the BEC 
explicitly rejected this solution. Indeed, the BEC believed that it was 'absolutely 
essential' to reduce national expenditure in order to lower levels of taxation. 56 The 
BEC's position was somewhat confused: it rejected both higher, national insurance 
contributions and greater state fundingof social security. Implicitly this suggests that 
the BEC believed that the insurance scheme should be left as it was to provide only a 
very minimal level of help from the state and presumably being supplemented by 
private and occupational provision. 
The BEC was also hostile towards any unsolicited state interference in 
occupational welfare, particularly in view of the growing demands for transferability 
of occupational pension schemes in order to encourage greater labour mobility. 57 The 
Confederation argued that labour mobility was only problematic in relation to manual 
workers who tended not to be covered by superannuation in any case. Moreover, one 
of the objectives of the establishment of occupational pension schemes, to reward 
long service, would be undermined by transferability. BEC representatives claimed 
54 MRC, MSS 200/B/3/2/C 1120 pt. 2, N. C. 14050, April 1954, pp. 1-3. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
57 The Labour Party adopted a policy for the transfer of employers' contributions to occupational 
pension schemes in 1953 (LPA, Social Services Sub-Committee (SSSC) minutes 10,18 March 1953, p. 
2. ) 
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that employers would be deterred from setting up this provision if employees were 
able to take their employer's contributions with them when they left. 58 The Phillips 
Committee was sympathetic to the BEC's argument. Although it supported the 
expansion of occupational provision, it recommended against making such schemes 
transferable at present owing to employer resistance. 59 
The Phillips Committee also took up the Conservative government's proposals for 
a higher retirement age. The TUC remained implacably opposed to an increase on the 
grounds of both practicality and, uniformity. 60 Within the trade union movement, 
opposition was most marked among unions based in heavy industries owing to the 
arduous nature of this type of work .61 The TUC 
itself also believed that existing 
pensioners themselves would reject a higher retirement age. 62 It proposed that later 
retirement could best be achieved by improving financial inducements, which did 
signal a relaxation of its position on this subjeCt. 63 At first, the BEC had also opposed 
an increase in the pension age because it thought it would be impolitic to change the 
retirement age when workers were expecting to receive their pensions at 60/65.64 By 
1954, its position had changed; the BEC's evidence to the Phillips Committee 
included a proposal for an increase in the minimum pension age, and the introduction 
of a common retirement age for men and women. 65 The Phillips Report subsequently 
recommended an increase in the retirement age, to 63/68 over a period of five years, 
58MRC, MSS200/B/3/2/CI120pt. 1, N. C. 13938,12 March 1954. 
59 MRC, MSS 200/B/3/2/C 1120 pt. 2, N. C. 14469,6 Dec. 1954. 
60 MRC, MSS. 292/16 I /11, SIIWC 8/2,14 Jan. 1954. 
61 MRC, MSS. 292/166.21/1, Old Age (54) eighth meeting, Note of TUC oral evidence to the Phillips 
Committee, 13 May 1954. 
62 MRC, MSS. 292/161/1 1, SIIWC 8/2,14 Jan. 1954. 
63 MRC, MSS. 292/166.21/1, Old Age (54) eighth meeting, Note of TUC oral evidence to the Phillips 
Committee, 13 May 1954. 
64 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C4 pt. 137, N. C. 12618,19 March, 1952; PRO, PIN 46/79, Note of meeting 
with British Employers' Confederation, 27 March 1952, pp. 1-2. 65 MRC, MSS 200/B/3/2/Cl 120 pt. 2, N. C. 14050, April 1954, pp. 1-3. 
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but retained the male/female distinction. This was opposed by the TUC members of 
the committee, Mr Bartlett and Mr McAndrews, who published a minority report on 
this issue. Their reservation stated that '[wle find it impossible to agree with the 
majority recommendations for raising -the minimum retirement ages. ' 
66 This was 
based on their argument that the resulting savings would not be sufficient to justify a 
later retirement age. 67 The TUC endorsed the minority report and rejected the Phillips 
Committee's proposal. 68 Its reaction provoked mixed sentiment within the 
government. The Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance was also opposed to 
an increase in the pension age while the Ministry of Labour and National Service 
considered it impractical because of TUC opposition. 69 The Treasury was irate that 
the MPNI had so promptly dismissed the possibility of a higher retirement age in the 
wake of the Phillips Report but its officials did concede that the TUC's views on the 
subject strongly militated against an increase. 70 A Working Group on Occupational 
Pension Schemes later decided in favour of raising the pension age, however, no 
further action was ever taken during this period. 71 
Another aspect of labour policy that had implications for pensions policy was the 
retirement condition. Throughout the 1950s the TUC resisted growing criticism of 
the retirement condition and opposed any proposals to raise the earnings allowance, 
for instance the Labour government's increase in 1951 and further demands for a 
higher earnings limit in the Labour Party in 1954.72 Conservative governments did 
66 Phillips Report, pp. 91-2. 
67 These were estimated to be L55 million in 1977-78. 
68 MRC' MSS. 292/161/12, SIIWC, 12 Jan. 1955. 
69 PRO, T 277/49 1, Note of a meeting held at the Treasury, 17 Oct. 1956. 
70 PRO, T 227/416, K Whalley to Mr Bancroft, 3 Dec. 1954; Note to Chancellor of the Exchequer on 
raising the old age pension age, 9 Dec. 1954. 
71 Ibid.; PRO, T 227/491, Working Group on Occupational Pension Schemes, summary of conclusions, 
undated. 
72 MRC, MSS. 292/16 1/11, SIIWC 9/1,10 Feb. 1954. 
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not seek to amend the retirement condition until 1955 following repeated complaints 
in the House of Commons. 73 The government then asked the NIAC to consider the 
implications of an increase - in the earnings allowance from 40s to 60s. Initially the 
TUC strenuously resisted an increase for the same reasons that it had given in the 
past: it believed that a higher earnings limit would encourage employers to use 
pensioners as cheap labour instead of younger workers. The TUC was also concerned 
that higher earnings limits could lead to the abolition of the retirement condition and 
stressed the negative implications of this for pensioners. It believed that pensions 
could be reduced, or the retirement age increased, in the absence of a retirement 
condition since there would be little justification for a universal, subsistence pension 
if no restrictions were placed on pensioners' earnings. 74 In view of the NIAC's 
proposal in 1955 to recommend a 20s increase in the earnings limit, the TUC 
reluctantly offered a compromise of 10s which would take the earnings limit to 50s. 75 
By this time the BEC was strongly in favour of the relaxation of the retirement 
condition. It wanted the limit to be increased by at least 10s in 1956.76 This was 
accepted by the NIAC, which also recommended that only 50 per cent of earnings 
between 50s and 70s be subject to deductions under the retirement condition. These 
changes were then incorporated in the 1957 National Insurance Act. 
By 1957, the failure to achieve subsistence-level pensions was beginning to create 
some doubts over the fairness of the retirement condition. 77 In the same year, the 
Labour Party decided it should be abolished when it published its proposals for 
73 Parliamentary debates (Commons), 1955-56, vol. 546, cols. 10 19-1023,21 Nov. 1955. 
74 MRC, MSS. 292/161/13, SIIWC 4/1,14 Dec. 1955. 
75 MRC, MSS. 292/20/40, GC meeting, 21 Dec. 1955; MSS. 292/161/13, SIIWC, 13 Jan. 1956. 
76 PRO, PIN 60/22, N. I. A. C. I 10, paper 19,27 March 1956. 
77 MRC, MSS. 292/166.21/2a, SIIWC, 13 Feb. 1957. 
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earnings-related pensions. It argued that about 60 per'cent of male employees over 
the minimum pension age would be better off if there was no retirement condition. 78 
The TUC itself realised that the retirement condition was becoming increasingly 
unpopular and was also aware that it restricted the income of certain workers. At the 
same time, the current strength of the trade union movement had also'reduced fears of 
79 
wage-cutting. Still, the removal of the retirement condition would cost E76 million 
in the first year, which was equivalent to a 1/5d increase in contributioný. The TUC's 
Social Insurance Committee was unwilling to accept such an increase when 'only 40 
per cent of (male) workers would derive any benefit. 80 Furthermore, the prospect of 
wage-related pensions raised new issues in relation to the' retirement condition: 
workers who had to retire at the minimum pension age, for health reasons, would be 
disadvantaged because they would then have a poorer contribution record and 
therefore a lower rate of superannuation. 81 i 
In 1959, the TUC General Council accused the government of increasing earnings 
limits instead of pensions and felt it had little choice but to agree with a 10/- increase 
in the absence of improvements to pensions. 82 Its Social Insurance Committee stated 
'[w]e are convinced that the aim should be to provide subsistence pensions 
conditional upon retirement, not an old age pension unrelated to subsistence which 
has to be supplemented by part I -time earnings in the case of thos Ie able to work or by 
National Assistance in the case of those who cannot. ' 83 The BEC continued to 
78 MRC, MSS. 292/161/14, Minutes of ajoint TUC SIIWC and Labour Party Home Policy Committee (HPQ meeting on 22 May 1957,12 June 1957. 79 MRC, MSS. 292/166.21/2a, SIIWC minutes, 13 Feb. 1957. so MRC, MSS. 292/160/1, Extract from TUC Report 1957. 81 Ibid.. 
92 Trades Union Congress Annual Report 1960, p. 137. 93 MRC, h4SS. 292/161/16, SIIWC minutes, II Feb. 1959. 
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support a higher earnings limit to supplement pensions. 84 The 1960 National 
Insurance Bill proposed a further dilution of the retirement condition by removing the 
restrictions on working hours, as advocated by the BEC, and increasing the earnings 
allowance by another 10S. 85 The TUC's Social Insurance Committee's response 
reflected its increasing ambivalence towards to the retirement condition as some 
members were concerned that the changes were a step closer to its abolition, while 
other members welcomed the end of the restriction on working hours; this was 
particularly detrimental for the low-paid. 86 The government made further increases to 
the earnings limit in 1962 and 1963 without reference to the NIAC. The TUC later 
complained about the lack of consultation 87 and expressed growing concern about 
exploitation of elderly workers as by 1961 the earnings limit permitted low-paid, full- 
time work. 88 On the other hand, it felt unable to oppose the increases because of the 
inadequacy of pension levels. In 1963, it suggested that the goverment should hold 
an inquiry into the impact of the increased earnings limit on elderly employment. 89 
The Advent ofSuperannuation 
Other important changes took place in state pension policy at the end of the 1950s 
vAth the establishment of a state superannuation scheme in 1959. The introduction of 
state eamings-related pensions had its roots in the work of Brian Abel-Smith whose 
ideas soon attracted the attention of the Labour Party. 90 Labour began to consider the 
84 PRO, PIN 46/115, N. I. A. C. 141, Paper 3,23 Feb. 1959; MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C4pt. 172, N. C. 
17534,26 Nov. 1959. 
95 Ibid. 
86 MRC' MSS. 292B/161/13, SlIWC 2,9 Nov. 1960. 
87 MRC, MSS. 292B/161/17, SllWC 3,11 Dec. 1963. 
88 MRC, MSS. 292B/161/13, SIlWC 4,11 Jan. 1961. 
89 MRC, MSS. 29213/1 61/15, SlIWC 4,9 Jan. 1963. 
90 B Abel-Smith, The reform ofsocial security. 
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reform of state pensions in 1953. The TUC was a slow and reluctant convert to 
reform, declining the party's invitation to participate in plans for reforming pensions. 
It decided to send its representatives to the Labour Party's meetings as observers 
rather than members. The Labour Party was critical of the TUC's unwillingness, or 
inability, to make a positive contribution: 'very little help can be expected from the 
T. U. C.. They are obviously not in a mood to consider any radical changes in the 
present position. They are completely wedded to the present contributory system, and 
it will take lengthy discussions to modify their views, should the Party wish to alter 
the present system'. 91 
In spite of the TUC's recaltricance, the Labour Party formally adopted the policy 
of national superannuation in 1955 after Richard Crossman had presented the 
principles of a scheme to the Annual Conference. Subsequently the party set up a 
Study Group on Security and Old Age in 1956 which co-opted Professor Richard 
Titmuss, Dr Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend of the London School of 
Economics as members. The study group quickly rejected the existing national 
insurance scheme as a means of delivering adequate pensions because of its flat-rate 
principles as well as the inbuilt notion of a fixed level of subsistence amid rising 
postwar standards of living. Its solution was a state earnings-related pension scheme 
which would 'universalise' the benefits and advantages of private provision. 92 This 
would be achieved by supplementing the existing flat-rate pension with a wage- 
related payment, funded by earnings-related contributions. The aim of the scheme 
was to prevent workers from experiencing a substantial fall in income upon 
91 LPA, Policy and Publicity Sub-Committee (PPSC), P-508/April 1955. 92 LPA, HPC, Re. 130/January, 1957. 
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retirement. Those who were already members of 'satisfactory' occupational or 
93 
private schemes would be permitted to opt out of the state system. 
At first the TUC showed little interest in the Labour Party's plan for national 
superannuation but it was becoming increasingly aware of the deficiencies of the 
national insurance scheme. Its recognition of these had been stimulated by the 
Phillips Committee's formal rejection of the subsistence principle and, subsequently, 
94 the government's persistent refusal to hold an inquiry into subsistence. In May 
1957, the Labour Party published its pamphlet National Superannuation outlining 
proposals to raise the flat-rate pension by J Os to E3 per week while the total pension, 
including the earnings-related supplement, would eventually reach approximately half 
of average earnings and would be uprated in line with inflation. A few months later 
the 195 7 TUC Annual Congress stated that 'the General Council are ... recommending 
that there should be a comprehensive re-examination of the Movement's previous 
95 policy embracing all aspects of social insurance'. Ultimately the TUC endorsed the 
Labour Party's proposals but still continued to be equivocal over the principle of 
earnings-related pensions. In part, this was because the TUC believed that the Labour 
Party's scheme had potential only as a long-term solution to the problem of pensions, 
with little to offer current pensioners and making no provision for other national 
insurance beneficiaries. Heclo suggests that the TUC's lack of enthusiasm reflected 
concern about the impact of state superannuation for union pension plans. 96 There is 
little evidence to support this explanation: the TUC quite naturally wished to 
safeguard established pension rights in trade union as well as in private and 
93 MRC, MSS. 292/161/14, SllWC 14/1,12 June 1957. 
94 MRC, MSS. 292/161/13, SllWC 513,12 Jan. 1956. 
95 Trades Union Congress Annual Report 1957, p. 140. 
96 H Heclo, Modern socialpolitics, p. 263 
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t 
occupational schemes but the Labour Party plan did include a contracting out 
provision that the TUC supported. 97 More generally, the TUC had consistently 
favoured increased state intervention in social security and other areas of social 
welfare that had been the province'of union, voluntary and private bodies since the 
1920s. It was one of the keenest supporters of the Beveridge Report in 1942, which 
reduced the significance of many union schemes. There is no indication in TUC 
records that it became less interested in state social reform after the war. 
Meanwhile, the BEC's response to Labour's national superannuation scheme was 
yet more negative. In particular, it opposed the proposal to make occupational 
pension schemes transferable. 98 The Confederation had already recorded -its 
objections to this in its evidence to the Phillips Committee. It now rejected the 
argument that transferability would help to improve labour mobility on the grounds 
that this was already too high. 99 The BEC was also unhappy with the prospective 
increase in state control that would accompany the establishment of 'a very large fund 
which would be at the disposal of the Govermnent'. 100 The ABCC also disliked 
Labour's pension plan, describing it as 'wasteful, oppressive to the working 
population and dangerous to the very security it pretends to off6r. "Ol It complained 
the contributions would be too costly for workers, that the scheme itself was 
inflationary and a deterrent to private savings, and would undermine occupational 
schemes while administration would be complicated., Finally, the redistribution of 
97 MRC, MSS. 292/166.21/2b, Notes on Labour Party Study Group - draft memorandum on Security 
and Old Age', 21 Jan. 1957. 
98 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/3n4O pt. 1, Note of a meeting on 16 Dec. 1957. 
99 Ibid., Notes for Lord McCorquodale, 16 Jan. 1958; Draft bulletin by K Burton, 23 Jan. 1958, p. 2. 
100 PRO, PIN 68/12, Note of a meeting between the Minister of Pensions and the Financial Secretary to 
the Treasury, and Lord McCorquodale of the B. E. C., 15 April 1958. 
101 PRO, PIN 18/342, HB Lenin to Mr Carswell, 27 June 1958, p. 1. 
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income that the scheme involved was condemned as a 'hidden tax on higher 
earnings'. 102 Thus, the ABCC favoured the maintenance of the existing flat-rate 
scheme of national insurance, operating at its most basic level, but was unable to 
suggest any solution to the problems which were currently arising from this 
provision. 103 
Following the Labour Party's lead, the Conservative goverrunent was beginning to 
consider reforming pensions along the lines of earnings-relation. It invited the TUC 
and BEC to participate in consultation in April 1958 when the Cabinet was still trying 
to choose between rival plans drawn up by the Treasury and the Ministry of Pensions 
and National Insurance respectively. Consultation was instigated, unusually, by the 
BEC who requested a meeting to discuss the implications of pension reforms for 
employers in April. 104 At the end of the month, the government approached both the 
BEC and TUC for consultation. Its objectives were to gather their views on 
provisions for contracting out of the state scheme and to assess the impact of a 
graduated state pension scheme on occupational provision. 105 The government 
particularly wished to discuss contracting out with the BEC because of the sustained 
disagreement within the government on this issue while it would appear that its only 
r--ason for consulting the TUC was to avoid criticism for not doing so. 106 
Both the TUC and BEC desired a contracting out option, the TUC recommending 
that this be exercised on an individual rather than a company or organisational 
102 Ibid., p. 1. 
103 Ibid., p. 2. 
104 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/3n4O pt. 1, Lord McCorquodale to Derrick Heathcoat Amory, 3 April 1958. 
105 Ibid., John Boyd-Carpenter to Mr EJ Hunter (BEC), 22 April 1958. 
106 Ibid.; PIN 68/12, John Boyd-Carpenter to lain Macleod, 17 April, 1958. 
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basis. 107 Further matters of interest to the TUC included the level of earnings-related 
contributions and the flat-rate pension: it required improvements to the existing 
scheme before it would endorse the principle of earnings relation. 108 The BEC's main 
concern was to ensure that graduated pensions would not precipitate earnings-related 
unemployment and sickness benefit, which, as shown in the previous chapter, was 
unacceptable in principle. 109 
The government published a White Paper, Provision for Old Age, on 14 October 
1958 containing details of its plans for pensions. It intended to introduce earnings- 
related pensions for those earning between E9 and f 15 per week only, which would be 
funded by contributions from employers and employees and a fixed annual 
contribution from the Exchequer of f. 170 million. The TUCýwas critical of several 
aspects of the government's, scheme. Firstly, its failure to uprate the basic pension 
caused concern that this would lead to further expansion of national assistance. 110 
Secondly it was unhappy that only workers within the f9-fl5 wage band would be 
included and that their earnings-related pension would not be protected against 
inflation. "' The narrow scope of the scheme meant that its redistributive impact 
would be limited. The TUC was also disappointed that the reforms did not address 
the problem of the shortfall in the national insurance fund! 12 Finally, it was irate that 
107 MRC, MSS. 292/161/15, SIIWC, 9 May 1958. MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/3/740 pt. 1, Notes for Lord 
McCorquodale - National Insurance Scheme, Note on views of Confederation's committee on proposed 
modifications, undated. 
log MRC, MSS. 292/161/15, SIIWC, 9 May 1958. 
109 MRC, MSS. 200/13/3/3/740 pt. 1, Notes for Lord McCorquodale - National Insurance Scheme, Note 
on views of Confederation's committee on proposed modifications, undated. 




the govcmment had not acceptcd its recommcndation for contracting out on an 
113 individual basis. 
The BEC's response to the White Paper was also lukewarm although for different 
reasons. It was most interested in the administrative and technical aspects of reform. 
These included the provisions for workers with fluctuating earnings and the 
arrangements for contracting out. With regard to the former, the Confederation 
complained that such employees would pay lower contributions and, consequently, 
receive a smaller pension than those workers with very similar, but more stable, 
incomes. The BEC also %N-anted bonuses to be excluded from calculation of graduated 
contributions owing to its concern that workers would seek different arrangements for 
the payment of these bonuses, which in turn would cause inconvenience to 
employers. 114 T11e employers believed the conditions for contracting out were too 
stringent. 115 It opposed the government's recommendation that employers and 
workers be required to make a payment to the national insurance fund based on 
earnings of LIS per week when leaving a contracted out pension scheme to join a 
company which had not opted out. 116 
Ile TUC and BEC's criticisms had little effect on the goverrunent's thinking: the 
1959 National Insurance Bill diffcrcd little from the White Paper other than to 
increase the Exchequer's contribution and the increments for deferred retirement. 1 17 
113 Ibid. 
114 PRO, PIN 34/12 1. Note by JA Atkinson - meeting between officials of the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance and the BEC to discuss the method of collecting contfibutions under the White 
Paper proposals. 18 Dec. 195 8. 
113 PRO, PIN 43/130. National Insurance Bill - Statement by the British Employers' Confcderation, 23 
Jan. 1959. 
116 MC, NISS. 200, UI4/l/19. ReE N. C 17800. BEC Annual Report, 1959, pp. 11-13. '17 PRO. PIN 43/121. Note for lobby journalists, fourth draft - National Insurance Bill, undated; MRC, NISS192/161/16, SIIWC 716,14 Jan. 1959. 
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The TUC reftised to endorse the Conservative government's scheme following the 
1959 National Insurance Act. 118 Neither did the BEC welcome the legislation, issuing 
a public statement that criticised, the lack of opportunity to discuss the content of the 
White Paper prior to the publication of the Bill! 19 The Confederation continued to 
hold reservations over the arrangements for assessing and collecting graduated 
contributions, and the 'unnecessarily severe' conditions for contracting out of the state 
scheme. 120 It also still opposed arrangements for the preservation of occupational 
pension rights following a change of employment. This was based on its argument 
that occupational pension schemes were often established in order to attain stability in 
the labour force and that greater mobility of manual workers was not desirable. 121 
This argument was later contradicted when the BEC participated in consultation on 
earnings-rclated unemployment and sickness benefit. 
Conclusion 
Both the TUC's and BECs pension policies were clearly informed by wider concerns 
than the alleviation of aged poverty. Like%vise successive governments were 
continually examining %%2ys of reducing the cost of retirement pensions to the state in 
view of demographic changes. The TUC %%-as sympathetic to Labour government 
problems in this area while the BEC favoured less state expenditure on pensions, thus 
both groups, perhaps inadvertently, were participants in a political consensus that 
provision for old age %N-as costly and complex. The TUC withdrew from this 
consensus during the 1950s not because it became more tolerant of the cost of 
"s MRC, MSS292/161/17, SllWC 13/2.13 July 1960. 
119 MRC, MSSI20QB5,2/C4 pL 168, N. C. 17028, Jan. 1959, p. 11. 
120 lbid, p. 12. 
121 MRC, mss. 2oowrvc4 pL 19 1, N. C. I W2,12 May 196 1; N. C. 19430,5 May 1961. 
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pensions but because it would not tolerate cuts or restrictions in any area of social 
policy by a Conservative government. At the same time, it was reluctant to accept 
any concessions that would impact upon other union policies such as the relaxation of 
the retirement condition in spite of its financial benefits for many elderly people. 
Accordingly it is clear that the TUC's concern for elderly standards of living was not 
completely devoid of self-interest. Neither the TUC nor the BEC made a positive 
contribution to debates on pension reform at this time. Both organisations adopted a 
very conservative stance, the TUC because it was wedded to the Beveridge scheme 
with its flat-rate principles, and the BEC because it was loath to countenance any 
finther state intervention in economic and social life. 
The TUC and BEC were involved in discussions that preceded any significant 
amendments to pensions policy, from the establishment of the Beveridge Committee 
to the introduction of earnings-related pensions in 1959. It is possible to identify 
areas and times where they appear to have had some influence in policy. For 
instance, the TUC effectively persuaded Beveridge to introduce the retirement 
condition and the BEC appear to have convinced the Phillips Committee not to 
recommend transferability of occupational pension schemes. Ultimately, however, 
their potential importance v6-as diminished by their own unwillingness to actively 
participate in formulating a positive solution to the 'problem of pensions' in the 
1950s. Nonetheless this should not detract from the fact that both Labour and 
Conservative administrations seem to have regarded consultation with these interests 
a prerequisite to any significant changes in policy. 
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Chapter Four Health PpHicy 
The previous two chapters examined the attitudes of the British Employers' 
Confederation and the Trades Union Congress towards government policy on social 
security and pensions policy, and their role in its formulation between 1939 and 1964. 
The findings of these chapters allowed us to begin to consider the degree to which a 
'welfare consensus' existed outside Whitehall, with particular reference to these 
powerful interest groups that were interested in the making of social policy but whose 
raison d7tre %%-as not explicitly linked to welfare issues. The involvement of the BEC 
and the TUC in health policy formulation provides a fiu-ther opportunity to assess the 
validity of Keith hliddlcmas' thesis of 'corporate bias' outside the particular confimes 
of economic and industrial policy. Herein the discussion addresses only the role of 
the TUC since the BEC seldom discussed health policy matters and did not seek 
consultation %%ith government in this area of policy making. This prevents us from 
examining the extent of agreement between the representatives of labour and capital 
on state health care issues, but the BEC's apparent indifference to health policy still 
has implications for the consensus thesis and the existence of corporate bias. The 
quite different approach of the TUC in the health policy sphere highlights the 
complexity of attitudes to%%-ards the welfare state as a single entity and, thus, the 
weaknesses of a model, such as consensus, which seeks to gcneralise. 
Employers. tmde unions and state health care before 1939 
Prior to the outbreak- of world war two, medical care for manual workers earning less 
than L250 a year was pro%ided under the 1911 National Insurance Act's contributory 
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National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme. Provision was usually confined to services 
offered by local doctors, generally excluding hospital care, and seldom covered 
dependants. The range of services that were offered under NHI tended to vary 
because it was administered by separate 'approved societies'. The lack of uniformity 
in the system and its limited coverage provoked much dissatisfaction with National 
Health Insurance in the intcr%-. -ar period. A number of reports all recommended 
reform of state health services: these included the 1920 Dawson Report, the 1926 
Royal Commission on National Health Insurance together with statements by the 
British Medical Association (BMA) in 1930, and the Socialist Medical Association 
(SMA) in 1933.1 By the 1930s, Political and Economic Planning (PEP), the Fabians, 
and the Nuffield Trust were all agitating for reform. 
2 Both the Labour Party and the 
TUC participated in this movement. The Labour Party had published a report in 1918 
entitled The organisation ofthe preventive and curative medical services and hospital 
and laboratory s), stems under a Alinistty ofHealth that called for the establishment of 
a free nationwide health service with doctors in full-time salaried service and a 
3 
comprehensive network of health centres. The TUC was unhappy with perceived 
deficiencies in NIII and the involvement of the insurance industry, which it believed 
acted as an obstacle to improvements in public health services. 
4 Ile National 
Confederation of Employers' Organisations, like the industrial assurance companies 
and the voluntary hospitals, %vas not reform-minded in the least. It believed that 
substantial changes were unnecessary particularly if they would require greater state 
intervention. Instead of seeking improvements in National Health Insurance, the 
1R Klein. 77ie new politics ofthe national health service, p. 4; R Lowe, The wetOre state in Britain 
since 1945. p. 167. 
2C Webster, The national health service, pp. 5&7; PRO, MH 77/30A, Mr Wrigley to Sir Laurence 
Brock, 25 Aug. 194 1. 
1B Watkin, The national health service, P. 12. 
4F flonigsbaum, Ifealth happiness. andsecurity, p. 9. 
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NCEO lobbied the goverrument to reduce NHI contributions in order to lessen the 
burden on industry. 5 
Planninp, health care reform in %-aftime 
In spite of the BEC's antipathy, the outbreak of the second world war and the 
successful establishment of the Emergency Medical Service served to advance the 
case of those who did favour reform. 6 By 1945 proposals for the introduction of a 
national medical service had been %videly discussed and agreement had been reached 
on the basic principles though not on how they were to be put into practice. The BEC 
declined to participate in these discussions and negotiations while the TUC strove to 
ensure that the government would take on board its views when making policy 
decisions. 'niere was fierce competition, however, from more immediate interests 
that also urished to shape the future of British health policy. Civil servants in the 
Department of Health had started drawing up plans for reform in 1938! The 
representatives of the medical profession, local government and voluntary hospital 
organisations; also had a far more direct and identifiable interest in state health care 
than the TUC. It is the influence of these latter groups that has been most widely 
rccognised by historians, the doctors in particular! Before 1948, the role of the TUC 
appears to be insubstantial by comparison, but its significance lies in its involvement 
in a broad coalition of forces that had pursued reform since the 1920s, and in 
5 MRC, MSSI00iW/2IC645 pt. 2, CEO deputation to the Rt. Hon. Neville Chamberlain, 17 July 
1925; Ref. N. C. 1285, Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Bill, note for deputation 
to Minister of Ilealth, 17 July 1925. 
6C Webster, 77je national health service, pp. 6-7; K Jefferys, 'British politics and social policy during 
the second world war', p. 133. 
R Klein, The new politics ofthe national health service, pp. 7-8. 
R Lowe, The wey; zrestate in Britair4 p. 171; R Klein, The newpolitics ofthe national health service, 
p. 8; C Webster, The national health service, pp. 8& 12. 
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promoting, disseminating, and obtaining the consent of the trade union movement for 
the fundamental principles that were to underpin the emerging NHS. Moreover, as 
Klein highlights, it is difficult to assess the contribution of individual interest groups 
because of the inherent interaction between them, thus he warns against taking an 
approach where it is presumed that 'the sets of actors involved were discrete and 
homogeneous'. 9 
Combined with the role of prewar pressure, interest groups and the impact of the 
war on social change -. %ms the 1942 publication of the Beveridge Report. Although the 
Beveridge Committee was primarily concerned with income maintenance and 
poverty, the TUC deputation, which is widely credited with committee's 
establishment, was in fact sent to complain about NHI. Trade union representatives 
complained about its limited coverage, the failure to make provision for dependants, 
and disparity between benefits in different approved societies' schemes. 10 In the 
course of their discussions on health policy, Beveridge and the TUC reached 
agreement on the need to remove the industrial insurance companies from National 
Health Insurance administration, and also on -the general principles of a national 
health service. " In his report, Beveridge argued that his contributory social insurance 
szheme could only work if the government paid family allowances, guaranteed a high 
and stable level of employment, and provided a national medical service. Webster 
and Brown believe that the report's recommendations and Beveridge's own interest in 
health policy prompted the Ministry of Health to quicken the pace of reform if only to 
9R Klein, Ilse new politics ofthe national health service, p. 25. 
10 NIRC. MSS. 292/15531/4. Health insurance reform: history of case, 1941. "F llonigsbaum. Ilealth. happiness andsecurity. p. 35. 
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pre-empt a further Beveridge Report on health. 12 If the Beveridge Report did indeed 
act as such a catalyst to health reform then the TUC's role in the establishment of the 
Beveridge Committee has yetwider implications than have been previously realised. 
The TUC itself released a statement on health policy in March 1943.13 This 
statement and a further document were sent to Ernest Brown, the Minister of Health, 
in the autumn A%ith the hope of influencing government health policy, and creating a 
consultative relationship with the Ministry of Health. The TUC's statement indicates 
the nature and degree of its interest in health care refonn and the extent to which its 
ideas coincided with those of other groups while contrasting strongly with the BEC's 
apparent indifference. Still its influence was somewhat limited at this stage; Ernest 
Brown rejected the TUC's request for a meeting, suggesting that consultation should 
take place after the publication of the government's White Paper on health policy. 14 . 
In its statement on health policy, the TUC had reiterated its dissatisfaction with 
National Health Insurance, outlined other areas of health policy with which it was 
unhappy together, and provided a prescription for reform. Reorganisation was of 
primary importance: as %vith social security, several different government. ministries 
were responsible for health policy which was perceived to result in a fragmented and 
disorganiscd scrvicc. 's The TUC recommended that a single government department 
take sole charge of health policy with a view to securing equity and uniformity in 
12 C Webster, 7be health services since the war vol. 1, p. 36; J Brown, The British weyizre state, p. 90. 
13 MRC, MSS192/947/2, Stale medical service memorandum by Dr HB Morgan, 17 March 1943. 
14 PRO, MH 77n3, Ernest Brown to Walter Citrine, 10 Nov. 1943. 
15 At this time the Ministry of Health was responsible for national health insurance, the care of certain 
diseases such as tuberculosis, local authority hospitals, maternity and child welfare, public health and 
housing while the Home Office was in charge of industrial health, medical research was supervised by 
the Privy Council and the Board of Education organised the school medical service. The TUC's 
criticisms of these arrangements are discussed in MRC. MSS. 2921847/2, State medical service 
memorandum by Dr If B Morgan, 17 March 1943. 
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provision- Besides being critical of the wider organisation of health services, the 
TUC was particularly unhappy with the structure of the hospital system, and the 
separate administration of public and voluntary hospitals. This sentiment was widely 
held: Lord Dawson of Penn, the architect of the 1920 Dawson Report on the health 
services, had criticised the hospital system and the voluntary hospitals were quite 
evidently in financial difficulties by the 1930s. 16 The trade union movement had 
strong links with the voluntary hospitals through hospital contributory schemes but 
their financial instability led the TUC to favour a policy of nationalisation and the 
introduction of a single state hospital system. 17 This proposition was, of course, 
opposed by the voluntary hospital organisations. The government also currently 
favoured retention of the voluntary hospitals, a policy that the TUC described as 
'unfortunate and undesimble because there will never be a really unified hospital 
system in Great Britain %vith two different systems of hospital administration, on 
entirely different lines, one private, the other ... public'. 
18 Dissatisfaction with 
arrangements for hospital care and its belief that state health services focused 
excessively on curing rather than preventing ill-health provided the basis for the 
TUC's long-standing interest in health centres. 19 The health centre idea also had its 
roots in the interwar period: both the Labour Party and the 1926 Royal Commission 
had favoured their widespread introduction. 20 The TUC hoped that health centres 
would permit and encourage different branches of the medical profession to work 
together, again promoting a more integrated and cohesive health care system. 21 - 
16 R Lowe, 7he wetrare state since 1945. p. 169, C Webster, The national health service, p. 5. 
17 MRC. hISS292/947f4 State medical service memorandum by Dr HB Morgan, 17 March 1943. 
11 [bid., A SIC. WC & FC 1/1,20 Oct. 1943. 
19 [bid, State medical service memorandum by Dr HB Morgan, 17 March 1943. 
20 B Watkin, The national heafth service, p. 12; R Lowe, The wey'are state since 1945, p. 167. 
21 MRC, NISS192/847/2. State medical service memorandum by Dr HB Morgan, 17 March 1943. 
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On the details the TUC did differ at times from the views of other interests but 
most fundamentally it wanted a health service that promoted equality by providing 
universal and free access to health care on the basis of need, a concept which by 1943 
attracted little controversy. 22 Nonetheless the differences regarding details and the 
implementation of policy did become increasingly acute as plans for reconstruction 
developed. The coalition government published its VVIIite Paper, A National Health 
Service, in February 1944. Ile production of this joint Labour-Conservative 
document has seldom been interpreted as a sign of consensus. The Labour Party 
viewed it as a compromise while the Conservative Party would withdraw from its 
proposals as soon as it could. 23 Neither did the White Paper elicit a positive response 
from the medical profession or from voluntary hospital organisations. 24 The TUC 
itself was ambivalent: it described the W`hite Paper as 'a basis for discussion' and 'a 
considerable advance on present medical services but ... not a comprehensive 
National Service'. 25 It was pleased with the absence of direct charges and the 
apparent endorsement of health ccntres while the intention of retaining the voluntary 
hospitals in their present role , vas less welcome. 
26 The voluntary hospitals would be 
encouraged to cooperate and coordinate their provision with state hospitals but formal 
participation would not be required. The TUC had been very keen on an integrated 
hospital system and, %%-as anxious that the principle should not be ftu-ther undermined 
by allowing those -%ho, contributed to a voluntary hospital scheme to opt out of the 
state health service. 27 Finally the TUC considered the arrangements for public 
22 Ibid., A SIC. WC &- FC 1/1,20 Oct. 1943; R Lowe, 71e wey'are state since 1945, p. 167; C Webster, 
Ae national health service, p. 17. 
"K Je fferys , ed-. Labour and the m-artime coalition, p. 14; R Klein, The new politics ofthe national health service. p. 14; R Lowe, 'The second world war, consensus, and the foundation of the wel fare 
state', p. 164. 
24 C Webster, The national health service, p. 10. 
23 MRC, MSS. 292/947/2, Jt SICWC & FC 4/1.1 March 1944. 
'16 Ibid. 
27 MRC, MSS. 292/161.1/3, Jt SICWC & FC, 9 March 1944. 
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participation in the administration of the new health service to be inadequate, a matter 
28 
which was to become a particular issue for the TUC in the postwar peno . 
Following the publication of the White Paper, the TUC finally was able to discuss 
health policy with the government. Thomas Johnston, the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, requested a meeting with TUC representatives when he received its report 
on the White Paper. 29 'Me TUC also met with Henry Willink, the new Minister of 
Health, in March 1945. Its representatives asked for his assurance that the state health 
service would be universal in its scope and that there would be no option for 
individuals to contract out Willink vouched for the comprehensive nature of the 
scheme with the proviso that the right to engage in private practice would be 
retained. 30 Shortly after this meeting the Labour Party resigned from the government, 
which precipitated further changes in government policy. Willink amended the 
proposals contained in the White Paper in order to placate the medical profession and 
the voluntary hospitals. His memorandum entitled 'Progress with the Proposals of a 
National Health Service' rejected a salaried GP service and controls over distribution 
of practices. Ile health centre project %ras also to be administered centrally rather 
than by local authorities. 31 
In fact the election of a Labour government and the appointment of Aneurin Bevan 
as Minister of Health upset Willink's plans. In 1945 consent had been secured on the 
basic principles of state health care, but there was still substantial disagreement with 
respect to the actual structure of the proposed health service. Willink's concessions to 
22 NIRC, mss. 292twa, A SIC-WC &- FC 411,1 March 1944. 
19 MRC. NISS192/947/3, T'homas Johnston to Walter Citrine, 19 Dec. 1944. 
30 thid, R SIC. WC & FC 9/Z 8 March 1945. 
3' C Webster. The health services since the war volume 1, p. 74. 
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the doctors and the voluntary hospitals may have diminished a measure of dissent 
from those quarters but in the process had alienated the labour movement. The 
Ubour Party's electoral victory on 5 July 1945 precipitated a new set of tensions and 
disagreements that were to threaten the very establishment of the NHS. 
The National Health Service under Labour. 1945-1951 
It follows that signs of consensus diminished rather than increased between 1945 and 
1948. In the political sphere, the Conservatives had already withdrawn from some of 
the White Paper proposalswhile the new Labour government made it clear that it had 
compromised itself in agreeing to the publication of the White Paper. 
32 While a 
cross-party consensus was sustained on the basic principles of universalism and the 
provision of health care free at the point of use, agreement existed on little else. The 
protracted negotiations with the medical profession that followed detracts finther from 
the notion of a health policy consensus. Local government associations and voluntary 
hospital organisations gradually dropped their resistance but the medical profession 
33 
remained hostile to government plans virtually until the appointed day. 
Relations between Bevan and the BMA deteriorated after the publication of the 
Labour government's National Health Service Bill. Pri6r to this, it has been 
suggested that, Bevan paid little attention to outside interests while he was devising 
'" Rivett believes that Bevan did not reveal his plans to any interest his reforms., 
32 NIRC, NISS192,147/4, Deputation to Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland, 8 
Jan. 1946; C Webster, The national health service, p. 13. 
11 C Webster, The national health service, P. 25. 
34 G Rivett, From cradle to grave, p. 29; C Webster. 7he national health service, pp. 14-15. 
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groups prior to the first reading of the National Health Service Bill. 35 In fact as 
Webster is a%rare, Bevan informed the TUC of his intentions at a meeting in January 
1946, more than two months before the introduction of the Bill. 36 Whether as a 
consequence of the close relationship between the Labour Party and the TUC, or a 
product of 'corporate bias', the TUC appear to have been the first and only external 
organisation to have been informed of the Labour government's health policy before 
it was made public. This, of course, does not necessarily suggest that the TUC had an 
undue influence on the government's policy, not that a great deal of discord existed 
on this subject bem-een these two bodies in any case. 
The meeting largely served the purpose of advising the TUC of government policy; 
Bevan told TUC representatives of his intention to nationalisc the hospital service, 
and the decision not to introduce a salaried GP service or to abolish private practice in 
view of the opposition these policies would incite. The only matter that provoked real 
disagreement at the meeting concerned the representation of the general public in the 
administration of the health services; the 'IUC argued that this would be inadequate 
while medical participation Nvas excessive. Bevan defended his plans on the basis that 
doctors would be involved in all areas of the National Health Service while other 
h. -alth workers, %%ith, %%-hom the TUC %%-as also concemed, had a more limited role. 37 
Trade unions could also make nominations for the Regional Hospital Boards (RHBs), 
which would organise hospital and specialist provision for the region, and to Hospital 
Management Committees (IINICs). Iliese appointments would, however, be made on 
35 G Rivett. From crade to grave. p. 29. 
36 MRC, MSS. 2921847/4, Deputation to Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland, 8 
Jan. 1946; C Webster, 7he health services since the war volume 1, p. 89. 3" PRo, imi 77n3. National IleaM Service Bill, deputation to the Minister from the Trades Union 
Congress, 17 June 1946; Aneurin Bevan to Sir Walter Citrine, 18 July 1946. 
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the basis of 'individual suitability and experience' as opposed to their capacity to 
represent particular organisations. 38 
Bevan's proposals were published in the National Health Service Bill, which was 
introduced to the House of Commons on 19 March 1946. The greatest opposition 
came from the medical profession, in particular the general practitioners, while the 
aversion of the Conservative Party, local government, and voluntary hospitals was 
muted by comparison and dissipated more quickly. 39 The TUC continued to be 
equivocal although it did prefer the Bill to the 1944 White Paper. The nationalisation 
of the hospital system and the prohibition on the sale of general practices were 
particularly welcomed but it A-as more critical of other proposals. 40 These included 
the failure to include industrial medical services in the new health service and the 
absence of a greater commitment to preventing illness .41 The TUC recognised the 
problems involved in abolishing private practice but suggested that it should be 
monitored. It also %%-anted guarantees that private medical care would not be superior 
to the national health service, and that NHS services would not be contracted out to 
private firms. Its greatest reservation continued to be the under-representation of 
NHS patients and health workers together with medical domination over the 
administration of the NHS. 42 Consequently it asked Bevan to make provision for 
representation of all grades of health workers on health service committees, and on 
the new Central Health Scnices Council (CHSC) which would advise the Minister of 
3s PRO, Nm 77n3. Aneurin Bevan to Sir Walter Citrine, 19 July 1946. 
"MI fill, The wetlare state in Britain, p. 33; R Klein, 7he new politics ofthe national health service, 
pp. 16-23; M Sullivan, The development ofthe British wett4re state, p. 168; C Webster, The national health service, pp. 25-28. 
40 MRC, NISS292/161.1/4, A SIC. WC & FC, National Health Service Bill, 28 May 1946. 
41 [bid-, Jt SIC. WC & FC 8.11 April 1946; Jt SIC. WC & FC, National Health Service Bill, 29 May 
1946; A SIC. WC & FC 11/1,18 June 1946. 
42 Ibid., Jt SIC. WC &- FCý National Health Service Bill, 28 May 1946. 
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t 
Health on technical aspects of policy. 43 Charles Webster believes that the trade union 
movement welcomed representation on RHBs. 44 This is true but the level of 
representation uras seldom satisfactory. Moreover, it was never held to compensate 
for what was perceived to be excessive medical participation at the expense of other 
groups of health workers. 
From producer interest to consumer representation 
The TUC had been unhappy with the arrangements for representation in NES 
administration from the outset It continued to express its dissatisfaction after the 
legislation of the 1946 National Health Service Act Walter Citrine, the TUC General 
Secretary, wrote to Bevan to question the position of health workers other fl= 
medical staff. The Minister of Health adhered to his original position: the medical 
profession should comprise a majority membership on the Central Health Services 
Council, and health workers could participate via Advisory Committees. In relation 
to RfIBs and HNICs, Bevan stressed that appointments reflected relevant experience 
and aptitude (although measurement of these was never explicitly defined) rather than 
the capacity to represent certain groUPS. 45 Bevan and TUC representatives met to 
discuss this matter further. The TUC made little progress; Bevan vetoed their 
suggestion that trade unions nominate health workers for RHBs in order to secure a 
greater role for these people. He also maintained his reftisal to consider TUC 
representation on the CHSC because the body dealt with technical aspects of health 
carc. In 1951, aftcr fivc ycars of Labour goverruncrit, the TUC was still complaining 
41 Ibid., Jt SIC. WC & FC 11,19 June 1946. 
"C Webster, 7he health services since the war volume 1, p. 89. 
45 MRC, f-ISS192/161.1/4, Jt SIC. WC & FC 1313,18 July 1946. 
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about the lack of opportunities for health workers to take part in the running of the 
health service. 4; Hilary Marquand, the new Minister of Health, was more responsive 
to its complaints and published a circular that advised RHBs that Management 
Committee officers could be appointed to committees outside their own area of work 
if they were suitable for the position. 47 The General Council was still not satisfied 
because the circular did not specifically recommend hospital staff for these 
appointments. 
48 
Since Bevan had denied the TUC a representative role on Regional Hospital 
Boards and prohibited its nomination of health service workers, the TUC began to 
manufacture itself as a representative of NHS patients or 'consumers'. ne 
government too initiated and subscribed to this interpretation of its role: in November 
1946, Bevan %%Totc to the TUC asking for advice on 'consumer representation' on 
NHS Executive CO=CilS. 49 This was followed by a finther request for a TUC 
nomination to the Medical Certificates Committee who would represent the 'general 
public'. 50 Although this new function allowed the TUC greater scope in its claims for 
representation, it %%-as disappointed NNith the results of its first nominations to the 14 
Regional Hospital Boards in 1947 particularly since it had been denied representation 
on the Central Health Services Council. " Bevan was not receptive to the TUC's 
request that its nominations be considered for vacancies which arose during the year, 
he emphasised again that members of Regional Hospital Boards would be appointed 
on the basis of their experience, and that he would only consult the TUC when it was 
" MRC, MSS192/161/8, SIIWC 10/1.15 Feb. 1951. 
47 [bid, SIIWC 12,15 hfamh 1951. 
4' [bid. 
49 SIRC, MSS192/161.1/4, A SICWC & FC 15.14 Nov. 1946. 
Ibid., Jt SIC. WC & FC 1.9 Om 1947. 
Ibid., A SIC. WC & FC 3.13 Feb. 1947; A SIC-WC & FC 4,3 March 1947. 
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appropriate to do so. 52 He then insisted that there was no medical overweighting on 
the regional boards and that new appointments reflected the existing balance between 
medical and non-medical members. 53 Bevan's indifference towards TUC complaints 
meant that representation of NHS patients was also a contentious subject in 1951. 
Yet, in principle at least, Bevan had accepted that the TUC had a role to play in the 
running of the NHS. While the qualifications for RHB membership remained ill- 
deflined, the notion of patient representation and the TUCs ability to fulfil this 
function had been bom. This cast the TUC in a new, broader role beyond that of an 
interest group directly concerned with only its own membership. This wider 
perspective had been a feature of TUC social security and pensions policy but self- 
interest had undermined its effectiveness. The NHS, funded from taxation rather than 
direct contributions, created no such conflicts of interest, permitting the TUC to take 
on board important issues . %ithout compromising its own members' interests. 
The Labour government and thefunding 'crisis 9 
Of course the dcmands of union members was not the only constraint on TUC policy. 
The election of a Labour govcmmcnt produced another source of compromise that led 
to inconsistencies in TUC social policy. This was most pronounced in relation to 
MIS financial issues. MIS funding very quickly became a great source of concern to 
the Labour Party. Expenditure was expected to fall once the 'backlog' of illness had 
been treated and the availability of free health care produced a healthier population. 54 
Instead the MIS exceeded its budget substantially in both 1947 and 1948 while 
12 IbidL, A SICWC & FC 1.9 Om 1947. 
53 NIRC, 16ISS192/161/6, SIIWC 3,10 Nov. 1948. 
54 C Ham, Ilealth Policy in Britain, P. 17. 
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55 
Bevan's argument that spending would gradually fall was ineffectual. In 1949 the 
government introduced the National Health Service (Amendment) Act which made 
provision for a prescription charge. The charge was not actually introduced because it 
transpired that it would not save as much money as had been anticipated. This 
discovery caused the government to set up the Cabinet Committee on the National 
Health Service to undertake a broader review of NES expenditure. 
56 The comn-dttee 
advocated the introduction of charges for dentures and spectacles, the acceptance of 
which by the Cabinet followed a heated debate resulting in the resignation of Aneurin 
Bevan, now the Minister of Labour together with Harold Wilson and John Freeman, a 
junior minister. The government also took further measures to contain health 
spending: the Exchequer introduced a ceiling on NES expenditure from taxation at 
57 E400 million (1950 prices). This was followed by a freeze on improvements that 
were not considered 'essential and urgent'. 
59 
In stark contrast to the upset caused in the Labour Party by Bevan's resignation, 
the spending cuts and the introduction of charges caused barely a ripple in the TUC. 
Its muted response was curiously so: not only did the government's policy contravene 
that of the TUC but the government had also failed to consult the TUC beforehand, 
usually a source of friction. Yet the TUC Social Insurance Committee did not even 
discuss the content of the 1949 Act nor its implications for NHS patients while the 
Economic Committee merely made a note of the introduction of charges in 1951.59 
55 C Webster, 77ie national health service, p. 3 1. 
56 PRO, MI I 135n5. Proposal for a standard charge for prescriptions, undated; C Webster, The health 
services since the war volume 1, p. 134. 
57 C Webster, The national health service, p. 37- 
52 PRO, M 1[ 137/28, National Health Service, revised estimates for 1950-5 1: estimates for 1951-52,21 
Sept. 1950. 
" MRC, mss. 292mo. in. Economic Committee (EC) 812,9 May 1951. 
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Furthermore the Economic Committee rejected a complaint about the charges by the 
Civil Service Clerical Association because they were preferable to cuts in the hospital 
sector. on this basis, 'the necessity for the Government's action was accepted'. 60 
Complaints at the 1951 Annual Congress were similarly deflected: the General 
Council defended the Labour government's charges because children and national 
assistance claimants were exempted and those who experienced fmancial difficulty as 
a result of the charges could seek a refund from the National Assistance Board . 
61 MS 
was remarkable advice that was completely incongruous with TUC policy on national 
assistance more generally. In 1951 the TUC had complained to the government about 
the growth of national assistance. 62 The TUC's position may be explained by its 
loyalty to the Labour government although it had also believed the charges to be 
temporary: the provision was due to expire in 1954.63 The former is more convincing 
since the TUC accepted lower retirement pensions as well as changes to NHS funding 
because of economic problems. Lincoln Evans of the General Council suggested to 
the 1951 Congress that '[I]t is not absence of the will of the Government, it is absence 
of the means, and I think they have taken care to see that the right priority is 
established here. '64 
Ile one exception in the TUC's apparent complacency to, %vards health service 
charges %%-as the government's decision to abolish refunds for hospital travelling 
expenses. Travel costs, clearly more so than charges for dentures and spectacles, were 
believed to be a real impediment to receiving hospital care because the new 
60 lbidL 
61 Annual Trades Union Congress Repom 195 1, p. 503. 
62 Chapter 2. p. 47. 
Ile change in TUC attitudes towards N1 IS charges is discussed further on pp. 117-18. 
Annual Trades Union Congress Report 195 1, p. 504. 
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arrangements required patients to pay their fares and then claim a refund from the 
National Assistance Board. Ile TUC wrote to the Minister of Health to advise him 
that the change in policy was resulting in financial problems ý for some hospital 
patients. 65 Bevan wras unsympathetic as he believed that the previous system had 
been abused. 66 Ile TUC disagreed with this contention and sought a compromise; it 
suggested that the policy be amended for those travelling long distances, or on a 
regular basis, to hospital. The new Minister of Health, Hilary Marquand, was more 
amenable to the TUC's complaints but Ministry officials were somewhat less so 
because NHS spending was already too high and an increase in national assistance 
was imminent. 67 Consequently Marquand was unwilling to make any concessions 
since they would require cuts in other areas of the NES. This could not be justified 
when there was little evidence that the abolition of refunds for travel costs by 
hospitals themselves had caused widespread financial difficulty. 69 
Health Centres 
A Labour government may easily have won TUC acceptance of health service charges 
but the trade union movement was less compliant over procrastination in the 
dp. velopmcnt of health centres. In July 1947, Ministry of Health officials admitted 
that shortages in the building industry would impede the establishment of the 
goverranent's programme. 69 In February 1948, a Ministry circular announced that 
65 MRC, MSS192/161/8, SllWC 6,14 Dec. 1950. 
" [bid., SllWC 10,15 Feb. 195 1. 
67 lbid, SllWC l5f2,10 May 195 1; PRO, MH 99188, note on hospital patients travelling expenses - 
C), ssible concession for long distances, undated; PRO, MH 99/88, JE Pater to Mr Ariner, 26 July 195 1. 
PRO, MH 99,188, Minister to Sir Vincent Tewson, National Health Service hospital patients 
travelling expenses, 25 July 195 1. 
" PRO, Nil 1134/48, Health centres, note of discussion, 9 July 1947; MH 134/49, draft circular by 
Ministry of Health to County and County Borough Councils and other local authorities, 1947. 
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shortage of building materials and a lack of research on the best model. Initially the 
General Council resigned itself to these delays as it did not want building problems to 
result in poor quality centres. 70 Eighteen months later it was becoming anxious for 
some progress: a Congress resolution, demanding the establishment of health centres, 
71 was sent to the Minister of Health. In March 1951 a TUC deputation met with 
Marquand to complain of unacceptable delays in hospital surgeries and public 
frustration. The TUC representatives suggested that health centres be introduced on a 
limited basis for the time being. n 'Me Minster cited the problem of building 
shortages and inexperience, but advised the TUC that the CHSC had set up a Health 
Centres Committee to review the situation. Marquand agreed that the government 
would set up a small number providing that local authorities minimised their cost. 73 
This represented a small success for the TUC even though the imminent election 
prevented implementation. Not that the TUC had made excessive demands on the 
Attlee govcnunents' health policy-, aside from the dispute over travel costs and the 
TUC's strong support for the lapsed health centre programme, it was generally 
acquiescen4 particularly %%ith regard to the issue of charges. This tolerance was soon 
to diminish upon the election of a Conservative government in 195 1. Thereafter NHS 
funding issues and charges were to become the main source of the TUC's growing 
disconsolation with the health service. Consumer representation also continued to be 
an important issue. Ile campaign for health centres, however, slowly petered out as 
the TUC turned its attention to problems in the hospital sector. 
" MRC, MSS2921161/6. SllWC 6.12 Feb. 1948; SlIWC 7,11 March 1948. 
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The NES under the Conservatives 
The election of a Conservative administration represented an opportunity for policy 
changes, but there were few radical moves. Charles Webster believes that political 
consensus underpinned the NIIS after 1951 on the basis of significant similarities in 
Labour and Conservative health policy. For instance, Labour introduced health 
service charges, which the Conservatives simply extended. 74 Dutton also cites the 
introduction of charges by Labour, the substantial increase in NHS spending which 
took place under the Tories, Conservative acceptance of the findings of the 
Guillebaud Committee, and the 1962 Hospital Plan. 75 Other historians have explained 
continuity not in terms of consensus but as a consequence of constraints on policy- 
making. 
76 For Klein, consensus was achieved by involving the relevant interest 
77 
groups in policy-making in order to preclude discord . According to Harriet Jones, 
external groups, including the TUC, acted to prevent changes in policy. 78 The nature, 
or absence of, consensus in this respect ý is considered below. Generally the TUC 
became increasingly dissatisfied with a number of aspects of health policy under the 
Conservative governments. This together with its more aggressive approach towards 
health policy under the Conservatives suggests that political sympathies played a role 
here. The BEC continued to ignore developments in health policy and declined 
opportunities to participate. 
74 C Pierson, 'Social policy', p. 148; C Webster, The national health service, p. 34. 
75 D Dutton, British politics since 1945 (1997), pp. 59-60. 
76 N Ellison, 'Consensus here, consensus there', p. 18; H Jones, 'New tricks for an old dog? ' p. 34; R 
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NHSfunding and health charges 
The TUC first approached the new Minister of Health, HFC Crookshank, to discuss 
hospital travel expenses. Like his Labour predecessors, he also refused to amend the 
regulations. 79 Further dissatisfaction resulted from the introduction of finther health 
service charges; the 1952 National Health Service Bill contained proposals' for 
charges for drugs, medicines, appliances, dentistry, and day nursery care. The TUC 
responded very negatively to the Bill; it rejected the government's argument that 
prescription charges were necessary to prevent abuse and suggested that controls on 
GPs' prescribing allocation should be introduced to address any such problem. 80 
Neither did the TUC accept economic difficulties as a suitable explanation even 
though this had been the reason accepted and produced by the General Council to 
justify similar policies of the Attlee governments. The TUC was now much more 
worried about the financial impact of charges on the low-paid and openly denied that 
this was a product of the change in government. In the words of one member of the 
General Council, '[t]he strong indignation aroused by the proposals'was not simply a 
matter of political difference; it arose from a conviction that the charges were unjust, 
a retrograde step from the point of view of the nation's health, and as sacrifice of the 
principles of the Health Scheme. 81 Also the TUC cited the temporary nature of 
Labour's charges as a reason for its compliance. 
This degree of inconsistency in policy may reflect partiality but it is also likely that 
the TUC simply had greater trust in the Labour Party to safeguard the NHS. This 
would have been encouraged fin-ther by the Labour Party's election campaign in 
79 MRC, MSS. 292/161/9, SIIWC 7,13 Dec. 1951. 
110 Ibid., SIIWC 9/6,13 Feb. 1952. 
g' Ibid., SIIWC 11/1,9 April 1952. 
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1951, which suggested that the Conservatives would dismantle the welfare state. The 
speed with which the Churchill government introduced new charges may well have 
caused the TUC to fear for the principles of universal health care, free at the point of 
use, thus, precipitating such a fierce reaction. It also believed that charges for dental 
care would have a deterrent effect and cause people to neglect their teeth. 82 
Crookshank reftised to advise the TUC on whether the charges were permanent or if 
the government intended to introduce ftirther charges since these would be dependent 
upon the economic situation. To placate the TUC, he did promise that 'the 
fundamental structure of the Service would not be undermined', and also pointed out 
that the National Assistance Board would help those for whom the charges did cause 
financial problems, advice that the TUC had of course already given its own members 
in 195 1.83 Tle TUC's antipathy towards the charges was then further intensified 
when Hilary Marquand pledged to the House of Commons that a Labour government 
would abolish all direct health service charges and review provision for those who 
experienced hardship when travelling long distances for hospital care. 84 
The finances of the NHS were also a source of disagreement within the 
gover=ent itself. The Treasury in particular was unhappy with spending levels and 
growth in the health service's annual budget. It therefore proposed that the 
govermnent should set up an independent conunittee to review the cost of the NHS 
with the clear expectation that this committee would be able to offer means of saving 
money. Webster claims that the Ministry of Health opposed the Treasury's idea 
because it believed that such an enquiry would find evidence of underfunding in 
32 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
34 MRC, MSS292/161/1 1, SIIWC 11/3,10 March 1954. 
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provision for tuberculosis, mental health, mental handicap, the aged and those with 
chronic health care needs. 85 In spite of the Ministry of Health's warning, the 
government set up the Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the National Health 
Service in May 1953 with Mr Claude W Guillebaud, a Cambridge economist, in the 
chair. The Committee's terms of reference were: - 
To review the present and prospective cost of the National Health Service; 
to suggest means, whether by modifications in organisation or otherwise, 
of ensuring the most effective control and efficient use of such Exchequer 
funds as may be made available; to advise how, in view of the burdens of 
the Exchequer, a rising charge upon it can be avoided while providing for 
the maintenance of an adequate Service; and to make recommendations. 86 
Miss BA Godwin, a member of the General Council, represented the TUC on the 
Guillebaud Committee. It also submitted both written and oral evidence, which 
focused chiefly on health service charges. The TUC argued that charges had a 
detrimental impact on NHS patients because they discouraged consumption of 
medicines, and use of dental and ophthalmic services. This contention was supported 
by evidence of a substantial reduction in the demand for spectacles, with expenditure 
falling from f2l. 7 million in 1949-50 to flO. 1 million in 1952-3, following the 
introduction of charges. 87 There had also been a significant decrease in spending on 
dental care although the role of the introduction of charges was less clear since 
dtmand for dentistry had been in decline beforehand. 88 The TUC also argued that the 
cost of travelling to hospital led to financial difficulties and, therefore, impeded access 
to medical care. 89 In order to address the NHS's financial problems without 
impinging upon the well-being of its patients, the TUC suggested the government 
$5 C Webster, The health services after the war vol. 1, p. 204 
86 Guillebaud Report, p. 1. 
87 MRC, MSS. 292/16 1/11, SIIWC 7/1,13 Jan. 1954. 
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introduce controls on prices of medical supplies, undertake bulk purchase and central 
contracting of medical goods and services, and investigate the remuneration of 
chemists and dentists. 90 
The Guillebaud Report was published in January 1956. Contrary to Treasury 
expectation it found little evidence of inefficiency or waste in the NHS. 91 In fact it 
identified certain areas where more funds were required owing to the accumulative 
impact of underspending and was critical of inadequate levels of capital investment. 
Neither did the Guillebaud. committee support the extension of charges: it ý was 
ambivalent about the prescription charge but recommended the abolition of the 
charges for ophthahnic and dental care because of their deterrent effects once this was 
financially viable. 92 With regard to health centres, the committee agreed, with the 
status quo that they should be set up on an experimental basis only for the time 
being. 93 The Guillebaud Committee did not make any recommendations with regard 
to wider reorganisation of the health service, and has been criticised for doing so, but 
it did note that the medical profession was too dominant in the current structure of 
administration. 94 Accordingly it recommended that medical appointments should 
comprise no more than 25 per cent of the membership of Regional Hospital Boards or 
Pospital Management Committees. 95 
Both Geoffrey Rivett and David Dutton have suggested that the Guillebaud Report 
helped to consolidate the political consensus over the NHS. Riven believes that this 
90 Ibid., pp. 4-6 
91 Guillebaud Report, p. 269. 
92 Ibid, pp. 260-6 1. 
93 Ibid.. p. 262. 
94 R Lowe, The weU4re state since 1945, p. 18 1. 
95 Guillebaud Report, p. 247. 
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was because its findings denied the Conservatives a mandate for significant change. 96 
Dutton claims that the Tory government accepted the committee's 
recommendations. 97 Yet Conservative governments did increase and extend direct 
charges while the process of reducing medical membership was a lengthy one. This 
does not necessarily militate against the existence of political consensus since a 
Labour administration did indeed introduce charges in the first instance, and Bevan 
had strongly defended medical representation in NHS administration. These two 
issues, however, were the source of growing antagonism towards government policy 
on the part of the TUC. The TUC had been fairly satisfied with the content of the 
Guillebaud Report, particularly its views on charges and medical participation in the 
nmning of the NHS. 98 The committee's endorsement of TUC policy together with the 
government's refusal to indicate whether it intended to comply with the Guillebaud 
Report's recommendations precipitated a more vigorous TUC campaign against NHS 
charges which now sought complete abolition. 
TUC representatives met with RH Turton, a new Minister of Health, on I March 
1956 to ask for the removal of NHS charges, and a change in government policy 
towards the refund of hospital travel costs. The Minister rejected both of these 
requests; he argued that the income foregone would require cuts in other areas of the 
NHS or a reduction in the hospital building programme. 99 The government was 
presently taking a hard line on social policy spending: Butler prohibited a substantial 
increase in expenditure on the social services and had commissioned a survey of the 
96 G Rivett, From cradle to grave, p. 114. 
97 D Dunon, British politics since 1945 (1997), p. 60. 
93 MRC, MSS. 292/161/13, SIIWC 8,9 Feb. 1956. 
99 Ibid., SIIWC 10/1,15 March 1956; MSS. 292/161/14, SIIWC 5,9 Jan. 1957. 
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prospective growth in social expenditure over the next few years. 100 This survey 
anticipated an increase in NHS spending of 15.4 per cent by 1960/1, which led to the 
establishment of a committee of ministers to review the cost of the social services as a 
whole. 101 With regard to the NHS, the ministerial committee recommended that a 
charge be applied to each item of medicine rather than each prescription slip in order 
to raise E5 million. 102 The TUC immediately condemned the proposal and asked the 
goverrunent to reconsider. 103 Both the Minister of Health and the Minister of 
Pensions and National Insurance defended the policy: Turton insisted that the increase 
was necessary in light of the current economic climate but asked the'TUC to let him 
know of any instances of hardship arising from the new policy. 104 Boyd-Carpenter 
reminded the TUC that the National Assistance Board would refund the charges to the 
low-paid. 105 
Four months later, the government also increased the NHS element in the national 
insurance contribution. The TUC issued a press statement expressing its opposition to 
financing the NHS from direct charges and contributions. 106 The Social Insurance 
Committee wrote to the Prime Minister, *the Minister of Health, and the Minister of 
Pensions and National Insurance to express its dissatisfaction with goverment policy 
but to little effect. 107 Its campaign against health service charges continued 
regardless. In 1957 it sent an Annual Congress resolution to the Minister of Health 
that condemned prescription charges, national insurance contribution increases and 
100 C Webster, The health services after the war volume I, p. 212. 
101 Ibid. 
102 MRC, MSS. 292/161/14, SIIWC 3,15 Nov. 1956. 
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limits on capital expenditure to the Minister of Health. 108 The government clearly 
ignored TUC feeling on the matter because, without consulting the TUC, it introduced 
a National Health Service Bill in 1958 that proposed to increase further the NHS 
contribution. TUC complaints once again met with a lack of response. 109 
A deputation to the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, John Boyd- 
Carpenter, in July 1960 raised the matter of hospital travel costs again. ' 10 In 1961, a 
further rise in the NHS contribution of 10d, a 100 per cent increase in the cost of 
prescriptions, and higher prices for dentures, spectacles, hospital amenity beds, and 
welfare foods exacerbated the TUC's concems about the govemment's policy. 
Concessions had been made for expectant and nursing mothers and children with 
regard to dentures and spectacles but the TUC still opposed the new charges. "' It 
issued another press statement denouncing the increase in charges, the shifting 
emphasis towards direct financing of the NHS, and also the government's failure to 
consult the TUC. 1 12 The latter is a somewhat surprising grievance as there is no 
evidence that the TUC was consulted on previous changes to the health service 
charging policy by either Labour or Conservative govermnents. Enoch Powell, who 
had been appointed Minister of Health, made no attempt to justify his actions to the 
TUC; he simply referred it to the parliamentary debate. 113 Subsequent complaints at 
Annual Congresses over NHS funding were equally ineffectual. ' 14 Powell refused to 
108 MRC, MSS. 292/161/15, SIIWC 3,13 Nov. 1957. 
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increase the proportion of NHS finance from general taxation, and insisted that the 
abolition of charges would simply means cuts in spending elsewhere. 
115 
Ile TUC's campaign against NUS charges and the NHS contribution was 
ultimately fruitless. In 1951 health service charges and the NHS contribution 
provided 9.4 per cent of NHS expenditure; this figure had reached 19.5 per cent by 
1963/64.1 16 It had also failed to convince successive governments that the NHS 
should assist with the cost of travelling to hospital in spite of its frequent attempts. 
Neither is there any evidence to suggest that the TUC's attitude towards charges ever 
informed any government decisions on NES funding. 
Signs ofprogress?: TUCparticipation on RHBs 
Given its lack of progress in relation to NHS charges it would appear that the 
government paid little attention to the TUC in relation to health policy. Yet the level 
of contact and access to ministers enjoyed by the TUC suggest that it could not be 
completely ignored. Representation of trade unionists on Regional Hospital Boards 
permitted participation in health policy at a more localised level. While the principle 
cf trade union participation on the regional boards had been accepted, the TUC 
consistently found the level of involvement to be deficient. No sooner had the TUC 
obtained a firm commitment from the government regarding trade union appointments 
to RHBs than the government failed to honour it, thus, leaving the issue unresolved. 
115 Ibid., SIIWC 4,9 Jan. 1963. 
116 C Webster, The national health service, p. 34. 
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During the Attlee years the TUC had complained of excessive medical 
participation, and inadequate representation of both health workers and NHS patients. 
The Ministry of Health forbade it to nominate health service workers to the boards, 
therefore, the TUC became more involved in the representation of NHS patients. The 
Labour goverrunent had initiated this practice and the role was quickly, accepted by 
the TUC. In 1953, when its North-West Regional Advisory Committee protested that 
its nominees were not being appointed to the RHB, the TUC Social Insurance 
Committee complained not of poor levels of trade union representation but of NHS 
patients. 117 Both Labour and Conservative governments accepted trade union 
nominations for representation of users of the health service. When the TUC 
complained to Ian Macleod about an increase in the number of Regional Hospital 
Boards that did not have a trade union member, the Minister replied that he realised 
that consumer representation on RHBs was important. ' 18 He promised that he would 
keep TUC nominees in mind when making the next round of appointments but in fact 
the number of Boards without a trade unionist increased in 1955.119 
This proved to be characteristic of TUC consultation with successive Ministers of 
Health on the subject of representation on Regional Hospital Boards over the 
following years. Ministers were sympathetic to TUC complaints and would promise 
improvements in future, -which would not materialise. 
120 Ministers of Health 
generally accepted that the TUC could represent NHS users although Derek Walker- 
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Smith, in 1958, pointed out that the TUC did not hold a monopoly in this respect. 121 
Nonetheless, improvements were made in 1959 and in 1963 Enoch Powell promised 
that each RHB and Board of Governors (with one exception) would now have a trade 
union member. 122 This commitment represented a significant achievement, which 
encouraged the TUC to seek a greater role on Hospital Management Committees, 
again presenting itself as a representative of consumer opinion. ' The Minister of 
Health was unable to assist since these appointments were made by the Regional 
Hospital Boards but promised to consider new guidance in order to address trade 
union representation on HMCs. 123 Meanwhile there was a decrease in the number of 
doctors on NHS committees in line with the Guillebaud Committee's 
recommendation. 124 These achievements were then overshadowed in 1963 when an 
additional Regional Hospital Board failed to appoint a trade union nominee. The 
TUC wrote to Enoch Powell expressing its disappointment. 125 Thus at the end of this 
period, the issue of trade union representation in NHS administration was still a 
source of dissatisfaction. 
Consensus at last? Developments in health services 
The TUC's main interest in health services during the years of Labour government 
concerned the establishment of health centres. Its campaign enjoyed little success 
before 1951 and even less thereafter. By 1955 the TUC appear to have more or less 
lost interest in health centres and took a growing interest in problems in the hospital 
121 MRC, MSS. 292/161/15, SIIWC 7/2,24 Jan. 1958; SIIWC 12,11 June 1958. 
122 MRC, MSS292/161/16, SIIWC 12,10 June 1959; MSS. 292b/161/16, SIIWC 6,13 March 1963 
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sector. Hospitals had dominated the NHS both in respect of policy development and 
resource allocation from the outset. In spite of this imbalance, they still suffered from 
the effects of inadequate investment and spending by both Labour and Conservative 
governments. 126 The Guillebaud Report also criticised the state of NHS hospitals in 
1956. Thereafter the government devoted more resources to hospital building and 
improvement, culminating in the 1962 Hospital Plan. The government's new-found 
commitment to hospital services coincided with growing TUC criticism of problems 
in this area which the government now planned to address. Therefore, dialogue 
between government and the TUC on hospital matters was quite amicable since, for 
once, TUC and Conservative policy on the NHS had taken the same direction. It 
should be noted, however, that this coincidence of views and objectives did not 
appear to have been a product of TUC pressure. 
In 1951 the TUC had only just managed to persuade the Labour government to 
undertake a small-scale experiment in the establishment of health centres when the 
Conservatives won the general election. The new government was unwilling to 
subscribe to even this minor concession; Crookshank wrote to Vincent Tewson to 
advise him that the continued shortage of building resources prevented the large-scale 
development of health centres, and he did not foresee any change in policy in the near 
future. 127 Ile General Council did not pursue the matter over the next two years until 
the Guillebaud Committee was appointed. The TUC was dissatisfied with progress in 
the health centre programme, or the lack of it, and still supported an experimental 
approach for the benefit of new towns and housing estates, and to facilitate 
126 C Webster, The national health service, pp. 3945. 
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cooperation between hospitals, GPs and local health authorities. 128 It sent an Annual 
Congress resolution on the subject to the Minister of Health and Sir Walter Monckton, 
the Minister of Labour. 129 Turton dismissed the TUC's proposal, again citing the 
building situation and a lack of research as reasons not to proceed. 130 At a meeting 
with General Council representatives in March 1956, he advised them that the 
government could only build health centres if it made cuts elsewhere in the NHS. 13 1 
After this meeting health centres were scarcely mentioned in discussions on TUC 
health policy. 
Perhaps the TUC's declining interest in health centres can be explained by the 
distractions produced by problems in NHS hospitals. It would appear that the TUC's 
Social Insurance Committee paid little attention to the hospital sector until it was 
required to present evidence to the Guillebaud Committee. In its evidence, the TUC 
called for higher spending on mental health and geriatric services. It also complained 
of overcrowding in mental hospitals, and of inadequate community-based care for the 
mentally ill. It still felt that the hospital sector was being given undue emphasis at the 
expense of preventive medicine and after-care services. Accordingly it recommended 
an increase in the number of home nurses, home helps and health visitors in order to 
improve these areas. 132 
While the TUC had always felt that the hospital sector had been'given a 
disproportionate amount of attention, it began to examine the problems in NHS 
128 MRC, MSS292/161/1 1, SIlWC 12/2,14 April 1954, pp. 2,12-13 
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hospitals. It soon found evidence of excessive waiting lists and poor standards of 
hospital buildings, particularly casualty departments. , It suggested that resources be 
concentrated on certain hospitals to ensure that each region was able to provide 
adequate emergency services. In 1957 the Social Insurance Committee wrote to the 
Minister of Health, Derek Vosper, to complain about the casualty services. 133 There 
were also complaints about the hospital service at the 1958 Annual Congress. It 
passed two resolutions that criticised the slow pace of hospital building, and 
improvement and the lack of developments in preventive health care measures. 134 
Vosper's successor, Derek Walker-Smith defended the government's record: NHS 
annual expenditure had increased from approximately E 10 million in its early years to 
reach predicted levels of UO million, L22 million and E25.5 million in 1958/59, 
1959/60, and 1960/61. The TUC acknowledged that spending had risen but criticised 
the government for failing to provide figures in real tenns. 135 
In spite of higher spending by Conservative govenunents the TUC was still 
unhappy with the hospital services. The 1959 Annual Congress discussed the 
inefficiency of out-patients departments and delays in obtaining appointments with 
NHS consultants. The Minister of Health investigated consultant waiting times in 
rt: sponse to the TUC's criticism; he later wrote to the TUC to advise it of recent 
improvements. 136 The 1961 Annual Congress complained of inadequate investment 
in hospital building again, and also the shortages in medical staffing levels. Once 
more the government was responsive to the TUC's criticisms; Enoch Powell wrote to 
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advise the TUC that the government was reviewing the staff situation in hospitals, and 
also in general practice, in association with the MedicalTractices Committee and the 
General Medical Services Committee. In addition proposals for an increase in the 
number of medical students were currently under consideration. 137 He wrote again six 
months later to inform the TUC that plans to increase the number of doctors were 
being implemented. 138 He also drew-the TUC's attention to the government's 
Hospital Plan which was designed to modernise the hospital service by closing 1250 
hospitals, improving 360 others, and building 90 new hospitals. Its overall aim was to 
offer 600-800 bed district general hospitals across the county. 139 In April 1963 the 
government also published a survey of local authority plans for their health and 
welfare services. 
While the TUC's Social Insurance Committee welcomed both the proposed 
developments in the hospital sector and in community health services, it was 
concerned that the under-developed community care services would be overburdened 
unless they were given adequate support. 140 Therefore it wrote to Enoch Powell for 
reassurance that sufficient ftmding would be provided to allow local authorities to 
improve their services, and that the government would not implement cuts in the 
number of hospital beds until community-based provision was adequately 
developed. 141 The 1963 Annual Congress expressed some dissatisfaction with the 
standard of several local authority plans for community care which unions believed 
did not reach the standards required by the Ministry of Health. The TUC was keen on 
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the development of community care given its reservations over the predominance of 
the hospital sector in the NES: the 1963 Congress passed a resolution which called for 
the abolition of all institutional beds before 1972 by developing community care 
policies and establishing elderly day care centres. 142 Anthony Barber, Powell's 
successor at the Ministry of Health, accordingly advised the TUC that the 
government's plans for hospital and local authority health services were flexible and 
that the TUC's comments would be given due consideration as the plans were 
developed. 143 It follows that developments in the hospital sector, particularly after 
1959, were marked by significantly more contact between the Ministry of Health and 
the TUC than in relation to any other area of the NHS. Ministers of Health were 
responsive to TUC observations, comments and criticisms; correspondence was 
frequent and cordial. This probably reflects the existence of government plans for 
improvements in NHS hospitals whereas the TUC's other policy aims, abolition of 
charges and health centres, did not feature in Conservative health policy after 195 1. 
Conclusion 
By 1964 the NHS remained untouched by radical policies, providing support for the 
aýgument that the National Health Service was an element of the postwar political 
consensus. The TUC's attitude towards the development of the NHS during this 
period has been examined in some detail in order to discern whether this consensus 
was broader in its scope. Strong TUC criticism of some government health policies 
after 1951 is suggestive of an absence of consensus. However, the matter is not so 
142 Ibid., SIIWC 2,13 Nov. 1963. 
143 MRC, MSS. 292b/161/18, SIIWC 5,12 Feb. 1964. 
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clear-cut. It is true that the TUC was extremely antagonistic where Conservative 
health charges were concerned whilst the issue of representation was not resolved 
during this period. Nonetheless, its fundamental goals in the sphere of health policy - 
universal access and free health care save the introduction of some direct charges - 
had been achieved. As the TUC stated in its evidence to the Guillebaud Committee in 
1953, '[a]ny criticisms or suggestions for improving the Health Service ... are not 
intended in any way to detract from the magnitude of this achievement. ' 144 
Furthermore, progress was made, albeit slowly, in relation to the representation issue, 
and the government's acceptance of the TUC as a representative of consumers was a 
noteworthy development in the history of the TUC as an interest group. Discussions 
on developments in hospital care after 1956 were held regularly and their tone was 
largely amicable. The record is, therefore, mixed with signs of consensus being not 
entirely absent after 1951 but neither does the concept accurately encapsulate the 
nature of government-TUC negotiations on the NHS during the Conservative years. 
Although scarcely mentioned in the course of this chapter owing to its lack of 
participation in the making of health policy, the British Employers' Confederation did 
not make direct attacks on the NHS., This is in keeping with the idea of a negative 
consensus. Lowe suggests that electoral considerations placed limitation on 
Conservative policy-making. 145 Similarly the BEC had, during the war, shown itself 
to be conscious of the dangers of contradicting the public mood and the NHS was 
hugely popular with the public. 146 Its unwillingness to participate in health policy- 
making also has implications for Keith Middlemas' theory of corporate bias. It 
144 MRC, MSS. 292/161/1 1, SllWC 12/2,14 April 1954. 
145 R Lowe, 'Second world war', p. 100. 
146 Chapter 2, p. 37. 
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strongly suggests that the existence of corporate bias was not simply dependent upon 
governmental desire to involve important interest groups since incorporation was not 
automatically welcomed or sought by these groups. In this instance, the BEC 
declined the opportunity to participate in health policy and tripartism is, therefore, 
quite absent. The BEC's approach to health policy serves to reinforce the findings of 
the two earlier chapters where BEC involvement was shown to be very closely linked 
to those issues that directly affected employers. Therefore, the Confederation was 
interested in national insurance and retirement pensions because employers helped to 
fund the schemes and, as the next chapter shows, in education because its members 
employed the products of state education. While the NHS may have assisted 
employers by creating a healthier labour force, the BEC appear not to have recognised 
such an indirect contribution. 
In contrast to the BEC, the TUC welcomed all opportunities to participate in the 
formulation of health policy and actively sought to influence it. - This desire was 
assisted by apparently unlimited access to Ministers of Health combined with 
representation on RHBs. This involvement may reflect corporate bias and Klein and 
Harriet Jones' interpretations of consensus as the TUC was not required to assist in 
the implementation of health policy in the same way as social security. However, 
competition from other more powerful interest groups in this sphere, such as, the 
BMA, certainly ruled out the prospect of the TUC becoming a 'governing institution' 
in relation to this aspect of government policy. Not only did the BMA dominate 
health policy during the 1950s, but both Labour and Conservative governments 
refused to appoint a TUC representative to the main advisory body in the NHS, the 
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Central Health Services Council. 147 Neither did the existence of corporate bias 
contain any guarantees that the TUC's views would influence policy in any way. On 
a more positive note, TUC participation in the administration of the NHS was 
guaranteed at a local level through its appointments to RHBs. Although these 
appointments were not representative, they cast the TUC in a new role as the 
representative of consumers rather than a narrowly-based producer interest group. 
How successful then was the TUC in advancing the interests of NHS patients? 
Between 1945 and 1951, the TUC can be criticised in this respect owing to its 
deference to the Attlee governments: its General Council was very quick to defend 
policy without even seeking consultation on issues which were causing anxiety in the 
wider trade union movement as was expressed at annual congresses. A more 
belligerent and critical approach did emerge following the Conservative electoral 
success in 1951 but the TUC failed to achieve many of its policy objectives. Several 
factors may offer some explanation for this: First, TUC policies were often expensive 
and would have required a greater contribution from the Exchequer during a period 
when the onus was on minimising the Exchequer's contribution. Second, other 
interest groups promoted policies that conflicted with those of the TUC; for instance, 
the TUC sought the establishment of health centres while GPs opposed them. Third, 
frequent changes in Ministers of Health may have prevented the TUC from building a 
more concrete relationship with the policy-makers. These are possible explanations 
as to why the TUC did not achieve its goals in relation to health policy. Less 
defensible is the TUC's failure to recognise and take action with regard to wider 
problems that were emerging in the NHS in the 1950s. Its tripartite structure was 
"7 R Klein, The new politics ofthe national health service, p. 5 1. 
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causing increasing concern, and also of great relevance to, but ignored by the TUC, 
was the growing awareness of the NHS's failure to tackle wider inequalities in health 
care and health standards which had their roots in class differences and geography. 
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Chapter Five: Education 
We have thus far examined TUC and BEC policies in relation to social security and 
pensions, and trade union involvement in health policy and the NHS. This chapter on 
education provides a ftu-ther insight into the social policies of these two organisations 
and also that of the Federation of British Industries, which otherwise had shown little 
direct interest in state welfare. Their involvement in the education policy-making 
sphere took a number of forms in this period. The war, of course, offered plentiful 
opportunities to influence education policy as the topic was then so open to debate. 
Thereafter, the establishment of ihe Central Advisory Council for Education 
(England) (CACE(E)), which held regular enquiries into different aspects of 
education, provided an important forum for educational debate in which these interest 
groups were able to participate. In addition to the activities of the advisory council, 
Ministers of Education were also willing to accept deputations and representations 
from these groups, and would also initiate consultation themselves. The TUC 
declared its interest in all aspects of education policy, including secondary, technical, 
ftu-ther and higher education, which are discussed here. Industrial interests were more 
complex given the division of responsibility between the BEC and FBI. The former 
addressed issues relating to education in secondary modem schools and technical 
education while the FBI concerned itself with the grammar schools, higher 
technological education and the universities. 
It must be conceded that the 61ite focus of this study is least useful in relation to 
education in view of the localised nature of policy implementation and the important 
role of local education authorities. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Education was 
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certainly active in the formulation of education policies, and represented the focus of 
much of these interests groups' activities. Therefore, it is still appropriate to seek the 
existence and significance of corporate bias, and explore policy at this level for 
evidence of consensus. Education has been cited as a feature of the welfare consensus 
but only briefly without ftu-ther explanation. ' The argument has tended to surround 
the Attlee governments' decision not to proceed with comprehensive schools or to 
abolish the public schools! Dennis Dean has offered a more detailed assessment of 
the Churchill government, and Brian Simon also addresses the notion but, in typical 
fashion, both these studies examine only the two major political parties. ' In view of 
the debate over Britain's relative economic decline at this time and criticisms of the 
paucity of British technical education in particular, this chapter offers a valuable 
insight into industrial attitudes towards education policy. 
Education before the second world war 
The interwar period has been designated, as one of stagnation with regard to state 
education: governments were not particularly interested and education was too readily 
the victim of cuts in public expenditure. " Still, ideas and proposals for reform and 
development were far from absent and provided the basis for subsequent reforms in 
the 1940s. ' The 1918 Education Act raised the school leaving age to fourteen and 
abolished fees for elementary schools. It also contained plans for part-time day 
continuation education for young workers between the ages of fourteen and eighteen 
1D Kavanagh &P Morris, Consensus politics (1994), p. 72; D Dutton, British politics since 1945 
(199 1), p. 3 1. 
2N Ellison, 'Consensus here, consensus there', p. 292. 
3D Dean, 'Consensus or conflictT and B Simon, Education and the social order. 
4D Fraser, The evolution ofthe British wey'are state, p. 205; A Crowther, Socialpolicy in Britain, 
r. 35. 
P Gordon et al, Education andpolicy, p. 59. 
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but spending cuts in the 1920s prevented its implementation. No ftu-ther reforms were 
legislated in education until the 1939 Education Act but planning did continue. 
Two sets of proposals were presented by the goverrunent's own Consultative 
Committee. In 1926 the Hadow Committee recommended a finther increase in the 
school leaving age to fifteen and the reorganisation. of elementary schools into distinct 
periods of primary and secondary education, with the division being made at age 
eleven. In 1931, over 30 per cent of children were receiving an education under the 
Hadow recommendations. " Nonetheless, most were still based in elementary schools 
- 88 per cent in 1938 - and tended to leave school at the minimum leaving age with 
no qualifications. " An Education Act in 1936 contained proposals for an increase in 
the school leaving age to fifteen as endorsed by the Hadow Report but with 
exemptions for those in 'beneficial' employment. Its implementation was planned for 
1939 but this was interrupted by the outbreak of war. In 1938, the Consultative 
Committee on Education released another report, which supported the earlier findings 
of Hadow and emphasised the need for the development of secondary education on a 
tripartite basis. However, the government rejected its recommendations. 
Few developments took place in the spheres of technical, ftirther and higher 
education. Local education authorities were responsible for technical education and 
could undertake initiatives on a voluntary basis, reflecting the government's lack of 
interest. Further education tended to be pursued only on a part-time basis at evening 
classes following the failure to develop day continuation education! Finally, Simon 
IP Thane, Foundations ofthe wetrare state, p. 190. 7B Simon, Education and the social order, p. 26. ' Ibid., p. 30. 
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believes that British higher education was inferior to that in other advanced industrial 
economies in the interwar period. ' 
The 1930s witnessed growing dissatisfaction with state education. Demands 
included an increase in the school leaving age, and parity of esteem between different 
secondary schools. Criticism of the public school system'was also growing. The 
Labour party published a pamphlet, written by RH Tawney, in 1922 which called for 
a range of secondary schools and the abolition of fees for secondary education. The 
party's dissatisfaction with state education reflected that of the TUC, which dated 
back to the nineteenth century. Congress resolutions had demanded a school leaving 
age of sixteen, part-time education for young workers, and maintenance allowances to 
permit children to remain at school after the statutory leaving age. ' Employers were 
also unhappy with the state education system, and identified poor English and 
numeracy skills as particular problems. However, there was also a tendency among 
some to belittle school education as being inferior to training in the workplace. "' 
Wartime Reconstruction 
While substantial progress may not have been characteristic the educational sphere in 
the interwar period, a range of ideas for reforms had been formulated. Therefore, the 
main impact of the outbreak of war was not to create original ideas but to provide a 
renewed stimulus to the demands of reformers. Amid mounting criticism of the 
education system, civil servants at the Board of Education acted quickly to grasp the 
9B Simon, Education and the social order, p. 31 
10 MRC, MSS. 292/811/5, TUC Education Committee (Educ. Ctce) 3, appendix, 10 Nov. 1942. 11 K Burgess, 'British employers and education policy', pp. 34-5,53. 
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initiative and to establish the agenda for debates on educational reconstruction. Its 
ideas were presented in a memorandum entitled Education after the war, the 'Green 
Book', designed to stimulate discussion in the direction of proposals that the Board 
found acceptable. " To this end, copies of the memorandum were sent to various 
organisations including other government departments, local education authorities, 
teachers' organisations, churches, selected individuals, and other interested groups. 
This latter category included the TUC since Herwald Ramsbotham, the President of 
the Board of Education had advised it of the preparation of the Green Book. " A copy 
was sent to neither the BEC nor the FBI, whose records offer no indication that they 
were aware of the document's existence at this time. 
Much of the Green Book's content was not original in the sense that several of its 
proposals had been first floated in the interwar years. It recommended the abolition 
of fees for secondary education, a single code for secondary education, the 
organisation of secondary schooling on a tripartite basis. It endorsed demands for a 
school leaving age of 15 which had already been legislated in 1936, albeit with 
exceptions. Its third major recommendation was for further education for young 
workers on a part-time basis between the ages of fifteen and eighteen. Again, this had 
fmtured in previous legislation: the 1918 Education Act. 
The TUC's Education Committee examined the Board of Education's 
memorandum over the course of several meetings, the conclusions of which were 
12 PRO, ED 13 6/293, 'Education after the war': distribution of copies, 194 1. The Board's agenda is 
discussed in B Simon, Education and the social order, p. 57 and P Gosden, Education in the second 
world war, p. 23 8. 
13 MRC, MSS. 292/811/5, TUC Educ. Ctee 3, Deputation to the Board of Education, 18 Dec. 194 1; 
Annual Trades Union Congress Report 194 1, p. 123. 
140 
recorded in a comprehensive statement of TUC education policy. " The TUC was 
interested in all aspects of education and formulated proposals for the reform of 
secondary education, further and technical education, and higher education. 
Regarding secondary education, its priorities were to ensure ftee secondary education 
for all and to secure an increase in the school leaving age to sixteen although it 
conceded that this could be implemented in two stages. The reasoning behind the 
TUC's demand for a higher school leaving age was to ensure equality of opportunity 
in all types of secondary education, 'which suggests that the TUC was not wholly 
averse to the tripartite system. It expected both public and church schools would be 
integrated into the state system, in view of its past criticism of the former before the 
war. These were seen to preserve inequality in the education system while the church 
schools provided the same outcome because their financial difficulties prevented them 
from offering an acceptable standard of education. " 
The TUC supported the provision of part-time finther education in day 
continuation schools for young workers up to the age of eighteen. Its purpose was to 
allow young people who left school at the minimum school leaving age to continue 
their general education; hence finther arrangements for the expansion of technical 
education would also be required. For those with the requisite qualifications for 
university, the TUC called for an expansion of the scholarship system to allow those 
who had been offered a place to accept it. Simultaneously, the TUC sought 
14 Ibid., TUC Educ. Ctee 1,17 Oct. 1941; TUC Educ. Ctee2,11 Nov. 1941; TUC Educ. Ctee3,16 
Dec. 194 1; TUC Educ. Ctee 8,25 March 1942; TUC Educ. Ctee 9,31 March 194; TUC Educ. Ctee 10, 
Comments of the Board of Education's memorandum on "Education after the war", 14 April 1942. '5 MRC, MSS. 292/811/15, TUC Educ. Ctee 10, Comments of the Board of Education's memorandum 
on "Education after the war", 14 April 1942; TUC Educ. Ctee 11,12 May 1942. 
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improvements in the current value of awards to permit a reasonable standard of living 
for univcrsity studcnts to allow full participation in studcnt life. "' 
At this stage the BEC and FBI were more conspicuous by their absence from 
debates on the future of education. We have noted that they were not recipients of the 
Green Book, and there is no evidence to suggest that they had begun to consider 
educational reconstruction within their own organisations. The replacement of 
Ramsbotharn by RA Butler as the President of the Board of Education signalled a 
new attitude towards education and industry. Not only did the pace of reform quicken 
under Butler and his Labour deputy James Chutcr Ede, but industrial organisations 
were brought into the fold. 
The TUCs activities were notable compared to those of its industrial counterparts. 
Once again the TUC showed itself to be more active in relation to postwar social 
reconstruction by becoming involved in the debate on educational reform from the 
outset. It was also anxious that reforms should be implemented before the end of the 
war in order to prevent potential delays, particularly since the war had caused so 
much interruption to children's education under the evacuation programmes. " This 
led the TUC to combine with the Workers' Educational Association (WEA), the 
National Union of Teachers (NUT) and the Co-operative Union in 1942 to form the 
Council for Educational Advance (CEA). Its purpose was to lobby government for 
early educational reform by way of representations, pamphlets, newspaper articles, 
and public meetings to promote wider interest in the subject. 
16 Ibid., TUC Educ. Ctee 10, Comments of the Board of Education's memorandum on "Education after 
the war". 14 April 1942. 
17 Annual Trades Union Congress Report 1942, p. 46. 
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Under RA Butler, reform proceeded apace. In spite of Churchill's aversion to the 
prospect of educational reform owing to the controversies it might stimulate, Butler 
and Chuter Ede had refonns on the statute book by 1944. " This was achieved in large 
part by commissioning committees, a deliberate tactic, to review the more contentious 
aspects of reform, thus allowing Butler to concentrate personally on the church issue 
while deflecting criticism from the government in relation to these other aspects of 
policy. Hence, the school curriculum, private education and technical education were 
passed to government committees for detailed consideration. Conveniently, neither 
the Norwood Committee on Secondary Education nor the Fleming Committee on the 
Public Schools reported in time for their recommendations to be incorporated into the 
government's legislation, while the Percy Committee on Higher Technological 
Education was not appointed until 1944. " 
The Fleming Committee was of particular interest to the TUC given its attitude 
towards the private education system. Its General Council, Walter Citrine represented 
the TUC on the Committee and the Education Committee presented evidence. The 
FBI also submitted evidence to the Fleming Committee, of a quite different tenor. 
The war had not softened trade union views on the public schools in any way. The 
TUC's evidence to the Fleming Committee favoured their abolition and integration 
into the state system in order that their advantages could be enjoyed equally by all 
children. " This reflected the its policy that fees should not be charged for secondary 
education unless the schools were of an experimental nature, as were some direct 
"P Addison, 'The road to 1945', p. 173; P Thane, Foundations ofthe wet(are state, p. 213. 19 PRO, ED 136/537, Outline of how educational reconstruction grew, undated. 20 MRC, MSS. 292/811/5, TUC Educ. Ctee 3, Memorandum of evidence for Committee on Public 
Schools, pp. 1-2. 
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grant schools, or self-supporting denominational schools. " The lack of fees would 
remove distinction between different types of school to secure the principle of 'parity 
of esteem' in secondary education. ' The FBI's Education Committee, in its 
submission to the Fleming Committee, strongly supported the retention of public 
schools. Several of the Federation's members recruited actively from this sector and 
the FBI expressed a desire to establish closer links with the public schoolS. 2' It was 
supported in this stance by the ABCC, which also endorsed the maintenance of 
private education, and complained of the prospect of greater government intervention 
in this sphere. 
24 
The Fleming Committee served its purpose well: these differences of opinion as 
well as those of other participants were effectively contained within this forum. 
When the committee released its report, which ultimately recommended the retention 
of the private sector with only small concessions in return for local education 
authority financial support, the TUC's criticisms had little impact, and the controversy 
over private education was never again so heated. " While the TUC actively pursued 
involvement in the movement for educational reform, promoting it widely, it was left 
to the government to stimulate industrial interest in the subject. At an early date, 
Butler expressed an interest in improving relations with industry. " Hence, a meeting 
was organised with BEC representatives in December 1942 with a view to keeping 
21 Ibid., TUC Educ. Ctce 4/1, Memorandum of evidence on abolition of tuition fees in grant-aidcd 
secondary schools for the Committee on Public Schools, 10 Dec. 1942. 
22 Ibid. 
" MRC, MSS. 200/F/l/l/Vol. 116, FBI D/4268 A, ref 325/A/l, Memorandum to members of the 
Education Committee, District Secretaries and F. B. I. departments, 8 Jan. 1943; FBI D/4290B, rcf, 
325WI, Education Committee, 20 Jan. 1943. 
24 PRO, ED 12/518, RB Dunwoody, ABCC Secretary to RN Heaton, Joint Secretary to the Committee 
on Public Schools, 10 Feb. 1943. 
25 MRC, MSS. 2921811/6, TUC Educ. Ctee 10/3, Note on Fleming Report on Public Schools, 10 Aug. 
1944. 
26 C Barnett, The audit ofwar, p. 282. 
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them informed as to the government's plans for education. " Further consultation and 
discussion on technical education took place within the Joint Consultative Committee 
of the TUC and BEC to the Ministry of Labour. " Both Rodney Lowe and Correlli 
Barnett have criticised the goverrunent for its neglect of technical education prior to 
the establishment of the Percy Committee, especially when compared with the 
attention paid to the religious aspects of refonn. " It is true that Churchill's attitude to 
education required Butler to prioritise church issues where the potential of an outcry 
was perceived to be greatest. Nonetheless, industry was hardly seeking participation. 
The government was responsible for encouraging BEC involvement but there is no 
indication of the FBI's views prior to the passing of the 1944 Education Act with the 
exception of its submission of evidence to the Fleming Committee. Its lack of direct 
interest clearly contrasts significantly with that of the TUC, which sought meetings 
with Butler to promote its education policy, and helped to organise over 400 public 
meetings in conjunction with the CEA. " 
The government's plans were revealed in the 1943 White Paper, entitled 
Educational Reconstruction. It contained few departures from the Board of 
Education's original proposals. Its main features included the abolition of fees in 
state secondary schools, an increase in the school leaving age to fifteen with the 
prospect of a ftuther increase to sixteen, and the provision of further education for 
young people in day continuation schools for one day each week. These proposals 
themselves gave the TUC no cause for complaint, but they were considered to be 'the 
27 PRO, ED 46/155, Meeting of BEC representatives with RA Butler and J Chuter Ede, 21 Dec. 1942. 23 These meetings are discussed in C Barnett, The audit ofwar, pp. 285-6. 29 R Lowe, The wey4re state in Britain since 1945, p. 200; C Barnett, The audit ofwar, p. 282. 30 Annual Trades Union Congress Report 1944, p. 76. 
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very minimum of reform necessary'. " The timetable for reform caused most dissent. 
In particular, the government had ruled out an increase in the school leaving age 
within the first 18 months after the end of the war unless there was a laboUr surplus. " 
This proviso, combined with ambiguity. in other respects, led the TUC to criticise the 
government for its 'far too leisurely approach to the whole question of reform'. " 
Moreover, the postponements in increasing the school leaving age were perceived to 
threaten the key concept of equality of opportunity. If the leaving age was not 
increased then grammar schools would offer a longer course of secondary education 
than the modem schools, thus undermining the principle parity of esteem. "' 
The BEC appeared to have virtually ignored the publication of the White Paper, as 
it did many other prescriptions for social reform but the FBI's Education Committee 
did discuss it. The Federation was happy with the proposal to increase the school 
leaving age to fifteen in the hope that an extra year of schooling would facilitate 
learning in a curriculum, which some of its members considered to have too much 
breadth. They had found poor standards of secondary education in some recruits, 
which undermined the effectiveness of industrial training. The FBI Education 
Committee expressed an interest in becoming more involved in the educational sphere 
vrith a view to ensuring that state education matched industry's needs more 
effectively. For instance, it advocated industry's participation in the design of courses 
provided in day continuation schools to ensure industry accrued maximum benefit 
31 MRC, MSS. 292/811/5, TUC Educ. Ctee 10/1, Statement on White Paper on educational 
reconstruction II Aug. 1943, p. 3. ý 32 Annual Trades Union Congress Report 1943, p. 64. 
33 MRC, MSS. 2921811/5, TUC Educ. Ctee 10/1, Statement on White Paper on educational 
reconstruction, II Aug. 1943. 
34 Annual Trades Union Congress Report 1943, p. 65. 
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from this provision2' Again, these attitudes contrast quite starkly with those of the 
TUC: it sought the extension of a more liberal education, while industry seemed bent 
upon shaping the system to meet its own requirements. Hence, the FBI's greater 
interest was in technical education: it wanted better standards of courses, and all 
teachers to have a teaching qualification. The Federation hoped that industry could 
help in this respect by organising staff exchange programmes, and arranging refresher 
courses for technical teachers, which would heighten industrial awareness of the 
important role played by technical teachers. " 
The Coalition published an Education Bill in December 1943, which again was 
based on broadly similar lines as the White Paper. Plans for the abolition of fees in 
the state sector and the introduction of county colleges for the education of young 
workers were confu-med. The introduction of a higher school leaving age was fixed 
for I April 1945, however the President of the Board of Education could postpone it 
for up to two years, and no mention was made of a leaving age of sixteen. 
The TUC's reaction to the Education Bill was equivocal; although it was 
appreciative of much of its content, it described the government's policy as 'vague 
and uncertain'. "' The principle of free secondary education was not to apply to the 
direct grant schools, much to the TUC's displeasure. The plan for county colleges 
was welcomed more, although the TUC hoped that young workers would ultimately 
spend half of their time in education. " Still, the TUC certainly wanted the measure to 
be implemented. As part of the CEA, it wrote to Labour MPs and other MPs with an 
35 MRC, MSS1OO/F/I/INol. 116, D/5084, ref. 325/A/l, 25 Nov. 1943. 
36 Ibid., D4882A, ref. 325.1. A, 10 Sept. 1943. 
37 MRC, MSS. 292/811/6, TUC Educ. Ctee 4, Note on the Education Bill, 13 Jan. 1944. 
3s Ibid. 
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interest in educational reform urging them to demand the abolition of fees in all 
secondary schools, and for a school leaving age of sixteen. However, Butler rejected 
Citrine's representations on this latter issue, suggesting that priority should be given 
to the reorganisation of all-age schools. " The TUC also published a statement on 
educational reform in the Daily Herald, and sent circulars to affiliates asking them to 
lobby their local MP for support. The CEA continued to organise local meetings in 
recognition of the vital role local education authorities would play in the 
implementation of legislation. ' 
The TUC's activity in this sphere was substantial and even the BEC showed an 
interest in the Education Bill, and asked the Board of Education to receive a 
deputation to discuss it further. However, it was Sir Robert Wood, the deputy 
secretary at the Board of Education, rather than Butler, who met with the deputation. 
Sir John Forbes Watson, the BEC director, sought a stronger focus on the basic 
subjects of reading, writing and arithmetic, but was unenthusiastic about the prospect 
of a school leaving age of sixteen. The Confederations' reservations were not based 
on educational considerations but interference with the apprenticeship system if pupils 
had to remain at school until the end of the term in which they reached sixteen! ' This 
showed that the BEC's interest in education, like that of the FBI, was very narrowly 
conceived in line with the particular needs of industrialists. Nevertheless,, the 
39 PRO, ED 136/457, Walter Citrine to RA Butler, 17 March 1944; RA Butler to Sir Walter Citrine, 
29 March 1944. 
' MRC, MSS. 2921811/6, TUC Educ. Ctee 6,14 March 1944; MRC, MSS. 292/810.26/1, TUC circular 
no. 27 to secretaries of trades councils and federations, II Nov. 1943; TUC circular no. 28 to general 
secretaries of all affiliated organisations, II Nov. 1943; Annual Trades Union Congress Report 1944, 
77; Annual Trades Union Congress Report 1945, p. 87. 
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Confederation also expressed an interest in becoming ý more involved with state 
education. 
The Education Act itself received the Royal Assent in August 1944. It heralded 
the introduction of free secondary education for all until the age of sixteen although 
definite plans were made for the raising of the school leaving age to fifteen only. 
County colleges would be established to provide part-time education for workers aged 
fifteen to eighteen, although no timetable for their introduction was provided. The 
Act also upgraded the Board of Education to a Ministry, and made provision for the 
appointment of the Central Advisory Council for Education (England). It ignored the 
issue of the public schools on the basis that their future was being considered by the 
Fleming Committee, which had only just reported. It presumed rather than prescribed 
a tripartite basis for secondary education as endorsed by the 1943 Norwood 
Committee, but offered no explicit guidance either way. The dual system was also 
retained with more local control in exchange for more public finance. 
Following the passing of the 1944 Education Act, the FBI published a pamphlet 
that raised educational issues that were important to industry. 42 It identified the 
shortage of technical and science teachers as an important educational issue. "' With 
regard to secondary education, the FBI shared the TUC's view that parity of esteem 
between different types of school was of the utmost importance. Yet while the TUC 
held this objective in the interests of social equality, the FIB was more concerned with 
the perceived anti-industry bias prevalent in public and grammar schools -a problem 
42 Federation of British Industries, Industry and education. 
43 MRC, MSS/200/F/l/l/Vol. 116, D/6046, ref. 325/A/l, 4 Oct. 1944. 
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that could be alleviated by reducing the hierarchical nature of secondary education. " 
The appointment of the Percy Committee provided the FBI with a fin-ther opportunity 
to express its views on state technical education. It advised the Committee of a 
growing need in industry for workers with training in technology. The prospect of 
staff exchanges was raised as a means of assisting its development, but the FBI was 
also concerned that practical difficulties including being able to provide teachers with 
suitable work, and the ability of firms to release their own staff for teaching would 
render this policy impracticable. " 
Ile Labour povemment and the 1944 Education Act 
The 'White Paper Chase' presented the new Labour government with a number of 
prescriptions for reform, but the Education Act had actually been legislated with the 
consent of the Labour party as partners in the Coalition govermnent. Responses to the 
Act varied in different quarters of the Labour party, but ultimately the leadership and 
both Ministers of Education, Ellen Wilkinson and George Tomlinson, sought to 
implement educational reforms in the spirit of the Butler Act. 46 The Attlee 
government did not instigate any radical education policies: 'the simple priorities 
were to maintain prewar standards and to lay the foundations for the achievement of 
"equality of OpportUnity". 141 
44 K Burgess, 'British employers and education policy', p. 52. 
45 PRO, ED 46/295, Fourteenth meeting of Higher Technological Committee, 26 April 1945; ED 
46/296, ref. 325/A/l, Basis of evidence to be presented by the Federation of British Industries to the 
Departmental Committee on Higher Technological Education, 12 April 1945. 
"M Sullivan, 7he development ofthe British wetOre state, p. 125. 
4" R Lowe, The weyare state since 1945 (1999), p. 208. 
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Hence emphasis was placed on raising, the school leaving age to fifteen, and 
providing more school places accordingly, improving ftu-ther education and technical 
education, and increasing access to higher education. The pursuit of these goals was 
hindered at an early stage by shortages of building materials and teachers, which was 
compounded further by economic difficulties after 1947. Conflict over education 
policy between the parties was virtually absent, but was present within the Labour 
party, and was on the increase in the trade union movement. Here the General 
Council did follow up complaints about education expressed at annual congresses, 
proving itself to be less tolerant of financial restraint in this area of the social services. 
Discord also existed between the TUC and industrial representatives over 
fundamental aspects of government education policy. Their attitudes towards 
developments in state education at the level of secondary education, further and 
technical education, and higher education are considered below. 
Secondary Education 
The TUC's wide-ranging interest in education policy has already been illustrated in 
relation to its wartime activities. Neither the BEC nor the FBI demonstrated a 
comparable degree of interest, but had sought to discuss education policy with 
government or government committees where it could be seen to impinge upon 
industry. Both had expressed a desire to build closer links with the Ministry of 
Education, albeit in the narrowest sense. The TUC sought to secure the principle of 
(equality of opportunity' in the state education system, and anticipated that the 1944 
Act, in spite of its weaknesses, would produce this outcome, particularly if the TUC 
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sought to ensure its full implementation with improvements in line with trade union 
policy. 
The Labour government adhered to the tripartite system of secondary education, 
recommended by the 193 8 Spens Committee, endorsed by -the 1943 Norwood 
Committee, and assumed in the 1944 Act. The TUC had supported multilateral 
schools in the 1930s whereby single schools would offer a range of courses in 
accordance with the different needs and abilities of their pupils, and criticised the 
Spens Committee for not choosing this option. " Nevertheless, high priority was not 
attached to the organisation of secondary education either during the war or 
afterwards. Despite a backlash against tripartism on the left of the Labour party, the 
TUC appear to have been ambivalent. It believed that 'our public education system 
should provide equally (but not identically) for all children'. "' Its only obvious 
reservations concerned the efficacy of the tripartite system to meet this objective if the 
school leaving age was not raised to sixteen for the modem schools, and if restraint in 
public expenditure undermined development of the secondary modems in other ways. 
The question of the school leaving age prompted an early debate: the TUC had 
been bitterly disappointed in 1945 when Butler had announced the postponement of 
the increase in the leaving age to fifteen. Ellen Wilkinson intended to implement this 
policy as soon as possible, but was still not particularly responsive'to a CEA 
deputation that requested timescales. She also ruled out a ftirther increase to sixteen 
"D Rubinstein &B Simon, The evolution ofthe comprehensive school, p. 18. "9 Annual Trades Union Congress Report, 1946, p. 117. 
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prior to the establishment of county colleges. " The TUC was unhappy with her 
response because of its implications for parity of esteem between the grammar and 
secondary modem schools. " When the Minister announced the raising of the school 
leaving age to fifteen in April 1947, the TUC merely regarded this as a first step and 
started a campaign for a leaving age of sixteen, which would last for the whole of this 
period. Ellen Wilkinson continued to reject TUC demands for a further increase: she 
argued that the demands on resources of the increase to fifteen had been too great to 
contemplate another extra year of education. Other policies including the introduction 
of county colleges, the reorganisation of all age schools, and a reduction in class sizes 
also took priority over a statutory leaving age of sixteen. " 
Ellen Wilkinson's recaltricance over a higher school leaving age did not meet with 
universal concern. The BEC was irate when a date was set for its increase to fifteen. 
Owing to full employment, employers had little interest in improvements to schooling 
that would produce a corresponding reduction in the size of the labour force. Hence 
the Confederation asked the goverment to keep the leaving age at fourteen to avoid 
exacerbating the labour situation. " Hugh Dalton also put this proposition to the 
Cabinet in view of the findings of the 1947 Economic Survey but the government 
decided against a fiu-ther delay. The school leaving age was raised to fifteen in April 
much to the annoyance of the BEC, which criticised the Act for its 'inopportuneness 
and unwisdom' since it would remove approximately 370,000 potential school leavers 
5o mRc, mss. 292/8 I in, TUC Educ. Ctee 4/3, Council for Educational Advance deputation on 19 
Dec. 1945,3 Jan. 1946; TUC Educ. Ctee 6,19 March 1946, p. 24. 
51 Ibid., TUC Educ. Ctee 8/1, Notes for deputation to Minister of Education on school leaving age, 14 
May 1946, p. 1; TUC Educ. Ctee 8/2, Memorandum to Minister of Education on school leaving age, 14 
May 1946; Annual Trades Union Congress Report, 1946, p, 117. 
52 MRC, mss. 292/8 I in, TUC Educ. Ctee 9/1, Report of deputation to Minister of Education on 
school leaving age on 5 June 1946,19 June 1946. 
33 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C4 pt. 118, reE N. C. 9730, notes for National Joint Advisory Council Meeting 
on Economic Survey for 1947,14 May 1947. 
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from the labour market. This loss of manpower would be compounded by the 
requirement for labour to build and equip the schools needed to accommodate the 
increased school population. ' Any benefits which may have accrued from a better- 
educated workforce did not seem to occur to the BEC. Timmins suggests that the 
level of demand for labour at this time meant that quality considerations were simply 
not as important. " 
Economic difficulties created a significant strain on the state education system 
after secondary education was extended, which was exacerbated by the additional 
demands on the education system created by the postwar increase in the birth rate and 
the need for schools on new housing estates. The balance of payments crisis in 1947 
led to cuts in the school building programme. Following a further sterling crisis in 
1949, the Ministry of Education issued Circular 210 with instructions for local 
education authorities to reduce standards of school accommodation, to cut leisure 
facilities, to make administrative savings, and to increase the fees for evening classes 
by ten per cent. 
As in other policy areas financial restrictions imposed by the Labour government 
did not appear to cause the TUC's Education Committee undue concern. However, at 
least two unionists at the 1950 Annual Congress felt that the General Council was 
being too lenient over the government's education policy. "' WB Beard, the Chairman 
of the TUC's Education Committee, sought to deflect criticism of the government's 
policy by asking unions to monitor the actions of local education authorities who 
54 Ibid. 
55 N Timmins, Thefive giants, p. 97. 
-56 Annual Trades Union Congress Report, 1950, p. 500. 
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would implement the cuts. " Still, the Education Committee did then write to George 
Tomlinson with Congress' complaints about the school building programme, where 
not enough schools were being built and standards were perceived to be inadequate. " 
This approach was significant given that the General Council had not presented 
criticisms of the government's social policy in other areas made at Congress while 
Labour was in power. George Tomlinson rejected its complaint on the basis that the 
government expected to reach its goal of providing 1,150,000 new school places by 
December 1953 which led him to believe that schooling was receiving its fair share of 
resources. 39 
Further and Technical Education 
This area of education presented a fin-ther area of disagreement between the TUC and 
BEC. The main thrust of policy initially was the introduction of county colleges. 
Although the Labour government attached much importance to this policy, the 
increased demand for schooling combined with accommodation and staff shortages 
necessarily reduced its capacity to proceed with their establishment. ' The TUC's 
interest was long-standing, but the BEC was much less keen. "' The Confederation 
opposed the introduction of county colleges in principle, and complained that 
employers had not been consulted over which workers would attend and the content 
of the curriculum. Disagreement also arose over cost-related issues: employers were 
unwilling to pay their workers who wanted to take further education courses on a 
57 Ibid., pp. 163 & 500. 
MRC, MSS-292/811/10, TUC Educ. Ctee9,3 July 1951. 
MRC, MSS. 292181 1/11, TUC Educ. Ctce 1,9 Oct. 1951, P. 5. 
PRO, ED 46/677, Memorandum on county colleges by Ministry of Education, undated. 
MRC, MSS. 292/811n, TUC Educ. Ctce 4/1, Memorandum for Central Advisory Council for 
Education (England), 15 Jan. 1946, p. 5. 
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block-release basis, and many were even averse to bearing the cost of day release. " 
As the TUC insisted that workers should be paid when absent for educational reasons 
regardless of their timetable, the National Joint Advisory Committee to the Ministry 
of Labour was unable to make any recommendation on this matter. " 
In 1948 the government asked the CACE(E) to review the future development of 
county colleges. The Council's report on 'The Education of the Young Worker' 
reached the conclusion that the government should prioritise the needs of schooling 
over the establishment of county colleges. Even once there were enough school 
places, the government would have to carry out improvements in many schools and 
complete the Hadow reorganisation of all-age schools. In the meantime, the Council 
advised the establishment of a small number of colleges to provide an indication of 
how they would function. " There is no record of the BEC's response to this report 
but the TUC was clearly disappointed. 
Higher education 
Otherwise the government was more interested in developing the study of technology 
at' more advanced levels, including specialisms such as engineering. The Percy 
Committee released its report on Higher Technological Education in 1945. Its 
recommendations were somewhat limited: its only concrete proposal regarded the 
designation of some technical colleges to provide diploma and degree level courses. 
It also suggested that the government set up a central advisory body with regional 
62 PRO, ED 46/676, National Joint Advisory Committee meeting, 27 Oct. 1948. 
113 Ibid. 
" PRO, ED 136/730, Central Advisory Council for Education (England) memorandum to the Minister 
of Education, May 1949. 
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committees to promote the study of technology and to foster relations between 
industry and the technical colleges. The government quickly accepted the latter 
proposal and appointed a National Advisory Council for Education in Industry and 
Conunerce (NACEIC) and Regional Advisory Councils for Further Education. Both 
the central and local bodies had trade union and industrial representation, the BEC 
having actively sought appointment to the National Advisory Council; nonetheless 
Martin Davis points out that both the NACEIC and the regional councils were 
dominated by educational interests with industrial representation never exceeding 20 
per cent of their membership. " 
The new NACEIC took responsibility for developing the government's policy on 
technological education. , Its first report, 'The Future Development of Higher 
Technological Education', advocated the introduction of new advanced courses in 
technology and a new type of award. It proposed the establishment of a Royal 
College of Technologists to make awards in order to improve the status of technical 
education. The Labour government published a White Paper'that largely embodied 
these recommendations but the Conservatives' success in the 1951 election 
interrupted its plans. 
The TUC welcomed the government's White Paper as the unions attached much 
importance to the development of technical education at its more advanced levels. 
There is no record of the FBI's response but Roy Lowe found it was unhappy with 
postwar developments in technical education. " It complained of the shortage of 
15 M Davis, 'Technology, institutions and status', p. 124. 
66 R Lowe, Education in thepost-waryears, p. 165. 
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science and technology graduates amid the broader labour shortage and the need for 
Britain to increase her export levels. The Federation argued that advances in 
scientific and technological research in the production of substitutes could help to 
address the shortages of manpower and raw materials. Consequently it was irritated 
by the continued recruitment of science and engineering students into the armed 
forces when they were so obviously needed in the domestic economy. Moreover, 
amid the industrial labour shortage, science teachers were returning to industry, which 
was likely to further undermine the development of scientific education in the long- 
term. "' 
Besides the govenunent's policy relating to higher technological education, both 
the TUC and the FBI followed developments in university education. The FBI sought 
direct involvement with the universities because many of its member firms recruited 
from their ranks. In order to develop greater understanding of industry's needs and 
the functioning of the universities for their mutual benefit, conferences were held and 
a FBI working party was established to examine how closer links could be created. 
Suggestions arising from these initiatives included the appointment of industrialists to 
university governing bodies, staff exchanges and better communication in general in 
order to establish the qualifications that industry sought in graduate recruits. " In 
addition, regional conferences were held in order to develop links between local 
industry and their universities. " 
67 MRC, MSS1001B/3/2/C966 pt. 2, D14703, Memorandum from FBI to BEC, 'Call-up of university 
scientific and technical graduates' submitted to the Technical Personnel Committee of the Ministry of 
Labour and National Service, Sept. 1947. 
6" MRC, MSS. 200/F/l/1NoL 116, D/5128, Education Committee, 17 Oct 1947, p. 6,19 Nov. 1947; 
Dn733A, Education Committee, 4 Oct. 1948, p. 4,28 Oct. 1948; PRO, ED 46/470, Report of 
conference on industry and the universities organised by the FBI Education and Industrial Research 
Committees 1949, p. 77. 
69 h4RC, MSS. 200/F/I/INOI 116, D13674, Education Committee, 12 Oct. 1950, p. 4,2 Nov. 1950. 
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The TUC was more concerned with government policy, and in particular the 
question of access to higher education. It joined the Campaign Committee for Higher 
Education to promote interest in the work of the universities. " The TUC wanted 
expansion of university education to ensure an adequate number of places for all 
qualified pupils, and improvements to the award system to ensure that financial 
circumstances did not prevent anyone from pursuing a university degree. " It was 
critical of the number of awards available, discrepancies between different local 
education authorities, and the lack of provision for non-university students. ' Its 
demands were met in part by the report of the government's Working Party on 
University Awards, which advocated reform of the grant system to ensure that merit 
71 
was the only criterion for entering a course of higher education. 
Ultimately the Labour government's policy was centred upon the implementation 
of the 1944 Education Act insofar as resources and demographic change would 
permit. Secondary education dominated government policy: its major achievement 
here was the raising of the school leaving age to fifteen, much to distaste of the BEC. 
Otherwise, the trend in this sector was one of expansion along broadly similar lines as 
before. Secondary schools were set up on tripartite lines, and there was no mention of 
abolishing the public schools while Labour was in goverment. Further education in 
county colleges was the victim of economic circumstances and a redrawingof the 
" other member groups included the Association of Scientific Workers, Association of Teachers in 
Technical Institutions, Association of University Teachers, British Association of Chemists, British 
Medical Association, National Union of Students, National Union of Teachers, Workers' Educational 
Association, Annual Trades Union Congress Report, 1948, p. 165. 
71 Annual Trades Union Congress Report 1948, p. 552; 1950, p. 534.. 
MRC, MSS. 292/811/9, TUC Educ. Ctee 5,11 Jan. 1949. 
ibid., TUC Educ. Ctee 6/2 (amended), Report on university awards, draft letter to the Minister of 
Education commenting on the report, 8 Feb. 1949. 
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government9s priorities in favour of schooling. Developments in technical education 
were planned at advanced levels but little was actually achieved under Labour. 
Similarly, gradual expansion of higher education was initiated. Cuts to'educational 
expenditure after 1947 caused concern in the TUC, as did the lack of commitment to a 
school leaving age of sixteen and the postponement of county colleges. Both these 
policies were unacceptable to the BEC. At this stage, the Confederation prioritised 
labour market needs over education. The FBI adopted a longer-term perspective with 
regard to technical education, and supported government plans for its development. 
Otherwise, it formed direct contacts with universities in order to discuss industry's 
needs in relation to their work rather than discussing higher education policy with the 
government While continuity between the Coalition government and Labour's 
policy gives rise to signs of consensus, as does the lack of Tory opposition in this 
sphere between 1945 and 195 1, producer interests were not quite so harmonious. 74 ,,, 
Conservative izoverrunents 
As Tory interest in education reform had been largely precipitated by a desire to 
overshadow the Beveridge Report, it is perhaps hardly surprising that the new 
Churchill government in 1951 showed little interest in the subject. " Moreover, the 
reforming Minister of Education, RA Butler, now presided at the Treasury where 
financial considerations were predominant. Education policy between 1951 and 1955 
was characterised by financial restraint, and the emphasis lay simply on making 
enough provision for the ongoing implementation of the 1944 Act. 76 By contrast, the 
'4 B Simon, Education and the social order, identifies a strong element of continuity in education 
policy in the 1940s. 
"A Seldon, Churchill's Indian summer, p. 270. 
76 Ibid., p. 274. 
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period after 1955 has been described by Brian Simon as one of 'break-out" a term 
used to convey the significant degree of expansion at all levels. ' Concerns about 
economic decline and public dissatisfaction informed much of government interest in 
education policy after 1955. 
Although Tomlinson had sanctioned significant cuts to education spending in 
1949, the TUC's response to Conservative implementation of this policy was by now 
predictably censorious. The new Minister of Education, Florence Horsburgh, released 
Circular 242 in December 1952 in order to reduce educational spending'-by E13 
million with instructions for local education authorities to cut their budgets by five per 
cent. The TUC now found cuts in educational spending to be unacceptable: 'Circular 
242 makes a second bite at a cherry already bitten by Circular 210 and the cherry is 
just not big enough to accommodate two bites. "' As with the Conservatives' health 
charges, the TUC's concern was based on its belief that Labour policy had been a 
temporary contingency in response to difficult economic circumstances, whereas it 
anticipated that increased charges and spending cuts would typify Conservative 
policy. Its Education Committee suggested that 'this circular indicates an intention ... 
to halt and reverse the whole process of development and expansion of the education 
service'. " Spending concerns featured highly in TUC dissatisfaction with the 
government's education policy over the next thirteen years, but to little effect., It 
argued with successive Conservative Ministers of Education that their policies 
represented a threat to the principles of secondary education for all and equality of 
"B Simon, Education and the social order. 
73 MRC, MSS. 292/81 1/11, TUC Educ. Ctee 3,11 Dec. 195 1, p. 27; TUC Educ. Ctee 511 (amended), 
Ministry of Education circular 242 - Educational Economies, statement by the Trades Union Congress, 
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opportunity. Ministers duly accepted these representations and defended goverment 
policy against TUC criticism, but it would appear that the TUC's concerns merited 
little further consideration. " 
Secondary Education 
The impact of spending restrictions was felt throughout the whole of the system but it 
was most visible in relation to schooling. The abolition of fees, the raising of the 
school leaving age, new housing estates, and the increase in the birth rate at the end of 
the war that affected primary schools in the early 1950s had already increased demand 
substantially in this sector. Under Churchill, education was not given a great deal of 
prionty, and the main thrust of policy with respect to schooling was to ensure there 
were enough places in terms of provision of accommodation and staff. " ý The school 
building programme captured TUC attention throughout the early 1950s, while being 
of little or no interest to the industrial organisations. The Ministry of Education 
regularly released circulars that advised of new restrictions on school building. These 
would be removed as the economic situation eased but were then re-established at any 
sign of a downturn. These circulars caused a great deal of frustration in the TUC: not 
only did the matter preoccupy the Education Committee, but persistent complaints 
were made at annual congresses. Meetings with Ministers of Education produced 
little by way of results. Both Florence Horsburgh and Sir David Eccles countered 
TUC criticism, each claiming that the level of school building was at its highest ever, 
so MRC, MSS. 292/811/12, TUC Educ. Ctee 4,12 Jan. 1954, pp. 25-26; TUC Educ. Ctee 5/7, Report of 
meeting with Minister of Education on IS Jan. 1954,9 Feb. 1954; MSS. 292/811/13, TUC Educ. Ctee 
6,13 March 1956, pp. 46-47; TUC Educ. Ctee 9,9 July 1956, p. 65; MSS. 292/811/14, TUC Educ. Ctee 
2,12. Nov. 1957, p. 12. 
"A Seldon, Churchill's Indian summer, pp. 270 & 275. 
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and showing that spending on education under the Conservatives was growing at 
faster rate than that on other areas of social poliCy. 92 Yet cuts were made in 1955, 
83 
1956 and 1957, all of which angered the TUC. Its Education Committee identified 
the impact of financial stringency in terms of the number of substandard school 
buildings, overcrowded classrooms, inadequate facilities for teaching science and the 
persistence of all-age schools. " 
It was not until 1957 that the TUC seriously began to lend consideration to the 
functioning of the tripartite system of secondary education. Professional and public 
reservations over tripartism and the eleven-plus selection examination had gradually 
mounted throughout the decade. The Labour party formally adopted a multilateral 
policy in 1953, but the TUC remained fixated on the school leaving age as the source 
of all difficulties in secondary education. Neither was the BEC nor the FBI 
particularly concerned, although the latter complained of discrepancies in the number 
of grammar school places between local education authorities. " The Conservatives 
had retained the tripartite structure with limited experiments in comprehensive 
schools where desirable, but in truth the system was more bipartite than tripartite 
owing to the lack of development of the technical school. Local education authorities 
were never particularly keen on this type of school on the grounds of the cost of their 
establishment, and disputes over the appropriate age of entry. " Conservative 
82 MRC, MSS192/811/12, TUC Educ. Ctee 5n, Report of meeting with Minister of Education on 18 
Jan. 1954,9 Feb. 1954; TUC Educ. Ctee 6/ 1, Report of deputation to Minister of Education on 8 Feb. 
1955,8 March 1955, pp. 1-2. 
113 MRC, MSS192/811/13, TUC Educ. Ctee 6,13 March 1956, pp. 4647; TUC Educ. Ctee 9,9 July 
1956, p. 65; MSS. 2921811/14, TUC Educ. Ctee 2,12 Nov. 1957, p. 12. 
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Feb. 1958. 
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governments were ambivalent and left it up to local education authorities to decide 
how they wished to provide technical education. "' Local education authorities tended 
to opt for a greater emphasis on science subjects or technical streams in the modem 
and grammar schools. Consequently, only 3.7 per cent of school children -attended 
technical schools in 19572" 
No greater support for technical schools could be found in the TUC, which now 
expressed an aversion to these schools on the grounds that the curriculum was too 
narrow and restrictive. It favoured 'a flexible and adequate system of secondary 
technical courses available for suitable children following on a sound general 
education'. " This could best be provided in either bilateral or comprehensive schools 
in order to build a sound foundation for the urgent need for an expansion in higher 
technological education to address the shortage of scientists and technologists. 90 
Neither was the FBI keen on technical schools. It also expressed a preference for 
bilateml schools, which would not focus exclusively on technology. " Indeed, Rodney 
Lowe attributes much of the lack of development of technical'education to industry, 
as employers sought academic rather than vocational qualifications in potential 
employees. ' 
This discussion on technical education and the TUC's support for bilateral or 
comprehensive schools was the first indication that the TUC was beginning to reject 
91 PRO, ED 1471638, Edward Boyle, to Commander JW Maitland, MP, 15 April 1959. 
83 B Bailey, 'Technical education and secondary schooling, p. 97. 
119 PRO, ED 147/207, Extract from Mr Humphrey's note - views of industrialists, T. U. C., etc., undated. 
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the existing model. Its concerns were based not only on technical education but also 
on growing criticism of the secondary modem schools. Approximately 75 per cent of 
pupils attended these schools, which were widely and increasingly regarded as 
inferior to the grammar schools. As standards of education in the modem schools 
were being questioned, doubt was correspondingly being placed on the fairness of the 
eleven-plus examination. Awareness was growing of the happy coincidence between 
the numbers who passed the exam and the number of grammar school places in each 
local education authority. Both the TUC and FBI highlighted this flaw in the system 
when discussing secondary education. " 
In 1957 the government requested the CACE(E) to examine education for children 
between fifteen and eighteen. The TUC, BEC and FBI submitted evidence to the 
committee, which was chaired by Lord Geofftey Crowther on which the TUC was 
also represented. The appointment of the committee coincided with, or inspired the 
TUC's recognition that the difference in the school leaving age was not the only 
source of inequality between the secondary modems and the grammar schools. 
Research was also indicating that social factors as well as demonstration of ability 
were important in determining children's performance in the eleven-plus examination. 
Furthermore, the opportunities to change schools after the initial selection process had 
taken place were limited. In its evidence to the Crowther Committee, the TUC 
advocated an expansion in bilateral schools and more experiments with 
comprehensives, but this did not amount to ftill endorsement of reorganisation. " It 
'3 PRO, ED 46/1070, FBI D/2638, Crowther Report - FBI memorandum to the Ministry of Education, 
2 Aug. 1960, p. 2. 
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stillplaced. a great deal of emphasis on a school leaving age of sixteen and urged the 
Crowther Committee to give this matter serious consideration as all children should 
receive a course of secondary education lasting five years. " The BEC was still 
strongly opposed to this proposal; although it was dissatisfied with standards of 
reading, writing and numeracy among young workers, it rejected the notion that an 
extra year of schooling would resolve these deficiencies. In fact the Confederation 
claimed that the increase in the school leaving age to fifteen in April 1947 had not 
been worthwhile for pupils in secondary modem schools since they made such little 
progress in their final year. Accordingly they would be better served by beginning 
work at fourteen rather than remaining any longer in education. " The FBI did not 
endorse a statutory leaving age of sixteen but it was embarrassed by the BEC's 
remarks; its Education Committee noted 'strong feeling ... that the B. E. C. 's evidence 
to the Central Advisory Council contained a number of unfortunate and retrogressive 
statements'. " The Federation favoured a voluntary approach, where suitable pupils 
could remain at school if they so wished after reaching fifteen. In a more tactful vein, 
it agreed with the BEC that not all pupils would benefit from a further year of 
secondary education, and also highlighted the burden that such a policy would place 
on teachers and accommodation. " ' 
While the Crowther Committee was carrying out its enquiry, the government 
responded to growing public dissatisfaction with the education system in the form of a 
95 Ibid. 
96 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C 1148, BEC N. C. 16297, Central Advisory Council for Education (England) - 
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White Paper, Secondary educationfor all, in 1958. This was the fruit of a dialogue 
between Sir David Eccles and Harold Macmillan. Subsequently the Prime Minister 
decided that the Conservatives should select secondary education as a high-profile 
policy measure in view of the current debate. " The White Paper contained proposals 
for a 000 million programme to improve standards in secondary schools, permit 
pupils to remain at school until sixteen on a voluntary basis, and complete finally the 
reorganisation of all-age schools. " The White Paper promised to address many 
issues raised by the TUC in recent years, but its Education Committee was ambivalent 
towards it. The repeated expenditure cuts and restrictions of the past decade had 
taken their toll on the TUC's relationship with the government; it no longer trusted the 
government to implement this programme. In addition, it also complained that no 
progress had been made in increasing the school leaving age. "' 
Consolation was offered, however, in the following year, when the Crowther 
Committee put forward as a key recommendation an increase in the leaving age to 
sixteen, to be implemented at an appropriate juncture between 1966 and 1969. "1 The 
TUC was obviously pleased, and issued a public statement urging the government to 
accept the conunittee's recommendation and raise the leaving age at the earliest 
opportunity. "' Less predictably, the BEC's Education Sub-Committee also endorsed 
the Crowther Committee's proposal in a marked reversal of its previous position. The 
99 PRO, ED 136194 1, Harold Macmillan to David Eccles, 27 Dec. 195 7. 
100 Ibid., Draft interim report to the Prime Minister on progress in formulating proposals for a drive in 
education by GN Flemming, Permanent Secretary, 17 March 1958; MRC, MSS. 292/811/15, TUC 
Educ. Ctee 5,13 Jan. 1959, pp. 29-30. , 
101 MRC, MSS. 2921811114, TUC Educ. Ctee 213 (amended), The Education of Boys and Girls between 
15 and IS - memorandum of evidence submitted to the Central Advisory Council for Education 
(England), 12 Nov. 195 7. 
102 15 to 18, pp. 131 & 454. 
10.1 MRC, MSS. 2921811116, TTJC statement on the Education ofBoys and Girls Aged 
15 to 18,4 Jan. 
1960. 
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Confederation now accepted that a higher leaving age should be implemented in order 
to secure higher standards in English and mathematics with the mere proviso that the 
final year could be spent in either school or technical college. '" The BEC's records 
offer no explanation for this turnaround. The FBI's influence is unlikely given that it 
maintained its support for a voluntary policy only. Another reason for its change of 
heart could be growing awareness of the link that was being made between education 
and Britain's relative economic decline. " There is no evidence to suggest explicitly 
that this directly influenced the BEC's attitude towards the length of secondary 
education, but it -was also becoming more positive about day release and staff 
exchanges towards the end of the 1950s. 
The government accepted the Crowther Committee's proposal, but did not address 
the question of implementation immediately. "' In March 1960, the Minister of 
Education, Derek Walker-Smith, announced a reordering of the government's 
priorities in education. Its main concern would now be the reduction of class sizes, 
which would be pursued before the school leaving age was to be raised, but this 
would now be considered more urgent than the establishment of county colleges. 107 In 
1964, the government announced that the school leaving age would be raised to 
sixteen in 1970. " This eventually took place in 1972. 
104 PRO, ED 46/1070, N. C. 17932, Education between the ages of 15 and 18 - first report by 
Confederation's Industrial Education and Training Committee, May 1960, p. 1. 
105 M Sanderson, Education and economic decline, pp. 74-5. 
106 MRC, MSS. 292/811/16, TUC Educ. Ctee 8,10 May 1960, p. 6 1. 
107 PRO, ED 46/1070, N. C. 17932, Education between the ages of 15 and 18 - first report by Confederation's Industrial Education and Training Committee, May 1960. 
108 PRO, ED 147/516, 'Minster announces raising of the school-leaving age', 27 Jan. 1964. 
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The Crowther Committee was followed by another Central Advisory Council 
enquiry on secondary education in, 1961 when the Newsom Committee was appointed 
to consider the education of children between the ages of thirteen and sixteen of 
average or less-than-average ability. In its evidence to the Newsom Committee, the 
TUC finally rejected the tripartite system outright. On the basis of contemporary 
research findings, the TUC argued that academic ability could not be measured 
effectively at the age of eleven. "' The BEC's evidence, as was now customary, 
reflected its own specific interests in state education. Nevertheless, its attitude was 
positive as it sought to develop links between industry and the schools. Afterwards, 
the Confederation introduced a pilot programme to allow student teachers to 
undertake work placements. "' 'Introduction to Industry' had several aims that 
included providing an insight into the, nature of industrial work; helping to indicate 
the standards of education required by employers; assisting employers in 
understanding the teaching process; and to improve generally relations between 
education and industry and encourage better communication. "' Although these still 
reflected a preoccupation with the needs of employers rather than a wider appreciation 
of state education, the BEC's new-found interest in schools should be viewed in a 
positive light, and suggests a greater recognition of the importance of education for 
industrial performance in the longer term. The pilot programme signalled a much 
more active role for the usually reticent employers' organisation. 
109 MRC, MSS. 292B/811/18, TUC Educ. Ctee 8/4, The education between the ages of 13 and 16 of 
pupils of average or less than average ability - memorandum of evidence for the Central Advisory 
Council for Education (England), 10 July 1962. 
110 MRC, MSS. 200/CIEDU/1/1, BEC 65/327, Training and Education Bulletin, June 1965, p. 17. 111 Ibid., BEC 64/352, Introduction to industry schemes for teachers - note by Confederation, undated. 
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By the end of this period, a substantial expansion had taken place in secondary 
education to meet the demands placed on the sector, if not always successfully in 
views of the continuation of overcrowded classes and poor standards of 
accommodation. Nevertheless, the appointment of the Crowther Committee and the 
Newsom Committee and the 1958 White Paper all reveal that the government was 
aware of the deficiencies of secondary education. The period was not entirely 
satisfactory for the TUC. ' Expenditure cuts, the school leaving age and the increasing 
problems of the ý tripartite structure all combined to create a great deal of 
dissatisfaction, and this was only in relation to schooling. The FBI and BEC were 
less concerned: the former did not get involved with the secondary modem schools 
and only the number of grammar school places gave it any cause for concern. it was 
ambivalent in the debate about the leaving age and merely considered the policy 
inadvisable but no great threat either. The secondary modem schools should have 
been of more concern to the BEC, but this organisation showed little positive interest 
in schooling until the late 1950s. Even then, its concerns reflected industrial interests 
rather than awareness of the wider debates in education at this time. 
Further Education and Technical Education 
It was not until the mid-1950s that concerns about decline began to have implications 
for this sector of education, which were recognised in a White Paper, Technical 
Education, published in 1956 under the new Eden government. Further and technical 
education were somewhat neglected under the Churchill government, and no further 
progress was made with county colleges. The White Paper indicated a renewed 
interest in technical education to reflect recognition that Britain's provision was poor 
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compared to that of her industrial competitors. It was proposed to spend E20 million 
to promote technical education in local, regional and advanced technical colleges. 
One approach favoured by the Ministry of Education was to encourage staff 
exchanges with the technical colleges. The FBI and BEC had already expressed some 
apprehension, which was sustained but the BEC did make a tentative suggestion that 
industry may be able to offer refresher courses for teachers. ' 'I The Confederation was 
less encouraging when the Ministry of Education consulted it with regard to its plans 
for day release courses for young workers. The government had already made efforts 
in this diiection but to little effect. Therefore, the White Paper included plans to 
double the number of participants in day release schemes to 450,000. The BEC 
claimed this objective would be unattainable in some sectors of industry. It also 
continued to be concerned that workers would choose courses that pertained to their 
general education or other interests rather than vocational courses acceptable to their 
employers. "' 
Its doubts over staff exchanges aside, the FBI welcomed the White Paper, 
particularly its plans for the development of advanced courses, but the Federation was 
still disquieted by the lack of a firm timetable for its implementation. " The trade 
union movement hoped that better technical education would lead to higher levels of 
productivity, which in turn would raise living standards. Hence, to -encourage 
112 PRO, ED 461999, Document entitled 'Federation of British Industries, the White Paper on Technical 
Education (Cmd. 9703), May 1956; Ministry of Education interview memorandum - FBI. 3 July 1956; 
Ministry of Education interview memorandum - BEC. 27 July 1956; MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C966 pt. 5, 
BEC Secretary to H Gerrard, Ministry of Education, 5 Dec. 1956. 
113 PRO, ED 46/999, Ministry of Education interview memorandum - BEC, 27 July 1956. 114 Ibid., Norman Kipping to Sir David Eccles, 22 May 1956; Document entitled 'Federation of British 
Industries, the White Paper on Technical Education (Cmd. 9703), May 1956; Ministry of Education 
interview memorandum - FBI. 3 July 1956 
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students to choose technical courses, the TUC called for * non-means-tested 
scholarships for this sector. "' 
Further education also came under examination by the Crowther Committee. That 
year the Minister of Education, Derek Vosper, advised the TUC that the'government 
could not set up county colleges owing to an insufficient number of teachers. "" In 
their evidence to the Crowther Committee, both the BEC and FBI displayed an 
antipathy towards county colleges, although it was much stronger on the part of the 
former. The Confederation suggested that rather than setting up county colleges to 
provide ftuther education on a universal basis, the government should concentrate 
resources on its most talented young people. "' The'FBI did not reject further 
education for young workers outright, but wanted to use the existing further education 
colleges for this purpose instead of creating a new institution. "s 
The Crowther Committee reached'a compromise: in principle it supported the 
establishment of county colleges, but suggested that a large-scale expansion of day 
release should precede their establishment in order to gain experience of how they 
would operate. "' This recommendation was quickly accepted by the government but 
not necessarily as a prerequisite to county colleges: David Eccles advised the TUC 
that he did not envisage compulsory attendance at these within the next 20 years. 120 
115 MRC, MSS. 292/811/14, TUC Educ. Ctee 2,13 Nov. 1956, pp. 13-17. 
116 Ibid., TUC Educ. Ctee 7/1, Report of Meeting with Minister of Education on 20 March 1957,9 
ýpril 1957, pp. 34. 
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Enquiry into Education of Children between Ages of 15 and 18 - draft Letter from Confederation, pp. 
2-3. 
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119 MRC, MSS. 292B/811/17, TUC Educ. Ctee 1/4, Day Release for Further Education, II Oct. 1960, p. 
1. 
120 Ibid., TUC Educ. Ctee 2/2, Day release for further education - report of meeting with Minister of 
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Ilie government was, however, very interested in the Crowther Committee's 
discussions on day release, particularly since it was not meeting the targets that it had 
set itself in the 1956 Wbite Paper. "' Consequently, the Ministry of Education 
undertook serious consideration of -an idea that had been discarded by the Central 
Advisory Council regarding the prospect of a legal right to day release. Eccles hoped 
that such a policy would alleviate criticism of the government's lack of progress so far 
in expanding day release, and also deflect attention from ý its refusal to introduce 
county colleges. 112 
Day release was discussed at length over the next few years by committees, 
working parties and tripartite discussions with employers and employees' 
representatives. Eccles initially consulted the TUC and the FBI on the prospect of 
compulsory day release. Both were circumspect: the TUC was worried that young 
workers who exercised their right to day release against the wishes of their employers 
would suffer recriminations, and the Federation was firmly of the opinion that day 
release should be initiated by employers. " In the wake of these consultations, the 
Ministry of Education appointed a working party to investigate the idea fin-ther. 
The FBI became increasingly hostile to the notion of a legally-based scheme: 'the 
general principle of placing the power in the hands of the young person instead of the 
employer is contrary to all our accepted ideas about the relationship between 
employer and employee'. Newton, a member of its Education Committee, suggested 
Education on 31 Oct. 1960,8 Nov. 1960. 
121 Ibid., TUC Educ. Ctee 1/4, Day release for further education, II Oct. 1960. 122 PRO, ED 46/1009, JF Embling, Under Secretary at Ministry of Education to S Goldman, Treasury, 
24 Aug. 1962. 
123 MRC, MSS. 292B/811/17, TUC Educ. Ctee 1/4, Day release for further education, II Oct. 1960, p. 2; MRC, MSS. 200/F/l/I/1 18, D/3691, FBI Education Committee, 12 Oct. 1960, p. 2. 
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that it might also discourage small firms from employing under-18s owing to the 
added cost. 124 The BEC did not seem particularly concerned about the prospect of a 
compulsory scheme, and still considered the type of course to be the most important 
issue. It was adamant that workers should not be allowed to choose recreational 
courses. 125 
The working party released its report in 1962, having reached the conclusion that a 
compulsory scheme of day release would be successful only if employers who refused 
to cooperate could be penalised in some way. " Even so, it warned that a very 
successful programme might exceed available resources of teaching staff and 
accommodation, which could adversely affect other aspects of education poliCy. 127 A 
further meeting with the TUC, BEC and FBI agreed that a compulsory scheme would 
be too expensive. The FBI was particularly unenthusiastic, and emphasised that the 
cost to the employer as well as the taxpayer had to be taken into consideration. 
The BEC proved to be more supportive. Although it still maintained reservations 
over course content, its representative Henniker-Heaton suggested that '[i]t might be 
more expensive in the long term not to undertake the development of day release. ' 128 
Having still not found a way of increasing participation in day release schemes, the 
Ministry set up a special committee: the Committee on the Development of Day 
Release, chaired by Henniker-Heaton. The Ministry had deliberately selected an 
124 PRO, ED 46/1008, Attachment to R. D. R. Minutes 2,19 Sept. 1961, circulated by Mr Newton (FBI) 
- The difficulties that employers foresee in the introduction of the proposal by the Minister of 
Education that young people under the age of 18 should have the right to demand part-time day release; 
R. D. FL Minutes 5,28 March 1962. 
'25 Ibid., R. D. R. Minutes 3,8 Nov. 196 1. 
126 MRC, MSS. 292B/811/18, TUC Educ. Ctee 8,10 July 1962, p. 43. 
127 PRO, ED 46/1009, Note on the working party on the right to day release by JAR Pimlott, Under 
Secretary at Ministry of Education, 4 June 1962. 
128 Ibid., The development of day release - note of a meeting, 20 July 1962. 
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industrialist for this position because industry's co-operation was so vital to the 
policy's effectiveness. ' Representatives of the TUC, BEC and FBI were also 
appointed to its membership. Those making representations were advised in advance 
that the committee would be unable to make proposals that would involve 
considerable cost. ` Hence, each of the industrial groups accorded a measure of 
prionty to different groups of young workers who should be entitled to day release. 
'Me TUC had recently decided in favour of a compulsory scheme, but under the 
committee's limited terms of reference it opted to prioritise fifteen year olds since 
they left school at the minimum age. Once this group had been provided for, it 
wanted the government to identify which sectors of the economy had most need for 
ftu-ther education. "' The FBI and BEC both prioritised on the basis of occupational 
hierarchy: the Federation attached, most importance to workers for whom further 
education provision already existed, followed by those school leavers who had been 
in employment for less than one year; then other young workers who would benefit 
from day release. 132 The employers gave preference to apprentices and other skilled 
workers over less-skilled young people who would then be offered courses which 
both they and their employers found mutually acceptable. 133 The Committee on the 
Development of Day Release issued a report in 1964 containing recommendations for 
an increase in the number of workers taking part in day release by 250,000 over the 
next five years. The target was to be divided among local education authorities who 
would be expected to work with local industry in order to ensure that it would be 
129 Henniker-Heaton was the Director of the Master Cotton Spinners and a member of the BEC 
Education and Industrial Training Committee. 
130 MRC, MSS. 292B/811/19, TUC Educ. Ctee 5,12 Feb. 1963, p. 24. 
13' Ibid. 
132 PRO, ED 204/3, DDR/E/7, Evidence by the Federation of British Industries, 1963 133 Ibid., BEC 63/179, Statement of Confederation's evidence to Special Committee of Enquiry into the 
Development of Day Release for Young Persons, March 1963. 
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achieved. " The plan was welcomed by the TUC, but the BEC's membership was 
less impressed. Although the Confederation publicly expressed its support, some of 
its members felt the government's targets were too high. The curriculum also 
remained a source of disagreement as, the Confederation, and also the ABCC, 
continued to resist non-vocational courses. 135 
As debate continued on the expansion of, day release, other developments were 
taking place with regard to technical education. In 1961, the government released a 
further White Paper entitled Better Opportunities in Technical Education. Its issue 
reflected recognition in the Ministry of Education that recent advances in technical 
education had overlooked the needs of technicians, operatives and craftsmen. Current 
technical courses were also considered to be out-of-date. The White Paper also 
sought to address the high wastage rates in ftn-ther education by reorganising courses 
to provide more variety and to meet industry's needs more effectively. 136 
Higher Education 
The FBI continued to meet with university representatives in the 1950s. A conference 
was held in 1953, and in the following year its Education Committee undertook a 
project designed to encourage their members to appoint graduates to higher 
positions. "' It also sought to increase student interest in work in industry, and 
134 MRC, MSS. 292B/811/20, TUC Educ. Ctee 12,14 July 1964, p. 64. 
135 Ibid., TUC Educ. Ctee 1214, Note of comment on the Report of the Committee on Day Release. 14 
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published two pamphlets on this subject - 'Industry and the graduate' and 'A career 
for the graduate in industry'. "" 
Both the TUC and FBI took an interest in the student award system, again for 
different reasons. The TUC's policy was still premised upon- the principles of 
improving access and ensuring the grants were adequate to allow students to accept a 
university place. In June, 1952, Florence Horsburgh announced the removal of 
restrictions on the number of awards in order that all those offered a university place 
would receive fmancial assistance. At the same time, the means-test would be 
tightened. Although the TUC was disappointed with the more severe means-test, it 
welcomed the new policy which would facilitate access to higher education and thus 
stimulate expansion. "' - The policy would have been less satisfactory for the FBI, 
which was already unhappy with the operation of the means-test. The Federation's 
concern reflected the impact of means-testing grants on parents in the higher income 
brackets. " Nevertheless, it had decided not to complain to the Ministry of Education, 
on the basis that such an approach would be inappropriate since the government had 
recently granted income tax relief, and was currently in pursuit of an economy drive 
of which the FBI highly approved. "' 
These issues were raised once again at the end of the 1950s when the government 
appointed the Committee on Grants to Students (Anderson Committee). For the TUC, 
access to higher education was still the crucial issue. Although the number of 
university places had been increased throughout the decade and awards had improved 
Ibid.; D/4537, Minutes of Education Committee on 7 Dec. 1954, p. 2,20 Dec. 1954. 
139 MRC, MSS. 292/81 1/11, TUC Educ. Ctee 10,3 July 1952, pp. 66-67. A 140 MRC, MSS. 200/F/I/l/VoI 117, Dn308 
, Minutes of Education Committee on 12 Feb. 1952; p. 3. 141 Ibid. 
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in value, the TUC noted the persistence of obstacles to higher education. - More pupils 
held the qualifications for university than places existed, while there were 
geographical discrepancies in the number of awards offered by different local 
education authorities. More fundamentally, the TUC believed that inadequate 
standards in some secondary schools prevented many children from fully developing 
their academic potential. To address this latter issue, it asked for increases in the 
maintenance allowances for children remaining at school beyond the minimum 
leaving age in order to encourage them to do so. It also sought a further increase in 
maintenance awards to encourage young people to take up university places. 142 
The FBI was also critical of regional disparities in the number of awards for higher 
education, and requested harmonisation of the criteria for receipt of awards in 
different local education authorities. It recommended a 50 per cent increase in the 
number of awards that were made by the Ministry of Education in order to combat 
these geographical differences and to make the selection process fairer. It also wanted 
the means-test to be abolished and replaced by a system whereby the value of the 
award would be added to parents' taxable incomes. "" The ABCC also disliked the 
means-test but was cautious about its abolition on the grounds of cost. Hence, the 
Chambers of Conunerce suggested that the goverment hold an enquiry 'with a view 
to alleviating hardship among professional men and those in the "middle income 
groups", who at present find it almost impossible to educate their children without 
considerable sacrifice'. " 
142 MRC' MSS. 292/811/15, TUC Educ. Ctee 4/1 (amended), Memorandum of evidence to the Ministry 
of Education Committee on Grants to Students, 9 Dec. 1958. 
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The expansion of higher education - had been an important issue for the TUC 
throughout this decade. It complained of shortages of graduates for industry and 
commerce, in public administration and the social services. "' In March 1957, its 
representatives met with Treasury officials and Sir Keith Murray of the University 
Grants Committee to discuss expansion in the universities. The TUC was reassured at 
this meeting that policies were already being considered to promote the development 
of higher education. '" 
The 1959 Crowther Report also criticised the inadequate number of university 
places. ""' Subsequently, the Prime Minister appointed the Robbins Committee on 
Higher Education in February 1961 to review and make recommendations on the 
long-term development of higher education. The TUC's evidence to the Robbins 
Committee was highly critical in its tone. It noted the inadequacy of provision in 
terms of the number of places and facilities. "" The Robbins Report was published in 
October 1963. It advocated the large-scale expansion of university education in order 
to ensure that all suitably qualified persons would be able to obtain a place. "' Hence, 
it anticipated that current numbers would double over the next ten years through the 
growth of existing universities and the'upgrading of approximately ten further 
education institutions. "' The government quickly endorsed the Robbins Committee's 
recommendations. "' The report was also warmly welcomed by the TUC. 1'2 
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Industry's response to the Report is not recorded although one commentator has noted 
its lack of influence: Carswell makes the point that 'though industry had three seats 
on the Committee, its voice was little heard'. "' 
Developments also took place in higher technological education during this period. 
Ile Labour government's 1951 White Paper on this subject was largely endorsed by 
the incoming Conservative administration. The one exception was the proposal for a 
Royal College of Technologists, which was dropped in preference for the 
establishment of at least one institution of university stature, which would specialise 
in technology. " The Conservatives also chose to develop higher technological 
education through the expansion of sandwich courses to address the shortage of 
technologists. "' This provoked a prolonged debate with the FBI over funding. The 
Ministry of Education wanted industry to pay tuition fees and also maintenance grants 
to employees who took sandwich courses. "" The NACEIC set up a sub-committee to 
review the provision of sandwich courses. Its report endorsed the Ministry's earlier 
contention that employers should pay their workers' tuition fees and their full salary 
for the time that was spent in college. The TUC was quite happy with these findings, 
but the FBI was less so. It argued that, in the past, employers had supported sandwich 
course students financially in order to get the courses underway; now that sandwich 
courses were an established method of providing higher technological education, the 
FBI believed that financial responsibility lay with the Ministry of Education or the 
Committee on Higher Education, 10 Dec. 1963. 
153 J Carswell, Government and the universities in Britain, p. 3 1. '-" PRO, ED 46n54, Higher Technological Education - Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of 
Commons, II June 1952. 
155 PRO, ED 46/504, Note of a discussion with representatives of the F. B. I. on sandwich training and 
education, 3 Feb. 1955. 
156 Ibid., G Withers, Education Section, Technical Department, FBI to F Bray, Under Secretary, 
Ministry of Education, 14 July 1955; Draft minutes of FBI Education Committee meeting, 4 Oct. 1955. 
180 
local education authorities. "' The Ministry rejected the FBI's argument, but was 
forced to accept a compromise when the Federation announced that industry would 
only be recruiting those students who had already completed their studies. 
Subsequent talks produced an arrangement wher& the, FBI would encourage firms to 
support employers on sandwich courses if they could afford to do so while the 
Ministry would recommend that local education authorities should provide 
maintenance to sandwich course students who did not receive financial support form 
their employers. "' 
Conclusion 
In spite of repeated expenditure cuts in education, the sum of development in the 
provision of state education by the end of 1964 conjures up a strong impression of 
real progress, particularly after 1956. The main points of contention between Labour 
and Conservatives concerned comprehensive schools and private education, but these 
were not so important for the representatives of industry or labour. While the TUC 
did adopt the policy of comprehensive schools, it did so only slowly and was not 
openly supportive before the 1960s. A number of other issues were regarded more 
sc-riously and merited a great deal more attention. Often these caused disagreement 
between organisations themselves and with the government. Nonetheless, unlike 
other aspects of the welfare state, a degree of consensus did exist by the end of this 
period. The TUC's constant demands for a school leaving age of sixteen now had the 
157 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/2/C966 pt. 5, Appendix to Paper D/160 (FBI) - Finance for Professional 
Sandwich Courses, p. 1, undated. 
158 MRC, MSS. 200/B/3/3/264 pt. 1, Finance of Advanced Sandwich Courses - report by the F. B. I. Education Conunittee, Jan. 1958, pp. 1-2. 
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endorsement of the BEC, and also the FBI, albeit only as a voluntary initiative. 
County colleges were still resisted by the industrial organisations, but plans for the 
expansion of day release were formulated in a tripartite forum. At the same time, the 
reasons behind their interest in education remained very different. The TUC's interest 
stemmed from a desire to ensure adequate provision for the population as a whole for 
the benefit of each person's own well-being. Both the Bk' , and FBI were clearly 
motivated by how industry could benefit from the state education system, and perhaps 
with wider concerns about economic and industrial performance. 
Both the BEC and FBI sought to develop links between industry and education, 
and expressed the view that this was a desirable objective. Both considered at length 
the benefits of staff exchanges, although they avoided making a firm commitment to 
the widespread adoption of this policy measure. Lobbying of government ministers 
was generally the province of the TUC, and was even regarded by the FBI as 
inappropriate behaviour. The TUC sent deputations and wrote to Ministers of 
Education regularly. Access was readily granted and communications were always 
acknowledged but there is little evidence that these approaches had much impact. 
Ministers seem to have paid little attention to the TUC's complaints, especially when 
these concerned government spending. 
The TUC's lack of success in influencing goverment policy and the FBI's lack of 
interest in securing consultation with ministers lends little support to the concept of 
'corporate bias'. Of more interest in connection with education policy is the role of 
government committees and enquiries. Through the Central Advisory Council for 
Education (England), Conservative governments encouraged a debate about the 
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direction of education policy with frequent investigations, the outcome of which was 
generally accepted by the goverrunent. Representatives of industry and labour 
submitted evidence to these enquiries on a regular basis. - 
While the impact of these 
groups is difficult to assess, the enquiries provided an invaluable opportunity in 
allowing these bodies to express their, views in an environment conducive to reform. 
Their representation on government committee may itself have been a product of 
'corporate bias' but, once again, there is little to suggest that the peak level 
representatives of capital and labour were elevated to the status of 'governing bodies' 
in the process. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusions 
In the course of this thesis, we have surveyed in some detail the attitudes of the TUC, 
BEC and FBI towards wartime social reconstruction and their responses to the 
postwar welfare state. This now permits us to draw some conclusions about the 
governments" relations with these groups in a hitherto neglected area of policy, to 
examine the implications of their participation in policy-making, and to explore their 
views on state welfare in connection with the concept of a welfare consensus. The 
thesis has sought to identify the existence of a welfare consensus among these interest 
groups on the premise that some adherents of the consensus thesis have considered 
consultation of them to be of significant importance during this period. ' 
Keith Middlemas' work remains the most thorough analysis of state-interest 
groups relations in terms of its substantial empirical element. 2 Like other corporatist 
theorists, Middlemas has looked only at industrial and economic policy in any great 
detail. The application of his theory of corporate bias to social policy thus tests its 
validity in relation to areas of policy that have been traditionally of -less interest to 
corporate theorists. It also holds the potential to explain government consultation of 
primarily industrial interest groups on social policy issues. Ultimately only a tentative 
case can be made for the existence of corporate bias. It is difficult to distinguish a 
pattern that encapsulates government attitudes towards consultation in all aspects of 
state welfare. Indeed this presumes state welfare to be characterised by a single, 
uniform set of values unaffected by political party, time or other external influences. 
1P Addison, 'The road from 1945'; D Kavanagh &P Morris, Consensus politics. 2K Middlemas, Politics in industrial society and Power, competition and the state, vols. I and 11. 
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Certainly, there was a great deal of communication between governments and the 
TUC, BEC and FBI during this period, bearing in mind the limited nature of the FBI's 
interest. In some respects this reflects the existence of corporate bias where 'fruitfid 
access to government' stemmed from acknowledgement of these groups' status in 
postwar Britain rather than their capacity to contribute significantly to the content of 
policies. 3 There were elements of this in some consultation by government, 
appointments to committees and working parties, and in the willingness, of 
government ministers to meet with these groups upon request but it was not always in 
evidence. 
The TUC in particular benefited from access to government, and continued to use 
deputations on a regular basis to gain knowledge of the govenunent's plans and to 
influence policy in accordance with its own views. Ministers in Pensions and Social 
Security, Health and Education all met with TUC representatives at intervals, and 
only seldom rejected its requests for consultation. The BEC approached government 
less often, while the Federation of British Industries disliked this practice and 
considered it to be inappropriate behaviour. 4 The BEC and FBI also chose not to be 
involved in health policy in any way outside of the industrial health services, so did 
riot take advantage of access to the Ministry of Health. The government also 
instigated consultation, though less frequently. This was more the case with regard to 
social security and education than health. It often reflected government requirements 
for advice, support and assistance, evident in the preparation of the 1952 National 
Insurance and Family Allowances Act, earnings-related retirement pensions and 
3K Middlemas, Power, competition and the state, voL I, p. 344. 4S Blank, Industry and government, p. 77. 
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unemployment and sickness benefit, the financial arrangements for sandwich courses, 
and provision for the expansion of day release for young workers. 
Direct contact with government ministers allowed policy to be made with 
knowledge of the views of these interests, but membership of, and the opportunity to 
submit evidence to, committees investigating particular aspects of social policy 
provided an invaluable prospect of influencing policies which were already under 
review. The war itself created such an environment across the range of welfare 
policies, but after 1945 government gained more control of the reform process. For 
this purpose, advisory bodies were set up for social security and pensions, health and 
education. These were complemented by a number of ad hoc committees and 
working parties in different sectors. Govenunent policy on industrial representation 
on advisory committees was at times inconsistent. Participation on the National 
Insurance Advisory Committee was countered by exclusion from the Central Health 
Services Council. Opportunities did always exist, however, for these groups to 
submit evidence which in itself offered regular opportunities to influence the direction 
of policy. 
Both the TUC and BEC were represented on the National Insurance Advisory 
Committee, which was responsible for'formulating social security regulations. The 
TUC was firmly refused representation on the Central Health Services Council, which 
provoked some consternation. Bevan's reasoning behind his rejection of TUC claims 
for an appointment to the CHSC reflected the specialised medical role of the Council. 
Thus, TUC nominations to Regional Hospital Boards were for the purpose of 
representing the viewpoint of NHS patients rather than the trade union movement. 
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This signif ied a new role for the TUC, reaching beyond its remit as a purely sectional 
producer organisation. In education, the Central Advisory Council for Education 
(England) was reconstituted for each of its enquiries; only the 1957 Crowther 
Committee on the education of fifteen to eighteen year olds included TUC 
representation. Curiously, the TUC did not pursue greater participation even though 
exclusion from the Health Services Council had met with bad grace. Besides the 
advisory councils, independent committees and working parties offered ftirther scope 
to influence government policy. During this period, these included the Percy 
Committee on Higher Technological Education, the -Phillips Committee on pensions, 
the Guillebaud Committee on the NHS, the Robbins Committee on Higher Education, 
and a number of working parties in the field of education. The TUC and BEC, and at 
times the FBI, were involved both as members and in providing evidence to various 
enquiries and investigations. 
Contact with government ministers and appointments to government committees 
may reflect the existence of corporate bias, but access was not always tantamount to 
influence. Moreover, the BEC and FBI were often unwilling to take advantage of 
access thus rendering corporate bias irrelevant in these circumstances. The 
participation of the British Employers' Confederation in policy-making was not 
merely dependent on government sanction; it also had to reflect the BEC's desire to 
be involved. This was not always evident: the Confederation ignored developments 
in social security policy once the Conservative government had been forced to 
endorse the Beveridge Report in spite of fierce early opposition to its proposals. 
Corporate bias may have permitted the BEC to take part in the formulation of health 
policy but its lack of direct interest in the NHS resulted in its exclusion from policy 
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discussions. Similarly, the FBI's views would not have been unwelcome, but the 
Federation eschewed the practice of approaching governments to apply pressure to 
implement its policy. 5 This, was exemplified by its attitude towards university 
awards: in spite of its dissatisfaction with the existing system, the FBI Education 
Committee believed that it would be unacceptable to approach government to discuss 
this matter. 
Even if corporate bias was in evidence in the practice of consultation, its 
significance is diminished if the resulting consultation and participation did not allow 
interest groups a measure of influence over the direction of government policy. The 
evidence is often to the contrary. Barberis and May have observed that 'access has 
never been any guarantee that influence will be exerted on goverment poliCy, ). 6 
Certainly, there are few signs that they did actively affect policy. The TUC failed in 
its campaigns for subsistence benefits, the abolition of health service charges, and to 
secure an increase in the school leaving age during this period. Similarly, from an 
opposite point of view, the BEC was unable to prevent plans for postwar reform of 
social security and the raising of the leaving age to fifteen. At times, influence was 
exercised negatively: the TUC's attitude prevented governments from increasing the 
age of retirement, while the BEC managed to prevent arrangements for making 
occupational pensions transferable in the 1950s. This role is suggestive of Addison's 
labelling of these organisations; as 'veto groups' than 'architects of policy'. 7 In some 
senses he is correct, but this concept still conjures up the image of passive groups 
which were not actively involved in the social policy sphere. It may fit the BEC 
5 Ibid. 
6P Barberis &T May, Government, industry andpolitical economy, p. 97. 7P Addison, 'Tle road from 1945', p. I S. 
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better than the TUC, which spent the whole of this period seeking improvements in 
state welfare. Perhaps then, it is Andrew Taylor's concept of 'inclusion' in his 
discussion of the trade unions that seems to be most apposite to both labour and 
industrial interests. Here 'unions achieve a representational status, are consulted 
frequently by government but are excluded from effective decision-making'. 8 
It must be bome in mind these groups often displayed views that contradicted each 
other. Beer points out that if the government had tried to meet the demands of the 
TUC in relation to welfare, it would have been unlikely to secure the consent of 
business when trying to create the necessary conditions for wage restraint. 9 
Combining this with the influence of other groups such -as the British Medical 
Association, it becomes difficult to attribute direct influence to any single 
organisation. Other factors determining policy include public opinion which was a 
key factor in secondary education reforms in the late 1950s, electoral considerations, 
and the economic- climate. During much of this period, expenditure considerations 
predominated in social policy decisions, which made many of the TUC's demands 
untenable. 10 Equally, BEC anti-welfare state sentiment had to be contained in view of 
the popularity of government welfare measures. 
Conservatism on the part of these organisations also impeded their ability to affect 
reform. The BEC's formidable reluctance to accept any measure of social policy 
reform during the war prevented it from influencing the direction it took, although its 
views were so negative that their acceptability was unlikely. The TUC accepted the 
1A Taylor, Trade unions andpolitics, p. 97. 9S Beer, British politics in the collectivist age, p. 3 67. 10 J Cronin, The politics ofstate expansion, p. 5. 
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Beveridge model of social security so resolutely that neither it nor the BEC were able 
to make a positive contribution towards the debate on pensions in the 1950s. The 
TUC was also reluctant to accept eamings-relation in either pensions or other national 
insurance benefits for the same reasons.. This tendency was also apparent also in 
other areas: TUC preoccupation with health service charges prevented it from 
recognising more fundamental sources of inequality in health care. In education, the 
BEC only slowly sought to establish links with schools and the TUC only seems to 
have recognised the divisive nature of schooling with the results of outside research 
and growing public dissatisfaction. 
Direct influence may be difficult to detect but these groups were substantially 
involved in the social policy sphere, and formulated detailed policy documents 
accordingly; the TUC was particularly rigorous in its research. Such documents and 
communication with the government provide a valuable insight into their attitudes 
towards state welfare, which permits us to assess existence, or otherwise, of a 
producer-based consensus that encompassed the welfare state. 
The TUC was, without doubt, a strong supporter of state welfare. This is evident 
from wartime campaigns for reconstruction, and its welcome of government 
initiatives in social policy. The Trades Union Congress had been lobbying 
governments for social security and health reforms, and improvements to the state 
education system before the war. It eagerly grasped the opportunities offered by the 
war to express widely its views in support of extensive social reform. Indeed, it was 
the TUC that inadvertently stimulated the range of plans for postwar reform when the 
government appointed the Beveridge Committee in order to, placate the unions. 
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During the %&-ar, the TUC prepared detailed policy documents, organised campaigns to 
secure public support for welfare reforms, and met with government ministers to urge 
them to proceed with reforms in line with TUC policy. It adopted the Beveridge 
Report as its model for social security and pensions provision, and supported the 
promise of secondary education for all, and universal, free health services. 
The potential support that this lends to a consensual picture disappears upon closer 
inspection, however. In spite of this obvious desire for social reforms, the TUC did 
not necessarily support all aspects of government policy. Various proposals contained 
in the Beveridge Report, the White Papers on social insurance and health and the 
1944 Education Act attracted TUC criticism. These included the incorporation of 
workmen's compensation into national insurance, the transitional period for the 
introduction of retirement pensions, the maintenance of the voluntary hospitals, and 
the government's failure to make a firm commitment to raising the school leaving 
age. But more fandamentallY9 the TUC believed that the Coalition's programme for 
social reform was lacking in precision, did not go far enough, and was particularly 
dissatisfactory in respect of its timetable. These reservations set the stage for the 
TUC's campaign in all aspects of government welfare in the postwar years. While 
welcoming developments thus far, the TUC was certainly not satisfied with the 
progress that was made during the war. 
If closer examination of TUC policy is necessary to detect only qualified support 
of government policy, a mere glance at BEC documents for this period instantly 
reveals its deep-seated aversion to the very principle of social reform. If the war did 
represent a watershed in attitudes towards social reform, it omitted the BEC, whose 
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earlier antagonism towards government welfare in the interwar period was sustained. 
'Me sole effect of the increasing popularity of social reform on the BEC was to cause 
intense irritation that its views were so out of step with the public mood to the extent 
that they had to be contained. Historians have tended to focus on the views of the 
National Policy for Industry group in an attempt to sustain the impression of social 
reform as an uncontested objective, and to lend support to the consensus thesis. It is 
hoped that the BECs much more negative views will now be given due consideration. 
Tle Confederation may not have been particularly representative of British industry 
but it, %-as the only industrial organisation to make representations to government, and 
to be consulted on questions pertaining to social policy after the war had ended. In 
this respect, its views had the capacity to be more influential in the long term. 
TUC and BEC social policies were clearly in conflict at the end of the war, and the 
early postwar period characterised by economic problems after 1947 was not 
conducive to change. The TUC welcomed the Attlee government's programme for 
social reform, and of its underlying principles: egalitarianism, universality and 
comprehensiveness. Still, even a Labour government precipitated complaints after 
refusing to pay social security benefits for an unlimited duration, failing to introduce 
h, mlth centres, and procrastinating over the raising of the school leaving age. 
Impatience with goverrunent policy grew at annual congresses but a superficial 
consensus prevailed owing only to the TUC's reluctance to criticise overtly the 
Labour government's policies. Jim Tomlinson has recently highlighted the austerity 
that chamcterised Labour's welfare state, which contrasts with prevailing images of 
extensive and radical reform. " In the 1940s, the TUC was aware of financial 
11 J Tomlinson, 'Why so austere? The British welfare state of the 1940s', p. 63. 
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stringency in social policy but was reluctant to draw attention to it. The ldck of 
substance in this consensus would be revealed immediately when the Conservatives 
won the 1951 election. 
Once more this rather tentative consensus is finther undermined when the BEC's 
views are taken into account. 'Me Confederation was even less enamoured of 
government social policy in the early postwar years. Its wartime reluctance to speak 
out on the subject ended in 1947 when, owing to the economic situation, it asked the 
government to cancel the implementation of social security and health reforms, and to 
postpone the raising of the school leaving age to which it was opposed in principle. 
In its dealings with the National Insurance Advisory Committee, the BEC also sought 
to increase restrictions in the national insurance scheme in order to reduce entitlement 
to benefits, prevent abuse, and minimise its cost. 
This mood continued to characterise the BEC's perspective on social policy 
throughout the 1950s while the TUC, having lost the need to support the goverrunent, 
irrespective of its actions, became much more critical. Accordingly, signs of 
consensus were disappearing rapidly. In particular, government spending, or the lack 
ol" it, was the greatest source of TUC discontent with all aspects of state welfare. 
Tbis, in turn, undermined many projects to which the unions attached great 
importance. Government refusal to increase the Exchequer's contribution to the 
national insurance ftmd was seen to prevent the maintenance of national insurance 
benefits and pensions at a subsistence level, a concept which had been scarcely 
implemented before increases in the cost of living rendered it redundant. Neither did 
the Conservatives introduce health centres, while adding insult to injury by regularly 
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increasing NHS charges and the NES element in the national insurance contribution. 
The fact that the Labour government had introduced charges was of little import as 
these had been considered a temporary expedient under Labour. The school building 
programme %-as a further source of concern after 1951, though it had also incited 
complaints beforehand. Once more, inadequate government spending was seen to be 
the cause of overcrowded classes, poor standards of accommodation and a shortage of 
teachers, which threatened to undermine the concept of free secondary education for 
all. 
While the TUC was fi-ustrated at the government's lack of development in the 
social services, the BEC was taking quite the opposite tack. TUC policies reflected 
Beveridgian principles of equality and social justice, but the BEC was motivated only 
by self-interest and a desire to contain the scope of state"welfare as much as it could. 
Economic objectives rather than social concerns represented the only justification for 
any expansion or reform of state welfare. These sentiments were expressed in 
meetings with the Minister of National Insurance in which the BEC urged the 
expansion of means-tested national assistance instead of offering subsistence benefits 
under the national insurance scheme. In its evidence to the Phillips Committee, the 
BEC expressed its distaste for the effects of state welfare in creating a population that 
was excessively dependent upon the government, and deplored the principle of 
subsistence benefits. The Confederation used the National Insurance Advisory 
Committee to oppose regulations, which would improve the national insurance 
scheme from the perspective of its beneficiaries, unless these also served the interests 
of employers. Thus, it opposed more restrictive conditions on unemployment benefit 
for short-time workers as they would create pressure on employers to organise 
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working patterns to permit maximum entitlement to unemployment benefit. In 1963, 
the BEC made its feelings on state social security quite clear: in discussions with the 
government and the TUC on the introduction of earnings-related unemployment and 
sickness benefit, the BEC refused to consider the social advantages of this provision, 
and insisted the proposals must be judged in terms of their economic benefits only. 
It was only in education that significant changes in the BEC's attitude took place 
during this period. Before 1959, it was typically antagonistic to measures of 
expansion in state education that did not offer direct benefits to industry. Even when 
advantages were obvious, it was very ambivalent towards further education for young 
people during working hours, and lent only qualified support for the expansion of day 
release on the grounds that employers might find it too costly, and that workers might 
choose courses from which their employers would derive no tangible benefit. The 
prospect of a school leaving age of sixteen was particularly bitterly resisted by the 
BEC, and the FBI would support only a voluntary policy for the extension of 
compulsory schooling. After 1959, BEC attitudes towards education became much 
more positive, for reasons that are not clear. It accepted the Crowther Report's 
proposal for full-time education to the age of sixteen and it was more favourable to 
the expansion of day release than the FBI. Prevarication over the practicalities of 
staff exchange schemes with educational establishments ended as the BEC launched 
its own pilot scheme. This much more interventionist stance can be detected in 
relation to education only, and contrasts significantly with its opposition to 
improvements to the national insurance scheme. Hence, it is unwise to conflate 
different sectors of welfare in the search for a wider consensus. 
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Education policy witnessed growing compatibility of industrial and labour views, 
but in other spheres they continued to be directly opposed to each other. Furthen-nore, 
the motives that underpinned their respective interest in social policy also remained 
very different. Although labour market considerations affected the TUCs capacity to 
campaign for better retirement pensions, its social policies were generally informed 
by humane and social concerns. These were seldom evident in the policies of either 
the BEC or the FBI, which continued to be motivated by economic and industrial 
interests only, and did not appear to recognise or accept the social objectives of state 
welfare during this period. For each of these groups, the welfare state was understood 
in no broader context than as a range of social services, which they studied in 
isolation from each other. The TUC at least understood and endorsed its wider goals 
- of equality and social justice - but these were rejected outright by the industrial 
organisations. Nowhere was this more clearly expressed than in the BEC's 
contributions to the discussions on earnings-related national insurance. Therefore, the 
supposed welfare consensus can scarcely claim to have included either organised 
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